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Case No. ~J - a 0 '7 ~ d i 
Peitition for Breach of Contract, 
Tortious Interference with Contract, 
and for Declaratory Judgment 
.JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
COMES NOW, plaintiff George Martin, personally and on behalf of Martin 
Custom Homes, L.L.c. as a member, and in support of his Petition for Breach of 
Contract and Intentional Interference with Contract against Defendant Ed Smith 
personally, and his Petition for Declaratory Judgment against Camas County, by 
and through its duly elected Board of Commissioners, does state following: 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 
& 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
1. George Martin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff' jointly with 
Martin Custom Homes, L.L.c.) is a resident of and owner of real property situated 
in the County of Camas, State of Idaho. 
2. Martin Custom Homes, L.L.C (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff' 
jointly with George Martin) is an Idaho Limited Liability Company in good 
standing. 
3. Defendant Ed Smith (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant Smith") is 
a resident of Camas County, State of Idaho. 
4. Defendant Ed Smith, is licensed by the State of Idaho as a Real Estate 
Broker doing business as Town and Country Realtors, and whose business address 
is 514 Soldier Road, Fairfield, Idaho 83327. 
5. All acts and activities alleged to have occurred in this Complaint 
occurred within County of Camas, State of Idaho. 
6. Damages claimed by Plaintiff are within the jurisdictional amount 
required to be heard in the District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Camas. 
7. The 5th District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Camas, has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 67-5270, 67-5273, 67-
5278 and section 1-705. 
WHEREFORE, this honorable court having jurisdiction Plaintiff prays this 
court hear and determine the controversies presented herein. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
8. On or about September 8, 2004 Plaintiff entered into an agreement 
nith Defendant Smith, in Camas County, for which good and valuable consideration 
\ 
was exchanged, whereby Defendant was to act as Plaintiff's "Exclusive Buyer's 
Broker" (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency Agreement") for purposes of 
purchase of vacant land in Camas County Idaho. 
9. Defendant Smith, by entry into said agreement, owed Plaintiff certain 
duties and obligations, including but not limited to the following; 
a. To perform the terms of the written agreement 
b. To exercise reasonable skill and care 
c. To promote the best interests of the Plaintiff in good faith, honesty 
and fair dealing including, but not limited to 
(i) Disclosing to the Plaintiff all adverse material facts actually 
known or which reasonably should have been known by the 
defendant; 
(ii) Seeking a property for purchase at a price and under terms 
and conditions acceptable to the buyer and assisting in the negotiation 
therefore 
d. To immediately, upon receiving any offer to purchase signed and 
dated by plaintiff, provide a copy of the offer to purchase to the buyer as a 
receipt 
e. To make certain that all offers to purchase real property or any 
interest therein are in writing and contain all terms and conditions of the real 
estate transaction as directed by the plaintiff 
f. Any and all fiduciary duties. 
10. On or about September 8, 2004 property for purchase was located, 
then owned by Ron and Deborah Pauls, Husband and Wife, (hereinafter, "Sellers"), 
which said property is situated in Camas County, Idaho, and fully described in the 
"Legal Description" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
11. Terms for an offer were defined by Plaintiff and submitted in writing 
to Defendant Smith. 
12. Defendant Smith thereafter failed to perform the terms of the written 
agreement; to exercise reasonable skill and care; to promote the best interest of 
Plaintiff in good faith, honesty and fair dealing; failed to notify Plaintiff of all 
adverse facts known or which reasonably should have been known by Defendant 
Smith; failed to make certain the offer to purchase real property contained all the 
terms and conditions as directed by Plaintiff. 
\ 
13. Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant Smith's 
breach of agency contract, suffered monetary damages in an amount exceeding Ten 
Thousand Dollars (S 1 0,(00). 
14. Defendant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law 
causing Plaintiff to incur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-
120 and 12-121. 
15. Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for 
its likely consequences. Defendant Smith acted with an extremely harmful state of 
mind ·whether his conduct was malicious or grossly negligent. 
WHERFORE, Plaintiff prays this court enter judgment against Defendant 
Smith in an amount in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars SIO,OOO for monetary 
damages, for punitive damages and for attorney's fees. 
COUNT II 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
16. Upon further negotiations Seller and Plaintiff entered into a contract 
to purchase real property (hereinafter the "Real Estate Contract") subject to a 
series of terms and conditions including a "contingent on rezone and replat" clause. 
17. Defendant Smith knowing of the contract between Plaintiff and Seller, 
and the specific terms and conditions thereof, set about a course of action that 
further breached his own contractual duties to Plaintiff and intentionally interfered 
with the contract for purchase of real property with Seller by taking all efforts 
possible to prevent the real property in question from being rezoned in a manner 
satisfactory to Plaintiff and otherwise intentionally obstructing closure on the Real 
Estate Contract. 
18. Defendant Smith actively enticed Sellers to breach the Real Estate 
Contract thereby directly causing Sellers to declare the Real Estate Contract null 
and void thereby breaching said Real Estate Contract. 
19. In addition to the above specifically described intentional interference 
with contract by enticing Sellers to breach the contract to purchase real property 
Defendant Smith continued his malicious and illegal conduct under this count and 
in his ostensibly official capacity, as plead in Count III below, by acting as Chair of 
the body ostensibly acting as Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission that 
apparently recommended amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
Ordinance. 
\ 
20. Plaintiff, seeking to mitigate his damages and take advantage of the 
residual value of his contractual rights, (i.e. diminished potential development rights 
and or resale value in the real property) waived all conditions, terms and 
contingencies and closed on the real property in question on or about September 26, 
2005. 
21. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Smith's intentional 
interference with the Real Estate Contract with Sellers that led to a breach of said 
contract Plaintiff suffered monetary damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars 
(SIO,OOO). 
22. Defendant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law 
causing Plaintiff to incur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-
120 and 12-121. 
23. Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for 
its likely consequences. Defendant Smith acted with an extremely harmful state of 
mind whether his conduct was malicious or grossly negligent. 
WHERFORE, Plaintiff prays this court enter judgment against Defendant 
Smith in an amount in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 for monetary 
damages, for punitive damages and for attorney's fees. 
COUNT III 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
OR IN THE AL TERNERA TIVE 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Factual Allegations Common to All Legal Theories 
24. During the period and within the time frame addressed by this 
Petition, Camas County, by and through its duly elected Board of Commissioners, 
and through the members of a body ostensibly acting as, but not lawfully organized, 
Planning and Zoning Commission, undertook to exercise the mandatory powers 
authorized Title 67 Chapter 65, commonly referred to as the Local Land Use 
Planning Act, by amending the Camas County Comprehensive Plan, the Land Use 
Map and Zoning Ordinance, text and Zoning Map, and did thereby uniformly and 
systematically up-zone real property owned by various members, relations and 
clients of members of the Board and Commission, and downzone real property 
owned by Plaintiff. 
25. The dates of approval or recommendation of the various aspects of 
the Comprehensive Plan, Land lIse Map, Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map, by 
\ 
the unlawfull}' organized Planning and Zoning Commission, are difficult if not 
impossible to discern because no proper record was created or maintained. 
26. The Camas Count}' Board of Commissioners did adopt an amended 
Zoning Ordinance No. 153, on April 18, 2007, but failed to attach a cop}' of the 
ordinance, text or map. Curiously, Zoning Ordinance Map No. 150, was adopted by 
the Board prior to the text, on March 29, 2007, which did not include legal 
description of the various zones. Also on March 29, 2007 the Board passed a 
resolution adopted a Comprehensive Land Use Map, but failed again to provide 
legal description of the areas contemplated for future land uses. No written record 
of recommendation from the unlawfull}' formed Planning and Zoning Commission 
was created. 
Conflict of Interest 
27. Defendant Smith, during the period addressed in this Petition, acted 
as an appointed government official serving on a bod}' that purported to be a duly 
empowered Camas Count}' Planning and Zoning Commission. 
28. Defendant Smith owns, and frequentl}' buys and sells, numerous 
parcels of real propert}' situated within Camas County, Idaho. 
29. Defendant Smith is actively engaged in the purchase and sale of real 
property situated in Camas County both for his own account and as a broker agent 
for the purpose of generating income through commission. During the period 
addressed by this Petition, it believed Defendant Smith has purchased, sold or been 
associated with the purchase or sale as a broker agent numerous parcels of real 
property. 
30. Defendant Smith and other members of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and Board of County Commissioners had an economic interest in the 
outcome of this legislative and quasi-judicial activity under Idaho Code Section 67-
6506 and therefore suffered a fatal conflict of interest requiring recusal in their 
capacity as a member(s) of the bod}' purporting to be the Camas County Planning 
and Zoning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners. 
Planning and Zoning Commission Lacked Jurisdiction 
31. During the period addressed by this Petition the Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission did not legally exist and/or was operating without 
authority in that no Ordinance was duly passed by the Board of County 
Commissioners creating a Planning and Zoning Commission and no organizational 
papers or bylaws had been adopted as required by Idaho Section 67-6504. 
Therefore, any and all acts dependant on a yalid amended Comprehensive Plan, 
including an amendcd zoning ordinance are without legal authority. 
Fatal Procedural Infirmities (Due Process Violations) 
32. The Camas Count)' Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to follow the notice and hearing procedures required 
by Idaho Code in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Ordinance. 
33. The Camas Count)' Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to keep a transcribable verbatim record of 
proceedings as required by Idaho Code in amending the Comprehensive Plan. 
34. The Camas Count)' Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to keep a transcribable verbatim record of 
proceedings as required by Idaho Code in amending the Zoning Ordinance. 
35. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to comply with the substantive dictates of the Local 
Land Use Planning Act. 
36. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed, in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning 
Ordinance, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law or other documentation 
or record of recommendations as required by I.e. 67-6508(b) thereby rendering 
impossible a meaningful review whether the substantive requirements and 
mandatory Planning duties under Idaho Code were adhered to. 
37. The Camas County Board of Commissioners, as governing board, 
failed to remand and re-notice public hearing after material changes were made to 
the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. 
38. Defendant Camas County, acting through its duly elected Board of 
County Commissioners acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law causing 
Plaintiff to incur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Section 12-117. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this court to enter its Judgment declaring 
null and void all activities and ostensibly official actions under LLUPA taken by the 
Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of Commissioners 
on and after September 8, 2004, to restrain Defendant from processing land use 
applications under the ostensibly adopted amended Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance and to enter judgment in an amount reasonably required for 
Plaintiff's attorney fees. 
\ 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY AT LA\V 
I GEORGE MARTIN, the Petitioner herein, declare under oath that the above is true to the 
best of my knowledge. 
st Dated this 1 day of May, 2007. 
Petitioner 
Gd¥TM~T~ 
State of Idaho ) 
) 
County of Blaine ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by GEORGE MARTIN, a person to me known, 
tht?. 1
st 
da .-ofMay, 20.0.7. 
,,/-;7. .4.,.-----
Ncita\ Public / ... ~ 
s~J0 
My commission expires: /,,-:;; ~ }; - d [; I d 
ZACHARY GREGERSEN 
NOfarypubllc 
State of Idaho 
- - -
\1 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Tel: 208 622 7878 
Fax: 2086227129 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
r::- ~LED '7 ~- ~ 0 
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CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacity, 
KEN BAXTROM, 































Case No. ~,,~ d. () 0'1 d ~ 
APPLICATION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
and PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
CO;\1ES NOW Plaintiff, George Martin, through counsel and files this his 
application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and in 
support thereof states as follows, 
1. Plaintiff has filed, contemporaneously herewith, a Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment against Camas County requesting this court to declare null 
and void the actions of the Board of County Commissioners and Planning and 
Zoning Commission in adopting an Amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
Ordinance as in violation of I.e. TitI~ 67 Chapter 65, commonly referred to as the 
Local Land Use Planning Act. (LLUPA). 
2. Plaintiff's Petition alleges certain members of the Planning and 
Zoning Commission and Board of County Commissioner's illegally acted under the 
influence of conflict of interest; and further alleges that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission was not lawfully formed and therefore lacked power to make the 
required recommendations under LLUPA; and that the procedure followed by the 
Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of County Commissioners was so ripe 
with infirmities that Plaintiff's Due Process rights were violated. Procedural 
infirmities alleged include, 
a. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners failed to follow the notice and 
hearing procedures required by Idaho Code in amending the 
Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Ordinance. 
b. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners failed to keep a transcribable 
verbatim record of proceedings as required by Idaho Code in 
amending the Comprehensive Plan. 
c. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners failed to keep a transcribable 
verbatim record of proceedings as required by Idaho Code in 
amending the Zoning Ordinance. 
d. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners failed to comply with the 
substantive dictates of the Local Land Use Planning Act. 
e. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners failed, in amending the 
Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Ordinance, to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or other documentation 
or record of recomme~dations as required by I.e. 67-6508(b) 
thereby rendering impossible a meaningful review whether the 
substantive requirements and mandatory Planning duties 
under Idaho Code were adhered to. 
\ 
f. The Camas County Board of Commissioners, as governing 
board, failed to remand and re-notice public hearing after 
material changes were made to the Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance. 
3. The impact and effect: of the amended Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance is to up-zGne under the Zoning Ordinance, more than twenty 
thousand acres of real property from Agricultural Zoning, wherein one home per 80 
acres could be built to densities ranging from one home per 20 acres up to four 
homes per acre while reclassifYing the 180 acres owned by Plaintiff, from seven per 
acre under the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map to a maximum of one home per 
acre. 
4. During the procedurally improper rezoning and reclassification of 
land under the Comprehensive Plan real property owned by Defendant Ed Smith 
was up-zoned or favorably rezoned, including real property located in, 
a. Aspen View Subdivision that had been zoned Agricultural, maximum 
density one home per 80 acres, was rezoned to Low Density 
Residential with a maximum of one home per acre, 
b. Lots in Smoky Dome Subdivision were up-zoned to higher density 
residential or rezoned from residential to Commercial. 
5. During the procedurally improper rezoning and reclassification of 
land under the Comprehensive Plan Defendant Ken Baxtrom, the owner and 
applicant for GamlaTunnland Subdivision, while serving as Camas County 
Commissioner, caused unauthorized, unadjudicated road improvement to be made, 
at tax payer expense, to enhance access and value of Baxtrom's property, and 
further purchased a parcel of real property in the old Townsite of Corral which 
parcel of favorably rezoned from Agricultural to Commercial. 
6. During the procedurally improper rezoning and reclassification of 
land under the Comprehensive Plan real property owned by Planning Zoning 
Member Robbie Miller was upzoned from Agricultural to High Density Residential 
with a maximum density of four units per acre. 
7. If Defendant is not reStrained from processing land use applications 
based upon the amended ccmprehensive plan and amended zoning Ordinance 
Plaintiff will suffer immediately and great or irreparably injury and loss. 
8. If Defendant is not restrained from processing land use applications 
the land itself will be altered to a state from which it cannot be restored. 
Ordinances and resolution may be passed, subdivisions of land may occur, buildings 
and roads may be built, legal obligations may arise that simply could not be 
repealed, rescinded, demolished or erased such that the status quo could not be 
restored without injunction. 
l\ 
9. Petitioner is particularly and uniquely damaged by the unlawful acts 
of Defendant because he is the Ol'mer of real property, purchased with the intention 
and purpose of subdivision and development, that has been, in effect, down-zoned 
while surrounding property, some owned by members of the Board of 
Commissioners and Planning and Zoning Commission, has been upzoned. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this court issue its order temporarily 
restraining and preliminarily enjoining Defendant Camas County from processing 
any land use applications under the amended Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Code., 
including any and all subdivision applications. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTOREY FOR PLAINTIFF 
Christopher P. Simms 
I GEORGE MARTIN, the Petitioner herein, declare under oath that the above is true to the 
best of my knowledge. 
Dated this 1st day of May, 2007. 
State of Idaho ) 
) 
County of Blaine ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by GEORGE MARTIN, a person to me known, 
this lst~dall.n .. f May, 200. 7. 




My commission expires: /;)----------------------
State Of IdOftO 
'd\~~\. 
Stephanie J. Bonney, ISB No. 603 7l\ ~ \
Carl 1. Withroe, ISB No. 7051 \.) 
MOORE Sr-vlITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St.. Suite 520 
Boise, 10 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneysfor Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his 
capacity as a memher of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 











ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 






Case No. CV -07 -24 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY, 
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF 
THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND ED 
SMITH'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Come now, Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected Board of 
County Commissioners (the Board), Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the 
Individual Commissioners), and Ed Smith in his capacity as a member of the Camas County 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL jvlEMBERS OF THE CA!VIAS 
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION -- I 
Planning and Zoning Commission (the Commission) (collectively, the County Defendants), by 
and through the County Defendants' legal counsel, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd .. and 
object to Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 
The County Defendants request that the Court deny Plaintiffs' Application and deny 
Plaintiffs any relief. The County Defendants also request Rule 11 sanctions in the form of 
reasonable costs and attorney fees because there is no reasonable basis in fact or law for 
Plaintiffs' Application. The County Defendants believe that the Court can deny the Plaintiffs' 
Application for both the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction and award 
Rule 11 sanctions based on Plaintiffs' own pleadings and without oral argument. Should the 
Plaintiffs schedule a hearing, however, the County Defendants will certainly participate. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
On May 4, 2007 Plaintiffs George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC filed a 
"Petition for Breach of Contract, Tortious Interference with Contract, and for Declaratory 
Judgment" and an "Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction." 
A. The Petition 
In their Petition, Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and tortious interference with 
contract against defendant Ed Smith from an alleged land sale gone foul and various infirmities 
in the Commission's and Board's alleged amendments to Camas County's zoning ordinance and 
comprehensive plan. Plaintiffs seek an order voiding "all activities and ostensibly official 
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actions under [the Local Land Use Planning Act] taken by the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission and the Board of Commissioners on and after September 8, 2004," an order 
restraining the County from processing land use applications under ·'the ostensibly adopted 
amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance," and an award of attorney fees. 
B. The Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 
Oddly, many of the allegations in the Application are not made in the Petition. Plaintiffs 
allege in their Application that the Board and the Commission violated various provisions of the 
Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) when they amended the County's comprehensive plan 
and zoning ordinance. Among the allegations: the Board and Commission failed to follow the 
notice and hearing procedures required by LLUPA; failed to keep a transcribable verbatim 
record of the proceedings related to the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance; failed to 
comply with "the substantive dictates" of LLUPA; I failed "to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or other documentation or record of recommendations as required by I.C. § 
67-6508(b)"; and failed "to remand and re-notice [a] public hearing after material changes were 
made to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance." Plaintiffs claim also that a conflict of 
interest marred the proceedings because defendant Ed Smith owned property that was subject to 
the alleged rezone. They claim that Ken Backstrom, member of the Board, "caused 
unauthorized, unadjudicated, road improvement [sic] to be made. at tax payer expense. to 
enhance access and value of Baxtrom's [sic] property .... " (Beyond this conclusory allegation, 
I The Application is silent on what "substantive dictates" were not followed or even what "substantive dictates" 
means. 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS 
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION -- 3 
there's no evidence of this.) They claim further that land belonging to Robbie Miller, a member 
of the Commission. was rezoned. 
The application is unaccompanied by any evidence whatsoever, neglects to mention the 
dates on which these alleged actions occurred, and cites no ordinance or resolution number 
associated with the acts alleged. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Temporary Restraining Order 
A temporary restraining order may be granted "only ... if it clearly appears from specific 
facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, 
or damage will result to the applicant before the party's attorney can be heard in opposition." 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(b). Plaintiffs allege that the Board illegally amended the County's zoning 
ordinance and comprehensive plan. They say that if the County is not restrained from processing 
land use applications they will "suffer immediately and great or irreparably [sic] injury and loss." 
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctio, p. 3 (May 4. 2007). 
They state further that if the County is not restrained from processing land use applications, "the 
land itself will be altered to a state from which it cannot be restored." ld. (They don't really say 
what land \vill be altered.) They continue: "Ordinances and resolution [sic] may be passed, 
subdivisions of land may occur, buildings and roads may be built, legal obligations may arise that 
simply could not be repealed. rescinded, demolished or erased such that the status quo could not 
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be restored without injunction." ld. (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' injury, they cry, stems from 
the fact that Petitioner Martin "is the o\\'TIer of real property. purchased with the intention and 
purpose of subdivision and development, that has been, in effect, dO\\TI-zoned while surrounding 
property, some owned by members of the Board of Commissioners and Planning and Zoning 
Commission, has been upzoned.,,2 ld. at 4. 
It is readily apparent from Plaintiffs' own Application that their claims of injury are far 
too premature and far too speculative to satisfy the requirement in Rule 65(b) that "immediate" 
injury "will result." Plaintiffs appear to complain about the Board's decisions on their property 
and property that is not theirs. With respect to decisions on land that Plaintiffs do not own, 
Plaintiffs allege the land "will be altered," but they neither (a) identify which land will be altered, 
nor (b) explain how that land will be altered, nor (c) explain how any alterations to land they do 
not own will adversely affect their protected interests. They say that other various evils "may" 
result. "May" is not synonymous with "will." Additionally, none of the potential harms would 
occur before a hearing on a preliminary injunction could occur. The harms alleged relate to 
applications, hearings, approvals. and the turning of dirt on land use matters. But there is neither 
allegation nor evidence that any dirt-turning is imminent. Nor is there any allegation that any 
applications have been tiled on that property. Indeed, given the current state of affairs as alleged 
= Plaintiffs are wrong when they argue that Mr. Martin's property has been "down-zoned."' The property of which 
Mr. Martin speaks was re-zoned from Agricultural Transition to R-l. The density for each was the same: one 
dwelling unit per acre. Ergo. the property has not been "down-zoned"; for density purposes, the property was same-
zoned, A quick and easy investigation of what the ordinance provided would have disclosed this. 
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in the Application. and given that the land-use process takes so much time before any land is 
altered. a temporary restraining order is inappropriate. 
Moreover, there is no allegation that decisions on property not belonging to Plaintiffs \vill 
adversely affect their interests in their land. There is no allegation that Plaintiffs' land is near the 
other land at issue, and there is no explanation of how the zoning and comprehensive plan 
amendments will affect their property. They thus fail constitutionally-based standing test insofar 
as their claims relate to property they do not own. Standing is a "fundamental prerequisite" to 
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 800, 53 P.3d 1217, 
1219 (2002). It is a component of the constitutionally-based case-or-controversy rule and the 
threshold necessary to obtain standing cannot be legislated to require less than the constitutional 
test. Id. at 801, 53 P .3d at 1220. In other words, the declaratory judgment act is not a forum for 
those with general complaints about the conduct of one's local governing board. When 
considering whether a party has standing, the Court focuses on the party, not the issues the party 
raises. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757,763 (1989). To satisfy the 
standing requirement, Plaintiffs must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact .... " Id. Or, put 
differently, Plaintiffs must possess a "personal stake" in the controversy. See Rural Kootenai 
Org., Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 841, 993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999). Indeed, 
Plaintiffs must show a "peculiar or personal injury that is different than that suffered by any 
other member of the public." Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Slate. 128 Idaho 831, 834.919 P.2d 
1032, 1035 (1996). But in this case. there is no allegation that the zoning ordinance and 
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comprehensive plan amendments will have any adverse effect upon any of Plaintiffs' protected 
interests. 
With respect to decisions regarding PlaintitTs' property, Plaintiffs claim that the property 
was purchased "with the intention" of subdivision and development. There is no allegation that 
either plaintiff has filed any application to do anything on property that either of them owned. 
Plaintitfs thus have no right to anything. The State Legislature granted local governing boards 
the authority to exercise legislative judgment in determining the appropriate zone or designation 
in a comprehensive plan-an individual has no right to a particular zone. To be sure, an 
applicant's rights are determined by the zoning and other ordinances in etTect at the time of 
application. See South Fork Coalition v. Board of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 
857, 861, 792 P.2d 882, 886 (1990). But without an application, there is no right to a particular 
zone; without a right to a particular zone, there can be no injury. Besides, amendments to the 
zoning ordinance and the comprehensive plan are legislative decisions, which may be initiated 
by a landowner. I.C. §§ 67-6511 (a) (requests for an amendment to the zoning ordinance shall be 
submitted to the planning and zoning request); 67-6509(d) (any person may petition the planning 
and zoning commission for an amendment of the comprehensive plan at any time). If the 
Plaintitls are dissatisfied with the zoning and comprehensive plan amendments, they are free to 
file an application to amend the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan. In short. even 
assuming PlaintitTs' claims are correct (which the County Defendants deny), Plaintifls' 
assertions that the sky is falling are so speculative and so premature that they cannot meet the 
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certainty and timing requirements mandated in Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(b). Their Application must 
therefore be denied. 
B. Preliminary Injunction 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e) sets forth the circumstances which will justify a preliminary 
injunction: when the complaint demonstrates the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded; 
when it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act 
during the litigation would produce waste or great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff; when it 
appears during the litigation that defendant is doing, or threatens to do, or is about to do, or is 
procuring or suffering to be done, some act violating the plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject 
of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual; or when it appears by affidavit that 
that the defendant during the pendency of the action, threatens, or is about to remove, or to 
dispose of the defendants' property with the intent to defraud the plaintiff. Idaho R. Civ. P. 
65( e )(1 )-(4). 
None of the circumstances articulated in Rule 65( e) apply. 3 
1. Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e)(1) 
Preliminary injunctions do not issue upon a whim: Plaintiffs carry the burden to prove a 
right to an injunction, Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 
634 (1965), and "a preliminary mandatory injunction is granted only in extreme cases where the 
right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal," Evans v . 
. 1 Only Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e)(I) and (e)(2) are discussed in this Objection; the remaining circumstances under which 
a preliminary injunction may issue are not applicable to the Plaintiffs' application. 
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District Court olthe F[fih Judicial District, 47 Idaho 267, 270, 275 P. 99, 100 (1929). As has 
been discussed, the Plaintiffs' Application does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs have a clear right 
to their remedy, nor does it demonstrate clearly that injury will result if the restraining order does 
not issue. In fact, it demonstrates the opposite. 
As the Supreme Court of Idaho has said, "[t]he substantial likelihood of success 
necessary to demonstrate that appellants are entitled to the relief they demanded cannot exist 
where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from doubt." Harris v. Cassia 
County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 994 (1984) (quoting First National Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 495 F.Supp. 154 (W.O. Mich. 1980); Avins v. Widener College, Inc., 
421 F.Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1976) (injunction not granted where issues of fact and law are seriously 
disputed): Wm. Rosen lv!onumenls. Inc. v. Ph;! Madonick Monuments, Inc., 62 A.D.2d 1053, 404 
N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (injunction granted only upon the clearest evidence». The 
County Defendants submit that the facts are not in doubt, and that they favor the County 
Defendants' position. However, at best, the facts as alleged are in sufficient doubt to preclude 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the record developed thus far. There are but bare 
allegations in a complaint, which are supported with nothing. The dates on which the alleged 
acts occurred are not even pleaded. The issues of fact relate to the notice for and conduct of 
various public meetings and decisions relating to the amendment of a zoning ordinance and a 
comprehensive plan. Therefore, the issues raised by the Petition cannot support a finding that 
there is a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs will prevail on their Petition. 
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2. Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e)(2) 
Just as the Plaintiffs fail to meet the standard set forth in Rule 65( e)(1). so too do they fail 
to meet the standard in Rule 65(e)(2). Again, with respect to Plaintiffs' claims about decisions 
on property they do not own, they have failed in their Application or Petition to demonstrate that 
the acts sought to be enjoined would "produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to the 
plaintiff." The allegations in the Petition and Application do not even connect the alleged action 
to an alleged interest. To the extent the Plaintiffs claim injury to their property, PlaintifTs' 
purchase of the property "with the intention" to subdivide and develop it does not-as stated 
above-confer upon them any particular right to any particular zone. 
III. 
REQUEST FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
The County Defendants respectfully request an award of Rule 11 sanctions in the form of 
reasonable attorney fees and costs for defending the Application. Idaho R. Civ. P. 11(a)(1) 
states, in relevant part: 
[t)he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or 
party has read the pleading. motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension. 
modification. or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
* * * 
If a pleading. motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule. the court, 
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed 
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it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the tiling of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
As the Supreme Court of Idaho has observed, "[a]n attorney is required to perform a prefiling 
inquiry into both the facts and the law involved to satisfy the atIirmative duty imposed by Rule 
11." Koehn v. Riggins, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021,895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). In this case, either 
the pre-filing inquiry was not conducted, or its results were disregarded. Either is a basis for an 
award of Rule 11 sanctions. 
Rule 65(b) unquestionably reqUIres a showing that immediate injury will result. 
Plaintiffs' Application-alleging that various harms "may" result-patently contradicts the 
rule's requirement. Moreover, there is no allegation, nor could there be, that the alleged harms 
would occur before a hearing on a preliminary injunction could be held. Relevant to this case, 
Rule 65( e) places the burden on the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded, or that the defendant is about to do some act violating the plaintiffs rights. Because 
Plaintiffs have failed to connect the complained-of actions to their alleged harm, there is no 
shmving (a) that they're entitled to the relief demanded, or (b) that the County is about to do 
something that would violate their rights. And the law on standing, while not necessarily clear in 
all respects, is crystal clear on the requirement that the plaintiff allege an injury to a protected 
interest. As has been discussed, Plaintiffs' Petition and Application fail even that easy task-
they have utterly failed to demonstrate how any decisions by the County on land that is not theirs 
will atTect any protected interest. 
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Additionally, with respect to the alleged decisions on Plaintiffs' property, they have 
alleged a purely speculative harm based on a non-existent right. Plaintiffs fail to even correctly 
grasp a fairly basic tenet of land-use law: that when a local governing board passes an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance and/or comprehensive plan, it is acting in its legislative 
capacity, and no findings of fact or conclusions of law are required. The Plaintiffs didn't even 
bother themselves to read the zoning ordinance, which would have told them that the densities in 
the Agricultural Transition and R-l zones are the same. The allegation that the County 
Defendants failed to keep a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings at issue is 
laughable. Plaintiffs and their counsel would have learned this if they ever had the bright idea to 
check with the County to see whether the tapes exist before alleging they don't exist. But they 
did not. The County did, in fact, keep a transcribable verbatim record of every single public 
meeting and public hearing on the amendments to the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan. 
And finally, the allegations that the notice requirements were not complied with are similarly 
laughable. Mr. Martin attended every single meeting and hearing on the ordinances and 
comprehensive plan. He therefore can claim no injury since he had actual notice. See Cowan v. 
Board ofComm 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006). This is a fairly 
straightforward princi pie of law. 
The errors in Plaintiffs' Application cannot be attributed to inexperience. The law on the 
issues raised is clear, and all of the evidence which defies the PlaintitTs' Application was a 
matter of public record at the time the Application was tiled. The information was not therefore 
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unknowable or even difficult to find. Any reasonable pre-filing inquiry would have disclosed 
this evidence. 
Counsel for the County recognizes the seriousness of a request for Rule 11 sanctions and 
is aware that a request for Rule 11 sanctions is not to be made lightly or without a clear basis in 
fact and in law. In this case, Plaintiffs have forced Camas County to unnecessarily expend 
taxpayer funds to defend the patently baseless Application. The County Defendants are duty-
bound to be wise and responsible stewards of the public's funds. This duty includes the 
obligation to seek reimbursement for unnecessarily-spent funds when defending a baseless 
request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. This is such a case, and the 
County Defendants should therefore be awarded Rule 11 sanctions jointly against Mr. Martin 
and Mr. Simms. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On its face. Plaintiffs' Application for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction is inappropriate. Therefore, their request for a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction must be denied. Finally, pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 11, the County 
Defendants respectfully request reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending the 
Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 
Dated this /L/ih. day of May, 2007. 
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MOORE SMITH BUXTO\i & TURCKE. Ono. 
C~L·TtJ-~ --------------------------------Carl 1. Withroe 
Attorney for the County Defendants 
* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection was this --
day of May. 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Carl 1. Withroe 
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COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION -- 14 
Phillip J. Collaer, ISB No. 3447 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P. O. Box 7426 
Boise, 10 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
E-mail: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Ed Smith 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN 
CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ED SMITH; CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
by and through the duly elected Board 
of Commissioners in their official 
capacity; KEN BAXTROM; BILL DAVIS; 
and RON CHAPMAN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV2007-24 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled defendant Ed Smith (the "answering 
defendant"), by and through his attorneys of record, Anderson Julian & Hull, LLP, and 
answers plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim against this answering defendant upon 
which relief can be granted. 




This answering defendant denies each and every allegation of the complaint not 
herein expressly and specifically admitted. 
II. 
Based upon information and belief, this answering defendant admits the 
allegations contained in "1, 3, 4, and 10 of the complaint as they relate to this 
answering defendant. 
III. 
This answering defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form 
a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in ,,2 and 5 of the 
complaint and, therefore, denies the same. 
IV. 
This answering defendant states that ,,6 and7 assert legal conclusions to 
which no response is required. To the extend ,,6 and 7 states facts, those facts are 
denied as to this answering defendant. 
V. 
With respect to the factual allegations contained in '8 of the complaint, this 
answering defendant admits that on or about September 8, 2004, Smith and Martin 
entered into an exclusive buyers representation agreement which authorized Smith to 
act as a limited dual agent. This answering defendant states that the referenced 
buyers representation agreement speaks for itself and specifically denies any 
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allegations in ,8 that are inconsistent with the terms or provisions of the buyers 
representation agreement. 
VI. 
This answering defendant states that the agreement referenced in ,9 of the 
complaint speaks for itself and specifically denies any allegations in , 9 that are 
inconsistent with the terms or provisions of the agreement referenced therein. 
VII. 
This answering defendant states that the written offer incorporated the parties' 
verbal discussions. Additionally, the reference in '11 of the complaint speaks for itself 
and this answering defendant denies any allegations in , 11 that are inconsistent with 
the terms or provisions of that offer. 
VIII. 
This answering defendant denies the allegations in "12 through 1 5 of the 
complaint. 
IX. 
This answering defendant states the real estate contract referenced in ,16 of 
the complaint speaks for itself and specifically deny all allegations in '16 which are 
inconsistent with the terms or conditions of the real estate contract referenced therein. 
X. 
This answering defendant denies the allegations contained in 1117 through 19 
of the complaint. 
XI. 
With respect to the factual allegations contained in 120 of the complaint, this 
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answering defendant admits that the plaintiff, Martin, attended the closing relating to 
the purchase of thp. property referenced therein and purchased the subject property in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the purchase and sale agreement which, 
at that time, existed between himself and the sellers. Defendant denies all other 
factual allegations or inferences contained in ,20. 
XII. 
This answering defendant denies the allegations contained in ,'21 through 23 
of the complaint. 
XIII. 
This answering defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form 
a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in "24 through 26 that 
are directed against other defendants and, therefore, deny the same. 
XIV. 
With respect to the factual allegations contained in '27 of the complaint, this 
answering defendant admits that he was a member of the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission. This answering defendant denies all other factual allegations or 
inferences contained in '27. 
XV. 
With respect to the factual allegations contained in '28 of the complaint, this 
answering defendant admits that he owns and in the past has purchased and sold 
properties located within Camas County, Idaho. This answering defendant denies all 
other factual allegations or inferences contained in '28. 
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VXI. 
With respect to the factual allegations contained in '29 of the complaint, this 
answering defendant admits that all times relevant he has been a licensed real estate 
broker and, in that capacity, represents the interests of buyers or sellers in regulated 
real estate transactions in Camas County. This answering defendant denies all other 
factual allegations or inferences contained in '29. 
XVII. 
With respect to the factual allegations contained in ,30 of the complaint, this 
answering defendant denies possessing an economic interest in the outcome of issues 
which came before the Camas County Planning & Zoning Commission when he 
participated as a member of the Commission. This answering defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief regarding the remaining allegations 
of ,30 that are directed against other defendants and, therefore, deny the same. 
XVIII. 
This answering defendant is without knowledge of information sufficient to form 
a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations contained in ,,31 through 38 of the 
complaint that are directed against other defendants and, therefore, deny the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are guilty of negligent and careless misconduct at the time of and in 
connection with the matters and damages alleged in the complaint, which misconduct 
on their part proximately caused and contributed to said events and resulting damages, 
if any. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
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Plaintiffs' losses or injuries, if any, were caused by the intervening acts and 
omissions of other third persons for whom this answering defendant bears no 
responsibility. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' clAims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of waiver, 
estoppel, and laches. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages, if any, and as a matter of law 
are barred from recovery. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
To the extent the plaintiffs are asserting state law claims against this answering 
defendant which arise out of his membership and activities as a member of the Camas 
County Planning and Zoning Commission, such causes of action arise out of and stem 
from activities for which this defendant is immune, in whole or in part, from liability by 
virtue of Title VI, Chapter IX, Idaho Code and, therefore, plaintiffs' causes of action in 
damages seeking recovery under state law are barred, in whole or in part, by the virtue 
of the provisions of Title VI, Chapter IX, Idaho Code. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' complaint is barred, in whole or in part, due to its failure to present a 
timely notice of claim as required by Title VI, Chapter IX, Idaho Code. 
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WHEREFORE defendant Ed Smith prays that the plaintiffs take nothing by their 
complaint, that the same be dismissed, and that the defendant be awarded his costs of 
suit and attorney's fees, and such other and further relief the court deems just. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant Ed Smith hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues. 
DA TED this 'H2 day of ~ 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HUll, llP 
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm 
Attorney for Defendant Ed Smith 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of ~w.' 2007., I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPlA T AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
191 Sun Valley Road, #209 
PO Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 622-7878 
Facsimile: (208) 622-7129 
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Phillip J. Collaer 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIM~lS 
Attorney at Law 
VS Bank Bldg., Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 833-'0 
Tel: 208622 7878 
Fax: 208622 7129 
ISB# 7-'73 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN, ) 
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MARTIN CUSTOM ) 











CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, ) 
By and through the duly elected ) 
Board of Commissioners in ) 
their official capacity, ) 
) 
KEN BAXTROM, ) 
BILL DAVIS, and ) 
RON CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. <L-V - d 00 '7 ~ .. ~ ~ 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
PRELI~HNARY INJUNCTION 
THIS MATTER, being brought before the Court by Christopher P. Simms, 
attorney for Plaintiffs, George ;\lartin and 'Iartin Custom Homes, seeking first a 
hearing on Application for Temporary Restraining Order preliminary to an 
eyidentiary hearing on application for Preliminary Injunction pursuant to I.R.c.P. 
65, based upon the facts set forth in the verified complaint and affidavit filed 
herewith and for good cause shown. 
It is on this __ .....L-_ day of ORDERED that defendant, 
Camas County, by and through their Board of Commissioners, Ken Baxtrom, BiU 
Davis and Ron Chapman in their official capacity, appear and show good cause 
before the Fifth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho in and for the County 
of Camas, located in the City of Fairfield at ---'~~:- +.1\1., or as soon thereafter 
as counsel may be heard, on the ---.:==--_ day of_-="":::=-=I-__ ' 2007, wh.Y an order 
should not be issued temporarily restraining and or preliminarily enjoining 
defendant Camas County, by and through their Board of Commissioners, Ken 
Baxtrom, Bill Davis and Ron Chapman in their official capacity, from acting upon 
or processing any land use application, rezone or subdivision, based upon the 
ostensible amendments to the Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance adopted 
under color of law on March 29,2007 and April 18,2007. 
~ ~Jt9 c;..- SO ORDERED 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of June, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Document, by depositing a copy there of in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid by first class mail to the following: 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
U.S. Bank Bldg., Suite 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Phillip J. Collaer 
Anderson, Julian & Hull LLP 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Stephanie J. Bonney 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Korri Blodgett, Deputy Clerk 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg .. Ste 209 
19] Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, 10 83340 
Tel: 208622 7878 
Fax: 208622 7129 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 











CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacity, 
KEN BACKSTROM, 































Case No. CV2007-24 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT CAMAS COUNTY'S 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER and 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. and 
REQUEST FOR RULE II SANCTIONS 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO CAMAS COUNTY DEFENDANTS OBJECTIONS 
TO APPLICATION FOR TRO and PRELIMINARY RESTRAINING ORDER and 
REQUEST FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, George Martin, individually and as a member of Martin 
Custom Homes LLC through counsel, and files this his Response to Defendant Camas 
County's Objections to Plaintiffs Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction, and for Rule II Sanctions, and does therefore state as folImvs: 
INTRODUCTION 
The Camas County Defendant's make two basic arguments that Plaintiffs 
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction should be 
denied. Each of these arguments is without merit and fails to recognize fundamental 
facts of the case and principals of Idaho law. 
Initially, the Camas County Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing. one, 
because the" .... claims of injury are far too premature and far too speculative ...... " and 
two, because of a lack of "peculiar or personal injury that is different than that suffered 
by any other member of the public." The case law is abundantly clear on this point. In 
land use decisions, a party's standing depends on whether his or her property will be 
adversely affected by the land use decision. Cmven v. Board ot Cmm 'rs ot Fremont 
County, 143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d1247 (2006); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71. 73 
P.3d 84 (2003) 
Secondly, the Camas County Defendants argue that Preliminary Injunction should 
not issue because "the substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that 
appellants are entitled to the relief they demanded cannot exist where complex issues of 
law or fact exist which are not free from doubt." Defendants, while correctly stating the 
law, overlook overwhelming and uncomplicated evidence of conflict of interests. failure 
to maintain a transcribable record, failure to provide proper notice, and improper 
formation of the Planning and Zoning Commission, all in violation of LLUPA. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 -*******) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about September 20, 2004 Plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase 
80 acres +- of real property, and acquired an option to purchase separate 29 acre +- and 
80 acre +- tracts, all located within unincorporated Camas County. Said real property 
was purchased with the intent to develop and contingent upon rezoning approval 
consistent with the Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map. Plaintiff had a development 
expectation, based upon the Camas County Land Use Map then in place allowing up to 
seven (7) residential units per acre. to subdivide the property to a net density of four (4) 
units per acre. 
Plaintiff made application with the Planning and Zoning Commission for Rezone, 
from Agricultural to R-7, in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. Subsequent to 
initial Commission recommendation for approval Defendant Ed Smith contacted 
Plaintiff. Smith alleged that Plaintiff was in breach of his contract with Sellers, because 
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the contingency was for rezoning to Agricultural Transition, not R-7. Smith further 
stated that the Board of Commissioners \vould never approve the rezone and that he had 
talked with the individual members of the Commission who agreed P&Z would never 
recommend approval of Plaintiffs subdivision application. Thereafter. Plaintiff 
withdrew his rezone request to R-7 and reapplied for rezone to Agricultural Transition 
\vhich application was eventually approved. After withdrawing said application, Plaintiff 
was placed on a Board of Commissioners Executive Session Agenda to review ex parte 
communications and conflict of interest issues relating to Ed Smith. No action was taken. 
On or about September 13, 2005 the Camas County Board of Commissioners 
submitted a letter to the Planning and Zoning Commission seeking recommendations for 
amendment of Camas County's Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map and Zoning 
Ordinance and Map. Exhibit 1. The Planning and Zoning Commission began a Public 
Meeting/Hearing process in March of 2005. Soon thereafter a question arose whether the 
Planning and Zoning Commission was duly and lawfully formed. Exhibits 2 (A)-(K). 
An Ordinance Defining and Creating a Planning and Zoning Commission and Providing 
for Rules of Organization was drafted, recommended by the body acting as the Camas 
County Planning and Zoning Commission, and passed by the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners on September 11, 2006. This ordinance was not published until March 7, 
2007. some six (6) months after passage. Exhibit 2 (J) 
Early on during the rezoning process alarm was raised that no record. or 
inadequate records, of proceedings were being kept by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and Board of County Commissioners. According to official responses to 
Requests for Public Records no tape recordings exist as to at least sixteen (16) Planning 
and Zoning Commission or Board of County Commissioner Public Meetings/Hearings 
dealing with the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Amendment Ordinances. Exhibits 3 
(A)-3(A)(iiii). Furthermore, it does not appear that any type of written record of Planning 
and Zoning recommendations to the Board exist regarding any proposed amendments to 
the Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance. Exhibit 4. 
In addition to the above issue, public concern arose regarding the sufficiency of 
citizen participation. Adequacy of Public Notice and Hearing was challenged. Exhibit 
5(A) & (B). On or about April 13, 2006 the Camas County Board of Commissioners 
adopted Ordinance # 142 that addressed Notice and Hearing Procedures when notice is 
required for two hundred (200) or more property owners. Exhibit 5 (C). 
The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and the Camas County 
Board of County Commissioners failed the notice and public hearing requirements of 
general Open Meeting Laws. LLUP A. and local ordinance in the following respects; 
1. Failed to provide notice of meetings five (5) or more days in advance of 
regular meetings, or forty eight (48) or more in advance of special meetings 
including a failure to post in at least three (3) prominent locations. Exhibits 5 
(A)-(P) 
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2. Failed to provide an intelligible summary of any of the matters to be discussed 
regarding the Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance amendments. 
Exhibits 5 (A)-(P) 
3. Failed to make available a notice to other papers, radio and television stations 
serving the jurisdiction for use as a public service announcement. Exhibits 5 
(A)-(P) 
4. Failed to provide notice of Hearings to all political subdivisions providing 
services within the planning jurisdiction, including school districts, for any of 
the meetings or public hearings addressing proposed amendments to the 
Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance. Exhibits 5 (A)-(P) 
5. Failed, following commission hearings, when the commission recommended 
material changes to the proposed amendment to the plan which was 
considered at the hearing, to give notice of its proposed recommendation and 
conduct another public hearing concerning the matter. Exhibits 5 (A)-(P) 
6. Failed the requirements for Adjourned Meetings, and Special Meetings in that 
the Board of Commissioners failed to enter an order duly entered of record, 
specifying the character of business to be transacted and to duly post notice in 
three conspicuous places. Exhibits 5 (A)-(P) 
7. Failed to post Notice in compliance Camas County Ordinance No. 142. 
Exhibits 5 (A)-(P). 
8. Failed to pass a proper Ordinance providing for Notice of future regular 
meetings in that the notice published January 17, 2007 in the Camas Courier 
provided no time or location or location of meetings, lacked an adopting 
Ordinance. Exhibits 5 (A)-(P). 
On or about March 19, 2006 during a public hearing of the Board of County 
Commissioners, Chairman Baxtrum announced that the proposed Zoning Ordinance 
would be remanded to the Planning and Zoning Commission for further 
recommendations due to mistakes or material changes. Exhibit 6 (A). The officially 
approved minutes fail to mention this motion and action by the Board, but live audio of 
said action was recorded. Exhibit 6 (A) & (8) On March 19, 2007 an Agenda for 
Regular Meeting of the Planning and Zoning Commission, for April 3, 2006, was posted. 
The posted Agenda included this item. Exhibit 6 (C). However, the Agenda was pulled 
and said hearing never occurred. 
Numerous material changes to the proposed amended Comprehensive Plan 
Zoning Ordinance were made throughout the process without further notice or hearing. 
For example during the amendment process at Planning and Zoning, and the initial 
Meetings/Hearings before the Board of County Commissioners the entire north half of 
the County was not included on any of the Maps or discussed at any Meeting or Hearing. 
Exhibit 7. Sometime prior to the tinal Public Hearings on the proposed Comprehensive 
Plan Land Use Map and Zoning Map, after public demand, a map of the entire County 
was produced. No remand or further notice and hearing \vas had. 
During the process of amending the Camas County Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance neither the Planning and Zoning Commission nor the Board of County 
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Commissioners utilized professional planning assistance. It does not appear from the 
record that either body considered or deliberated upon the impact an amended 
Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance would have on the cost of providing services; 
the economy: the environment: protection of prime agricultural land. forestry or mining 
for the production of food. fiber or minerals; encouraging urban and urban-type 
development within incorporated cities; avoiding undue concentration of population and 
overcrowding of land; ensuring development on land is commensurate with the physical 
characteristics of the land: protection of life and property in areas subject to natural 
hazards or disasters; protection of fish, \vildlife and recreational resources; avoiding 
undue \,vater and air pollution; or to allow local school districts to participate in the 
community planning and development process so as to address public school needs and 
impacts on an ongoing basis. It does not appear from the record that any studies or 
objective and reliable information related to any of these subjects was even considered. 
On or about March 29, 2007, the Camas County Board of Commissioners adopted 
resolutions and passed ordinances approving a Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map and 
identical Zoning Map, without supporting text. On or about April 18. 2007 the Board 
adopted an amended Zoning Ordinance. Together these ordinances abolished the R-7 
Zone designation, which had been included in the former Comprehensive Plan Land Use 
Map for areas surrounding the City of Fairfield including property owned by Plaintiff. 
The overall impact of the ordinances was to increase the allowable density for some 
twenty (20) thousand acres from Agricultural Zone, maximum density one (1) unit per 
eighty (80) acres to densities ranging from one (1) unit per twenty (20) acres to four (4) 
units per acre. It is also important to note that seemingly random parcels were upzoned, 
some of which are owned by members of the Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Board of County Commissioners, while development potential of Plaintiff s land was 
decreased from seven (7) units per acre to one (1) unit per acre. 
Defendant Ed Smith became the Chair of the Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission on or about March 7. 2006 and presided over most, if not alL of the Public 
Meetings/Hearings addressing proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance. Smith is a Real Estate Broker and owner of, at least, twenty (20) 
parcels of real property in Camas County, according to the Camas County Assessors 
records. Exhibit 8 (A) These parcels range in size from one hundred sixty eight (168) 
acres to one (1) acre. It is known that Defendant Smith owned property in the Aspen 
View Subdivision that was rezoned from Agriculture, maximum density one (1) unit per 
eighty (80) acres. to Low Density Residential with a maximum density of one (1) unit per 
acre. Exhibit 8 (8). Furthermore, it is known that Smith owned lots within the Smoky 
Dome Subdivision that were rezoned to higher density residential or rezoned from 
Residential to higher value Commercial. Exhibit 8 (C). 
Defendant Ken Backstrom, as a member of the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners, has presided over most. if not all, of the Public Meetings/Hearings 
addressing proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. 
During the rezoning process Backstrom purchased a parcel of real property in the old 
Townsite of Corral. which parcel was favorably rezoned from Agricultural to 
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Commercial. Exhibits 8 (D). During this period Defendant Backstrom was the owner 
and applicant for GamlaTunnland Subdivision. Backstrom. while serving as a member of 
the Board of Camas County Commissioners. caused unauthorized road improvement to 
be made. at tax payer expense. without benefit of public process. Said road improvements 
are adjacent to said subdivision and would appear to enhance access and value to 
Defendant Backstrom's GamlaTunnland Subdivision property. Exhibits 8 (E)-(K). 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
Rule 65 of the LR.C.P. provides the standards and procedure applicable to 
requests for Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions. Plaintiff seeks 
Preliminary Injunction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65(e) (I) and (2). In that Plaintiff owns land 
which has been. and continues to be, reduced in value due to the illegal conduct of 
Defendants and will be further reduced in value if the Defendants are permitted to 
process land use applications under the illegal ordinances, injunctive relief is appropriate. 
On the face of the verified Application herein Plaintiff has plead a host of fatal 
procedural infirmities, a positive finding on any of which would result in the Amended 
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance being declared null and void. None of the 
factual allegations have been specifically denied by the Camas County Defendants. 
Additional and more specific evidence of illegal conduct is attached hereto and will be 
presented at an evidentiary hearing hereon. 
Defendants, instead of specifically denying the various factual allegations, assert 
that Plaintiff lacks standing. In Cowen v. Board of Cmmr's of Fremont County, 143 
Idaho SOL 148 P.3d1247 (2006) the Board of County Commissioner's also argued that 
Plaintiff failed to allege a distinct palpable injury or particularized harm. The Plaintiff 
demonstrated, by pleading and proof, that he owned land that would be adversely 
impacted and diminished in value if a proposed development was built. The Court found 
Cowen had standing, and repeated the rule "that in land use decisions, a party's standing 
depends on whether his or her property will be adversely affected by the land use 
decision." Id, see also Evan v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84 (2003) 
The Camas County Defendants seem to argue that because the amendments to the 
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance are "legislative" rather than "quasi judicial" 
those actions are beyond challenge. The Court in Cowen stated "Legislative activity . .. 
is d(flerentiatedfrom quasi-judicial activity by the result-legislative activity produces a 
rule or po/iq which has application to an open class 'whereas quasi-:iudicial activity 
impacts specific individuals, interests or situations. " Burt v. Citv oj'Idaho Falls, 105 
Idaho 65, 6 7 , 665 P.2d 1075. 1077 (1983). While legislative actions by coullties are 
subject to collateral actiolls such as declaratoryjudgmellts, they cannot be attacked by a 
petitionjiJr judicial review. Scott v. Gooding County. 3 7 Idaho 206. 208. 46 P.3d 23. 25 
(2002)" (Emphasis added) 
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Plaintitf concedes that generalized amendments to a Comprehensive Plan or 
Zoning Ordinance may be legislative, but submits that the court in Jerome Countv v. 
Holloway, 1 18 Idaho 681; 799 P.2d 969 (1990), very clearly recognized the principle that 
a legislative act becomes quasi-judicial giving rise to due process rights vvhen a zoning 
decision impacts property rights. The court quoted the opinion in Citizens for a Better 
Government v. Countv of Vallev, 95 Idaho 320. 508 P.2d 550 (1973). quoting a 
California opinion Hurst v. City of BUrlingame, 207 Cal. 134,277 P. 308 (1929). "When 
the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect (~f a zoning law upon 
property rights the action of the legislative body becomes quasi judicial in character. and 
the statutory notice and hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfj; the 
requirements of due process and may not be dispensed with." Citizens for a Better 
Government, 95 Idaho at 322. 508 P.2d at 552. "It is a ,t'ell settled principle that notice 
and hearing requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions precedent to the proper 
exercise of the zoning authority, " Hart v. Bavless Investment & Trading Co .. 86 Ariz. 
379.346 P.2d 1101 (1959); Holly Development, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 140 
Colo. 95. 342 P.2d 1032 (1959). 
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS 
In Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County; 103 Idaho 626; 651 P.2d 
560, the court held that notice, opportunity to be present and to rebut evidence, 
preparation of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the keeping of a 
transcribable record comprise a common core of procedural due process requirements, 
constitutionally mandated in all cases where zoning authorities are requested to change 
the land use authorized for a particular parcel of property. The previously cited case 
Jerome County v. Holloway, I 18 Idaho 681; 799 P.2d 969 (1990), very clearly 
recognized the principle that a legislative act becomes quasi-judicial giving rise to due 
process rights when a zoning decision impacts property rights. In the case before the 
court Plaintiff has undoubtedly suffered a negative impact to his property rights and is 
therefore entitled to due process rights. 
VALIDITY OF PLANNING & ZONING COMMISSION 
Idaho Code 67-6504 (c), addressing the creation of and rules for a Planning and 
Zoning Commi ssion, directs as follows. ., Written organization papers or bylaH's 
consistent with this chapter and other laws of the state fiJI' the transaction ~lbusiness of 
the commission shall be adopted. A record of meetings. hearings. resolutions. studies. 
findings, permits. and actions taken shall be maintained .... " The record indicates that 
no such papers or bylaws have ever been lawfully adopted and therefore no Planning and 
Zoning Commission has ever been duly empowered. Apparently, an attempt was made 
to correct this obvious problem, but without legal success. 
The Camas County Board of Commissioners. on or about September I I, 2006, 
passed an Ordinance Defining and Creating a Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Providing for Rules (~f Organi:.:athm. This ordinance \vas not published until March 7, 
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2007. some six (6) months after passage. I.C Section 37-715 requires all ordinances. in 
order to be effective. to be published within thirty (30) days of passage. Specifically. the 
ordinance provides "The style of all ordinances shall he: "Be it ordained hy the hoard (~r 
county commissioners qf .... County, Idaho": and all ordinances of a general nature 
shall, before they take effect and within one (I) month after they are passed, be 
published in at least one (1) issue of a newspaper published in the county .... " I.C. 37-
715. (Emphasis added) 
Because no Planning and Zoning Commission has ever been duly empowered in 
Camas County it is not legally possible for a valid Comprehensive Plan or Zoning 
Ordinance to have been adopted. While no case directly on point can be found. the 
statutes are abundantly clear. In Love v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of Bingham, 105 Idaho 558, 
559; 671 P.2d 471 (1983). the Court stated "{tJhe enactment (~fa comprehensive plan is a 
precondition to the validity ~f:::oninr; ordinances. I.e § 67-6511 ("The zoninr; districts 
shall he in accordance with the adopted plan''): State v. Cit}, o(Hailey, 102 Idaho 51 I, 
633 P.2d 576 (1981); Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506,51 1,567 
P.2d 1257. 1262 (1977). It ji)lloH!s afortiori that an amendment to a zoninr; ordinance 
must also he in accordance with the adopted plan. I.e ,¢;' 67-651 I; see Dawson. supra, at 
51 I, 567 P.2d at 1262 ... " 
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN A REVIEWABLE RECORD 
Idaho Code 67-6536 requires a transcribable verbatim record of all proceedings 
under LLUPA to be kept for not less than six (6) months. The statute specifically states 
that, "The proceeding envisioned hy this statute for which a transcrihahle verhatim 
record must he maintained shall include all public hearings at which testimony or 
evidence is received or at l~'hich an applicant or aflected person addresses the 
commission or governing hoard regardinr; a pending application or durinr; which the 
commission or r;overning board deliberates toward a decision after compilation (~f the 
record .... " 
In addition to the requirement, under 67-6536. for a verbatim transcribable record, 
LLUPA is replete to requirements that a record be kept by a Planning and Zoning 
Commission regarding its various duties. Idaho Code 67 -6504( c) requires ·' ... A record 
of meetings. hearings. resolutions. studies. findings. permits. and actions taken shall be 
maintained ... :' Idaho Code sections 67-6509 (a) and (b) and 67-6511(b) contain 
requirements that a Planning and Zoning Commission make a record of recommendations 
made to a Board of Commissioners. Section 67-6511 too requires a Planning and Zoning 
Commission to make recommendations, based on standards. to be made to the governing 
Board. No written record of recommendations from the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission to the Board of County Commissioners can be found. Undoubtedly. 
the legislature recognized the importance of maintaining a record for purposes of 
accountability regarding matters of import affecting individual property rights. 
The Court in Rural Kootenai Organization. Inc. v. Board of Commissioners. 133 
Idaho 833; 993 P2d 596 recognized that "the ahsence ofa transcrihahle verhatim record" 
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of zoning or land use proceedings may result in a violation (~f a party's right to 
procedural due process. Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 115. 
118. 867 P.2d 989. 992 (1994) (citing Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs of Ada 
County, 101 Idaho 407,411, 614 P.2d 947.951 (1980)). "[A) transcrihahle record [i.s} 
indispensahle to meaning/Ill judicial review of rezoning proceedings 'where the 
sl(fliciency of notice, adequacy (~l opportunity to present or to rehut e\'idence, or the 
existence (?f evidence supporting the agency's findings may he put at issue." Gav v. 
County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626. 629, 651 P.2d 560, 563 
(CLApp.1982). 
INADEQUATE NOTICE AND HEARING 
Idaho Code 31-710 provides basic rules. regarding notice, for Board of County 
Commissioner Meetings. The Ordinance reads as follows, 
"(1) The regular meetings of the hoards (~lcommissioners must he held 
at their respective county seats on the second lvfonday of each month (~f 
the year, or if the hoard determines that county affairs require regular 
meetings more often then at such times as may be provided for in 
advance by ordinance. and must continue from time to time until all the 
husiness befi)re them has heen addressed. Such other meetings must he 
held. to canvass election returns. equalize taxation, andfor other purposes 
as are prescribed by law or provided for by the board. 
(2) Adjourned meetings may be provided for, fIXed and held for the 
transaction of business, by an order duly entered of record, in which 
must be specified the character of business to be transacted at such 
meetings, and none other than that specified must be transacted. 
(3) If at any time after the acijournment of a regular meeting the 
husiness ~f the county requires a meeting of the board, a special meeting 
may he ordered by a majority ~f the hoard. The order must be entered of 
record, and five (5) days' notice thereof must, by the clerk, be given to 
each member not joining in the order. The order must specify the 
business to be transacted, and none otlter titan that specified must be 
transacted at such special meeting. 
(.I) All meetings of the board must he public. and the hooks, rec()rd~. 
and accounts must he kept at the (?/Jice of the clerk. open at all times fiJI' 
public inspection. free ~fcharge. Tlte clerk of the board must give five (5) 
days' public notice of all special or adjourned meetings, stating the 
business to be trallsacted, by posting three (3) notices ill conspicuous 
places, one (I) ofwhiclt sit all be at the courthouse door. 
I.e. 31-71 0 (emphasis added) 
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Idaho Code Section 67-2343 also provides County Board of Commissioner 
Meeting notice requirements. Specifically the ordinance provides . 
.. (1) Regular meetings. No less than a five (5) calendar day meeting 
notice shall be given unless otherwise provided by statute. Provided 
however, that any public agency that holds meetings at regular intervals 
of at least once per calendar month scheduled in advance over the 
course of the year may satisfy this meeting notice by giving meeting 
notices at least once each year of its regular meeting schedule. A forty-
eight (48) hour agenda notice shall be required in advance of each 
regular meeting, however. additional agenda items may be added ajier 
completion of the agenda up to and including the hour of the meeting. 
provided that a good faith effort is made to include in the notice all 
agenda items known at the time to be probable items (~f discussion. The 
notice requirement for meetings and agendas shall be satisfied by 
posting such notices and agendas in a prominent place at the principal 
office of the public agency, or if no such office exists, at the building 
where the meeting is to be held. 
(2) Special meetings. No special meeting shall be held It'ithout at least 
a twenty-four (2-1) hour meeting and agenda notice. unless an emergency 
exists. An emergency is a situation involving injury or damage to persons 
or property, or immediate financial loss. or the likelihood (~f such injury, 
damage or loss, when the notice requirements of this section would make 
such notice impracticable, or increase the likelihood or severity of such 
injury, damage or loss, and the reason for the emergency is stated at the 
outset ~f the meeting. The notice required under this section shall include 
at a minimum the meeting date, time, place and name of the public agency 
calling for the meeting. The secretary or other designee of each public 
agency shall maintain a list of the news media requesting notification (~f 
meetings and shall make a good faith effort to provide advance 
notification to them ~f the time and place ~f each meeting. 
(3) Executive sessions. {f an executive session only .fill be held, a 
twenty-four (24) hour meeting and agenda notice shall be given according 
to the notice provisions stated in subsection (2) (~f this section and shal! 
state the reason and the .\pecifzc provision (~flaw authorizing the executive 
seSSi()I1. q 
I.e. 67-2343 (emphasis added) 
LLUPA mandates very specific notice of hearing requirements. The pertinent 
portion of section 67-6509 states, 
., ... AI least fifteen (15) days prior to the hearing, notice of the time and 
place and a summary of the plan to be discussed s'hal! be puhlished in the 
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ofJicial new"'paper or paper (~lKeneral circulation 'within the jurisdiction. 
The commission shall also make available a notice to other papers, radio 
and television stations servinK the jurisdiction ./hr use as a puhiic service 
announcement. Notice of intent to adopt, repeal or amend the plan shall 
be sent to all political subdivisions providing services within the 
planning jurisdiction, including school districts. at least./?fteen (15) days 
prior to the puhiic hearing scheduled by the commission. Following the 
commission hearing. !l the commission recommends a material change to 
the proposed amendment to the plan lvhich was considered at [he hearing. 
it shall Kive notice of its proposed recommendation and conduct another 
public hearing concerning the matter (f the governing board will not 
conduct a subsequent public hearing concerning the proposed 
amendment. If the governing board will conduct a subsequent public 
hearing, notice (~l the planning and zoning commission recommendation 
shall be included in the notice of public hearing provided by the governing 
hoard" (Emphasis added) 
I.e. 67-6509. 
The zoning ordinance statute Section 67-651 1 states, 
... provided that in the case of a zoning district boundary change, and 
notwithstanding jurisdictional boundaries, additional notice shall be 
provided hy mail to property owners or purchasers of record within the 
land heing considered, and within three hundred (300) feet of the external 
houndaries of the land heing considered, and any additional area that may 
he impacted by the proposed change as determined by the commission. 
Notice shall also be posted on the premises not less than one (1) week 
prior to the hearing. When notice is required to two hundred (200) or 
more property owners or purchasers of record, alternate .f{Jrms of 
procedures which would provide adequate notice may he provided by 
local ordinance in lieu of posted or mailed notice. In the absence of a 
locally adopted alternative notice procedure, sufficient notice shall be 
deemed to have been provided if the city or county provides notice throuKh 
a dL\play adl'ertisement at least four (-I) inches by two (2) columns in size 
in the (~fficial newspaper of the city or county at least '/ifteen (15) days 
prior to the hearing date, in addition to site posting on all external 
houndaries of the site. 
I.e. Section 67-6511 
The leading case related to notice and hearing under sections 67-6509 and 6511 is 
Jerome County v, Holloway. 118 Idaho 681: 799 P,2d 969. (S, Ct., 1990) where the court 
invalidated an amended zoning ordinance for failure to strictly comply with the statute, 
Specifically, the ordinance was stricken because notice was less than fifteen (15) days 
and failed to contain a summary, "It is a .rel! settled principle [hat notice and hearif1K 
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requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions precedent to the proper exercise (~l 
the zoning authority. " Hart v. Bavless Investment & Trading Co .. 86 Ariz. 379. 346 P.1d 
1101 (1959); Hollv Development, Inc. v. Board of Countv Comm'rs, 140 Colo. 95. 342 
P.2d 1032 (1959). Jerome Countv. at 684. 
In the case at bar the specific notice failures are simply too numerous to 
enumerate beyond the recitation given in the Statement of Facts. Testimony will be 
produced at hearing to elucidate the facts related to this issue. 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Perhaps the most distressing violation of public trust int1icted on the tax payers of 
Camas County is the appearance of impropriety inherent in an elected official holding an 
economic interest in the subject of legislation. Idaho Code 67-6506 prohibits a member 
of a governing board or a planning and zoning commission trom participating in any 
proceeding or action when the member has an economic interest in the procedure or 
action. The statute requires disclosure of any potential conflict. In the case at bar the 
connict of interest issue was raised but the affected Commissioners refused to step down. 
In Mannokian v Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, (S. Ct. 1987) the court held a 
conditional use permit issued by the Board of Commissioners null and void due to 
participation by members of the Board and P&Z in a zoning process where those 
members were economically affected by the permit. The court stated, 
"The statute is not ambiguous. The legislature intended to prohibit 
economic conflicts (?l interest. In adopting 67-6506, the legislature acted 
to assure that, consistent with our democratic principles, only impartial 
and objective persons make decisions afftcting other persons' liberty and 
property. 
The policy behind the statute is essential because, under the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act, I. C §§ 67-5201 et seq., the findings of/act 
ol an administrative agency are subject to review only under the 
"substantial evidence test" on appeal to a district court. I.e. S,' 67-5215(/), 
(g)(5): Van Orden v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare. 102 Idaho 663, 637 
P.2d 1159 (1981). In Idaho a district court may reverse a zoning decision 
on~v {lone Qlthe grounds set Jorth in subsection (g) oJthis section is Jound 
to exist. Love v. Board of County Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 1293 
(/985). With appellate review so limited it is imperative that biased or 
potentially biased commis.·,ioners be barred }rom participating in the 
zoning procedure... ..... I. C. § 67-6506 pronounces in clear and 
unambiguous terms that 'where a conflict oj interest exists a commission 
member "shall not participate in any proceeding or action .... .. 
Mannokian. at 701. 
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In this case not only did the Chair of the Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Chair of the Board of County Commissioners have an economic interest in the legislative 
activity, they appear to have actually acted in their self interest by upzoning properties 
they o\vned. If those acts aren't enough Defendant Backstrom appears to have used his 
position to cause road improvements to his new subdivision without the benefit of any 
public process whatsoever. 
FAILURE TO CONSIDER OR DELIBERATE SUBSTANTIVE DICTATES OF 
LLUPA 
Plaintiff argues that the "substantive dictates" of the Local Land Use Planning 
Act, have been illegally ignored. Idaho Code Section 67-6502 provides the purpose of 
the LLUPA. 
"The purpose of this act shall be to promote the health, safety. and 
general we(fare (~l the people of the state of Idaho as follOYFs: (a) To 
protect property rights while making accommodations jar other necessary 
types ol development such as low-cost housing and mobile home parh. 
(b) To ensure that adequate public jacilities and services are provided to 
the people at reasonable cost. (c) To ensure that the economy of the state 
and localities is protected (d) To ensure that the important environmental 
features of the state and localities are protected (e) To encourage the 
protection of prime agricultural, forestry. and mining lands for production 
of food. fiber, and minerals. (f) To encourage urban and urban-type 
development within incorporated cities. (g) To avoid undue concentration 
(?l population and overcrowding of land (h) To ensure that the 
development on land is commensurate with the physical characteristics of 
the land (i) To protect life and property in areas subject to natural 
hazards and disasters. (j) To protect fish, wildlife, and recreation 
resources. (k) To avoid undue water and air pollution. (I) To allow local 
school districts to participate in the community planning and development 
process so as to address public school needs and impacts on an ongoing 
basis. ,. 
Idaho Code 67-6508 describes the Commission's planning duties and requires a 
comprehensive plan to be based on certain components. In pertinent part the statute 
states, 
"The plan shall consider previous and existing conditions. trends, 
desirahle goals and ohjectives. or desirahle fiaure situations jor each 
planning component. The plan with maps. charts, and reports shall be 
hased on the fiJllowing components as they may apply to land use 
regulations and actions unless the plan spec(/ies reasons why a particular 
component is unneeded" 
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Idaho Code section 67-6511 provides both procedure and required standards in 
adoption of an amended Zoning Ordinance. In relevant part the statute reads as follows. 
"Each governing hoard shall, hy ordinance udopted, amended. or 
repealed in accordance lvith the notice and hearing procedures provided 
under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, establish within its jurisdiction one 
(1) or more ::ones or ::oning districts where appropriate. The zoning 
districts shall be in accordance with the policies set forth in the adopted 
comprehensive plan ... .. .. 
Ordinances establishing zoning districts shall he amended as 
lhllows: 
(a) Requests for an amendment to the zoning ordinance shall he 
suhmitted to the zoning or planning and zoning commission 
which shall evaluate the request to determine the extent and 
nature of the amendment requested. Particular consideration 
shall be given to the effects of any proposed zone change upon 
the delivery of services by any political subdivision providing 
public services, including school districts, within the planning 
jurisdiction ••... (b) After considering the comprehensive plan 
and other evidence gathered through the public hearing 
process, the zoning or planning and zoning commission may 
recommend and the governing board may adopt or reject an 
ordinance amendment pursuant to the notice and hearing 
procedures ..•.. " I.C. 67-6511 (emphasis added) 
Idaho Code 67-6507, describes the required process for a Planning and Zoning 
Commission. The Statute provides in pertinent part. 
As part of the planning process, a planning or zoning commission 
shall provide fhr citizen meetings, hearings. surveys, or other methods', to 
ohtain advice on the planning process, plan, and implementation. The 
commission may also conduct informational meetings and consult with 
public (~fficials and agencies. public utility companies, and civic. 
educational. professional. or other organizations. As part qlthe planning 
process. the commission shall endeavor to promote a public interest in 
and understanding (?lthe commission~r; activities. 
The commission may. at any time, make recommendations to the 
governing hoard concerning the plan. planning process, or 
implementation (~lthe plan. 
Plaintiff submits that the above quoted statutes provide mandatory "substantive 
dictates" that must be considered in adopting land use laws. Neither the Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission. nor Board of County Commissioners even pretended 
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\ 
to solicit public input or to deliberate based upon these mandatory standards. Sprenger, 
Grubb & Associates. Inc. v. City of Hailev, 133 Idaho 320; 986 P.2d 343; Love v. Bd. of 
Ctv. Com'rs of Bingham, 105 Idaho 558. 559; 671 P.2d 471 (1983). Because no written 
record of Meetings or Hearings was kept it is impossible to produce documentary 
evidence of this failing until discovery is complete. A complete set of minutes and 
transcriptions of Meetings and Hearings will make abundantly clear that the Planning and 
Zoning Commission and Board of County Commissioners did not consider or deliberate 
regarding the impacts that these land use decisions would have on the economic or 
environmental well being of the community. as required by law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Camas County Defendants have flagrantly violated the spirit and letter of the 
procedural and substantive requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act and Open 
Meeting Laws. As a result of these violations Plaintiff has suffered damages in the form 
of diminution in value of real property subject to the illegally enacted land use regulation. 
Plaintiff~ damages are ongoing and will become irreparable if land use applications 
continue to be processed, in that each new subdivision or development has a direct 
impact on the value of real property owned by Plaintiff. The only relief available to 
Plaintiff is to maintain the status quo by Preliminary Injunction. 
RULE II SANCTIONS 
Camas County Defendant's seek sanctions under Rule II alleging that Attorney 
for Plaintiff did not conduct a pre-filing inquiry or that the inquiry's results were 
disregarded. Attorney for Defendant assails and dismisses Attorney for Plaintiff as 
incompetent and or dishonest. 
Plaintiffs Attorney is a new member of the Idaho Bar but a seasoned litigator 
having been admitted to the Missouri Bar in 1990. During those seventeen (17) years of 
lawyering counsel has never observed such a disrespectful and misplaced personal attack. 
peppered with offensive language and misstated facts, as that included in Defense 
Counsel's pleading. Opposing Attorneys are required to vigorously represent their 
clients. Attorneys must respectfully argue good faith disputes of fact and law. However, 
to attempt to obfuscate the issues at bar with unfounded. scurrilous conclusions is 
shameful and perhaps. actionable. For example. Attorney for the Camas County 
Defendants concludes, 
"The allegation that the County failed to keep a transcrihahle verhatim 
record of the proceedings at issue is laughable. Plaintiff" and their 
counsel would have learned this if they ever had the bright idea to check 
with the County to see whether the lapes exist hefore alleging they don't 
exist. But the:v did not. The County did, in fact, keep a transcrihahle 
record of erery single public meeting and puhlic hearing on the 
amendments to the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan.·' 
(Emphasis added) 
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In truth Attorney for Plaintiff not only inquired. Plaintiff himself made 
public records requests to Camas County regarding this issue that prove the 
County failed to maintain a transcribable verbatim record as required by law. The 
official responses to those requests. attached and marked as group Exhibits 3 (A)-
3(A)(iiii, show that Defendants failed to maintain a transcribable record of at least 
sixteen (16) separate Planning and Zoning Meetings/Public Hearings or Board of 
County Commissioner Meetings/Public Hearings wherein the land use topics at 
issue were discussed. 
Perhaps it is Defense Counsel \vho failed to make inquiry regarding the 
facts before filing his pleading? Plaintiff stands by his request for an order 
awarding attorneys fees under I.e. 12-117. 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (I.R.P.e.) provide the standards by 
which members of the Bar are to conduct themselves. According to the Rule's Preamble 
.. .... A lawyer should use the /trw's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to 
harass or intimidate others. A la~yer should demonstrate re.\pectfor the legal system and 
.for those who serve it, including judges, other lmvyers and public ofJicials. While it is a 
lawyer's duty, 1cj,'hen necessary, to challenge the rectitude (~f (dJicial action. it is also a 
lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. " 
Rule 3.1 regarding meritorious claims and contentions states, "A lawyer shall not 
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein. unless there is a 
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law ... " In defining 
"abuse" and "frivolous" the rule's commentary states "[lJ The advocate has a duty to use 
legal procedure for the filllest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse 
legal procedure .... [2}. ...... The action is .frivolous. however, ~f the lawyer is unable 
either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the 
action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
e:risting law. .. 
Defense Counsel has no good faith basis in fact or law to support his misstatement 
of facts or legal arguments. This type of conduct brings the profession in to public 
ridicule and does nothing to serve justice. Counsel should voluntarily retract the entire 
pleading or be subject to reprimand by the Bar. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this court issue its order preliminarily enjoining 
Defendant Camas County from processing any land use applications under the amended 
Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Code, including any and all subdivision applications, to 
issue an order awarding Plaintiff s attorney fees and to strike the inflammatory 
misstatements of Attorney for Camas County Defendant contained in his Request for 
Rule 11 Sanctions. 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
A TTOREY FOR PLAINTIFF 
c~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this I Z. day of.) uiVE 2007, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Objections to Plaintiffs Application 
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Request for Rule 11 
Sanctions by delivering same, via US Mail to Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney for Defendant 
Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, 
facsimile number 208 344 5800, and Stephanie J. Bonney and Carl Withroe, Attorneys 
for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, 
facsimile number 208331 1202. 
Christopher Simms 
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Stephanie 1. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. Withroe, ISB No. 705 I 
MOORE S:VllTI-I BUXTO~ & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 




Attorneysfor Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 











ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 





Case No. CV-07-24 
ANSWER OF 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY, 
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF 
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE 
CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, AND ED SMITH IN 
HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE 
CAMAS COUNTY PLANNING AND 
ZONING COMMISSION 
Come now Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected board of 
county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual 
Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission, (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys ofrecord, 
COUNTY DEFENDANTS' ANSWER -- I 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and answer the Plaintiffs' Petition for Breach of 
Contract, Tortious Interference with Contract, and for Declaratory Judgment. 
This pleading is divided into three parts. In Part I, the County Defendants answer the 
Plaintiffs' Petition in this matter using the same numbering scheme as in Plaintiffs' Petition. 
Phrases in brackets immediately following some paragraph numbers correspond to the heading 
provided by Plaintiffs and in no way should be construed as an admission or denial. Unless 
specific responses to individual sentences or allegations are indicated, the response applies to the 
entire corresponding paragraph in Plaintiffs' Petition. Part II sets forth the County Defendants' 
affirmative defenses; Part III contains the County Defendants' request for relief. 
I. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION 
The County Defendants admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
I. [Facts Common to all Counts and Jurisdictional Statement] County Defendants 
lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
2. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
3. Admit. 
4. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
5. Admit that the acts or omissions alleged in Plaintiffs' Petition occurred in Camas 
County, Idaho to the extent those acts or omissions relate to the alleged actions of the Camas 
County Planning and Zoning Commission and/or Camas County Board of County 
COCi\:TY DEFENDANTS' ANSWER -- 2 
Commissioners. Otherwise, County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and 
therefore deny. 
6. Deny. 
7. Deny that the judicial review provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act 












[Count I; Breach of Contract] Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
[Count II; Tortious Interference with Contract] County Defendants lack 
information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
17. Deny. 
18. Deny. 
19. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
20. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 




24. [Count III; Petition for Declaratory Judgment or in the Alternative Petition for 
Judicial Review] County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore 
deny. 
25. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
26. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
27. [Conflict of Interest] County Defendants are unable to ascertain from the Petition 
what "the time period addressed in this Petition" is and therefore deny. County Defendants 
admit that Ed Smith has served as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission. 
28. County Defendants admit that Ed Smith owns property in Camas County, Idaho, 
and has purchased and sold property in Camas County. County Defendants otherwise deny. 
29. Admit that Ed Smith is a duly-licensed Idaho real estate agent and that Mr. Smith 
has generated income as such. County Defendants otherwise deny. 
30. Deny. 
31. [Planning and Zoning Commission Lacked Jurisdiction] Deny. 
32. [Fatal Procedural Infirmities (Due Process Violations)] Deny. 
33. Deny. 
34. Deny. 




38. Deny and affirmatively allege that Plaintiffs' Petition is wholly devoid of any merit 
\vhatsoever and that the County Defendants are entitled to costs and attorney fees pursuant to 
I. C. § 12- I 17 because this action has been brought without a reasonable basis in fact and law. 
II. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
First Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in their favor and 
against the County Defendants. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of their own actions 
or omissions. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of the acts or 
omissions of others for whom the County Defendants are not liable. 
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Sixth Affirmative Defense 
PlaintitTs have failed to comply with the requirements of Title 6, Chapter 9, Tort Claims 
against Government Entities. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants have immunity pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-904(1), 6-904(3), and 6-
904B(3). 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants are not liable for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. § 6-918. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
The Plaintiffs have not suffered actual harm or a violation of a fundamental right as 
required by I.C. § 67-6535. 
III. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore, the answering County Defendants request that the Plaintiffs take nothing by 
their Petition and each cause of action pleaded therein; that the County Defendants be awarded 
their reasonable costs and attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-117,12-120,12-121, and 6-918A; and 
that the Court provide the County Defendants any further relief as may be just and equitable. 
Respectfully submitted this J-o~ay of June, 2007. 
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MOORE SMITH BUXTO~ & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Carl J. Withroe 
Attorneys for County Defendants 
* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-; f"-
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer was this CLJ day 
of June, 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Via United States mail 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Via United States mail 
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Stephanie 1. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. Withroe, ISB No. 7051 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 




Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM ) 






ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 




Case No. CV-07-24 
POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORTING COUNTY DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINAR Y INJUNCTION 
Come now Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected board of 
county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual 
Commissioners), and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission, (collectively, County Defendants), by and through theh attorneys of record, 
POST-HEARING MEMORANl)U:v1-- 1 
U//uO/;::UUi 13:31 F:U. lOS 331 llOl MOORE SMITH BUXTON T{IRCK 141003 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit this Memorandum Supporting County 




At the June 27, 2007 hearing on Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction, the Court posed the question: If the Camas County Planning 
and Zoning Commission has not adopted organization papers or bylaws for the transaction of 
business, what is the remedy? The Court allowed the parties ten days to brief the matter and then 
a seven-day period in which to respond to each other's submissions. For the reasons discussed 
below, the County Defendants submit that an order invalidating the actions of the Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners and enjoining said Commission 
or the Board from processing land-use applications is not an appropriate remedy. 1 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs seek to invalidate the Board of Commissioners' March 2007 adoption of the 
County's zoning ordinance map and land-use map and the April 2007 adoption of the zoning 
ordinance. They seek also to enjoin the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
Commissioners from processing land-use applications under the new land-use map, zoning map, 
1 The position set forth in this Memorandum operates on the assumption that Camas County Ordinance No. II does 
not adequately supply the "organization papers or bylaws consistent with [the Local Land Use Planning Act] and 
other laws of this state for the transaction of business" contemplated in I.C. § 67-6504(c). This Memorandum, of 
course, in no way concedes that Ordinance No. I J does not supply what is required. 
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and zoning ordinance. They have lodged several justifications for this remedy, but at this stage 
of the action, the question is whether the assumed failure of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission to adopt organization papers or bylaws for the transaction of business is a basis on 
which to invalidate those actions and enjoin the Commission and Board from processing further 
land-use applications. It is not. In short, the requirement in I.C. § 67-6504(c) is directory, not 
mandatory. In such cases, invalidation of the ultimate governmental action is unavailable. 
A. The Requirement in I.C. § 67-6504(c) 
Idaho Code § 67-6504 authorizes governing boards to create planning and zonmg 
commissions and prescribes certain membership and other organizational requirements on those 
commIssIOns. Subparagraph (c) of that section, concerning rules, records, and meetings, 
provides that "[w]ritten organization papers or bylaws consistent with [the Local Land Use 
Planning Act] and other laws of the state for the transaction of business of the commission shall 
be adopted." Thus it is known what must be adopted-organizational papers or bylaws-and for 
what purpose they must be adopted-the transaction of business of the commission. 
Subparagraph (c) provides no remedy for noncompliance; nor does it state that the existence of 
organization papers or bylaws is a prerequisite to the validity of actions taken by a planning and 
zoning commission. 
B. Statutes and Ordinances Using "Shall" to Direct Action by the Entity May be 
Deemed to Have "Mandatory" Effect or "Directory" Effect; Failure to Comply with 
"Directory" Obligations will Not Invalidate the Ultimate Governmental Action. 
Plaintiffs assume that because subparagraph (c) contains the word "shall," any failure to 
strictly comply with that subparagraph renders void any action made by the Planning and Zoning 
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Commission whilst in noncompliance. This is not so. Statutes and ordinances containing a 
"shall" do not necessarily carry the inherent remedy of invalidation of the ultimate government 
action when the "shall" is not strictly obeyed. Indeed, courts have long followed the principle 
that the failure to follow the obligation imposed by a "shall" will only invalidate the ultimate 
governmental action if the provision is deemed to have "mandatory," rather than "directory" 
effect. See Department of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150,595 P.2d 
299 (1979). The distinction between statutes with a "mandatory" or "directory" effect does not 
say whether the obligation is mandatory or permissive; rather, it says merely what the remedy is 
for noncompliance. The remedy is invalidation of the ultimate government action where the 
obligation is deemed to have "mandatory" effect; where the obligation is deemed to have 
"directory" effect, the governmental action will not be invalidated. See Morris v. County 0/ 
Marin, 559 P.2d 606, 61-11 (Cal. 1977); Solen Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Heisler, 381 N.W.2d 201, 203 
(N.D. 1986). 
The test to determine whether a statute has mandatory effect or directory effect depends 
on the purpose of the act in which the "shaH" is found. In One 1955 Willys Jeep, for example, 
the state sought forfeiture of the Willys. Idaho Code § 37-2744(d)(3)(D) then provided: "If a 
verified answer is filed, the forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing on a day not less than 
thirty (30) days therefrom; and the proceeding shall have priority over other civil cases." 100 
Idaho at 151, 595 P.2d at 300 (emphasis added). Among the Willys' owners' arguments was that 
they were entitled to dismissal because the forfeiture proceeding was not given priority over 
other civil cases and cited the number of other civil cases scheduled for hearing in front of the 
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proceeding on the Willys. ld. at 154, 595 P.2d at 303. The Court detennined that the "shall" at 
issue was merely directory, not mandatory, and thus the failure to strictly comply with it did not 
entitle the owners to dismissal. ld. 
The Court captured the essence of the distinction thusly: "Where the prescribed 
procedure is not the essence of the thing to be accomplished the statute is generally considered 
directory and not mandatory." 100 Idaho at 154, 595 P.2d at 303 (citations omitted). It stated 
that "whether a statute is mandatory or directory [is] to be ascertained from a consideration of the 
entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences that would result from construing it one 
way or the other." ld. (quoting Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87,89,481 P.2d 318,320 (1971». 
The Court observed that the statute provided the circumstances in which a vehicle could be 
seized and set forth an orderly and expeditions manner for initiating and conducting forfeiture 
proceedings. ld. Where there was no showing of "substantial prejudice" caused by the lack of 
priority, the Court declined to endorse dismissal of the case on that basis. ld 
C. Provisions Relating to the Conduct of the Entity's Business are Considered to Have 
"Directory" Effect. 
Courts generally hold that provisions enacted to secure the orderly conduct of the entity's 
business, rather than those enacted for the benefit of the plaintiff, are typically considered 
directory. The decisional law on this is plentiful. See Western/California, Ltd v. Dry Creek 
Joint Elem. Sch. Dist., 50 Cal.App.4th 1461, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1996) 
(statute requiring school districts to give notice to county of increased fee related to the conduct 
of business, not the benefit of the individual, and was thus directory); Skelly Estate Co. v. City 
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and County of San Francisco, 9 Ca1.2d 28, 33 69 P.2d 171 (Cal. 1937) ("Provisions which have 
been enacted as a guide to orderly proceedings and which, from the intent of that legislature 
gathered from the provisions of the act and the end sought to be accomplished thereby are not 
mandatory, are merely directory"); Ryan v. Byram, 4 Cal.2d 596, 603, 51 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1935); 
Kiernan v. Roadway Express, Inc., 545 A.2d 1158 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988) ("The most satisfactory 
and conclusive test for determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the 
prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished or, in other words, 
whether it relates to the matter of substance or convenience"); Seattle v. Auto Metal Workers, 
620 P .2d 119 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) ("the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent as 
disclosed by all the terms and provisions of the act in relation to the subject of legislation, and by 
a consideration of the nature of the act, the general object to be accomplished, and the 
consequences that would result from construing the particular statute in one way or another"); 
Maricopa County v. Garfield, 513 P.2d 932 (Ariz. 1973) (per curiam) (holding statute directing 
county to levy assessments by date certain is directory, noting that "[i]fthe provisions are for the 
protection or benefit of the taxpayer the statute is generally construed to be mandatory in nature. 
If the purpose of the statute does not involve the protection of the taxpayer but is to set forth an 
administrative system and guide for the tax officials as to the time within which certain acts are 
to be performed by the officials, the statute is generally construed to be directory"); Nelms v. 
Vaughan, 5 S.E. 704, 706 (Va. 1888) ("A statute directing the mode of proceeding by public 
officers is to be deemed directory, and a precise compliance is not to be deemed essential to the 
validity of the proceedings, unless so declared by statute"). 
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D. Idaho Code § 67-6504(c)'s Command that Planning and Zoning Commissions Adopt 
Organization Papers or Bylaws for the Transaction of Business Relates to the 
Conduct ofthe Commission's Business. 
The test to detennine whether a statute or ordinance has mandatory effect or directory 
effect means that the purpose for the requirement in I.C. § 67-6504(c) that organization papers 
for the transaction of business be adopted is important. A plain, everyday reading of that section 
reveals that the requirement is aimed at the orderly conduct of the commission's business, and 
that it is not intended to be a substantive provision which relates to the essence of the thing to be 
accomplished in LLUP A or, which, if followed, would confer any benefit upon the Plaintiffs. 
The phrase, "the transaction of business" is a common phrase found no fewer than seventy-eight 
times in the Idaho Code. Often, this phrase is found in the context of a requirement that a 
quorum be present "for the transaction of business." See, e.g., I.C. § 1-206 (presence of three 
justices necessary for the transaction of business of the Supreme Court), Other times, the phrase 
is found in a provision relating to assembling the members to do what the body does-or, in 
other words, transact business-and the manner in which the body does its business. See, e.g., 
I.C. § 67-8303 (Idaho Food Quality Assurance Institute; providing that "[a]s soon as possible 
after their appointment the commissioners shall organize for the transaction of business by 
choosing a vice-chairman and by adopting bylaws and rules suitable to the purpose of organizing 
the institute and conducting the business thereof'); I.C. § 67-6204 (Idaho Housing and Finance 
Association; providing "[a]s soon as possible after their appointment, the commissioners shall 
organize for the transaction of business by choosing a vice-chainnan and by adopting bylaws and 
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rules suitable to the purpose of organizing the association and conducting the business thereof'). 
This phrase denotes only the conduct of business. 
By contrast, when the Legislature directs an agency to make substantive rules or rules to 
implement a statute, that command uses different language altogether. See, e.g., I.C. § 39-5209 
(Idaho Council on Domestic Violence and Victim Assistance; providing that "[t]he council shall 
promulgate, adopt and amend rules and criteria to implement the provisions of this chapter . . . 
."); I.C. § 6-2604 (Clandestine Drug Laboratory Cleanup Act; stating that Department of Health 
and Welfare "shall promulgate rules establishing the acceptable process and standards for the 
cleanup of clandestine drug laboratories"); I.C. § 67-7411 (state Lottery Commission "shall 
promulgate ruJes and regulations specifying the terms and conditions for contracting with lottery 
game retailers to provide availability of tickets or shares to prospective buyers of each lottery 
game"). 
Thus, it is clear that I.C. § 67-6504(c) is wholly procedural, relating to "[r]ules, [r]ecords, 
and [m]eetings," as is the whole of section 67-6504. It provides for the creation of commissions, 
membership requirements and terms, organization and subcommittees, and expenditures and 
staff. This section contains no substantive provisions. 
Indeed, the remainder of LLUP A supplies those substantive provisions. In some 
instances, LLUPA provides outright requirements. For example, I.e. § 67-6508 provides the 
substance of the plan, including those elements that a plan must include; section 67-6509 
provides the process to adopt or amend the plan; section 67-6506 prohibits commission members 
\vith economic interests in a particular proceeding from participating in such proceedings; 
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section 67-6511 supplies the procedure for adopting or amending zoning ordinances; section 67-
6509 provides the notice-and-hearing requirements for adopting or amending the plan (which are 
also to be used for development agreements, I.e. § 67-6511 A); section 67 -6512(b) provides the 
notice-and-hearing requirements for special use permits and planned unit development pemlits 
(see I.e. § 67-6515). 
That which is not imposed by statute is left to the governing board, not the commission, 
to determine by ordinance or resolution. Planning and zoning commissions are granted or 
permitted no substantive rulemaking authority. Planning and zoning commissions are creations 
of the particular governing board; they certainly cannot adopt rules contravening LLUPA or 
other laws or ordinances. Importantly, planning and zoning commissions are prohibited from 
passing ordinances. I.e. § 67-6504. The governing board, not the planning and zoning 
commission, adopts a comprehensive plan and ordinances authorizing and providing the 
requirements for various land uses. See, e.g., I.e. §§ 67-6509 (comprehensive plan adopted by 
resolution of the governing board); 67-6511 (governing board adopts zoning ordinance and 
amendments thereto); I.e § 67-6513 (governing board shall provide by ordinance for the 
processing of subdivision applications); I.e. § 67-6514 (governing board may provide by 
ordinance for the processing of applications for planned unit developments). Therefore, the 
requirement for organization papers or bylaws for the transaction of the business of the 
commission relates to the conduct of the commission's business. 
It would be absurd to think, as Plaintiffs posited at the June 27 hearing, that a planning 
and zoning commission would need to adopt organization papers relating to conflicts of interest 
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or other land-use or environmental matters when (a) planning and zoning commissions lack the 
authority to adopt ordinances, and (b) LLUPA and county ordinances supply those substantive 
provisions by which the planning and zoning commission must abide. 
Furthermore, it is not as if the Commission is running amok without any guidance or 
supervision of the parent body. Camas County Ordinance No. 11 fulfills the purpose identified 
in I.C. § 67-6504(c). Section 4--titled "Rules-Organization and Meetings"-directs the 
Commission to elect its own chair and create and fill such offices as it may deem necessary "for 
the proper conduct of the affairs and business of the commission." It provides the circumstances 
for calling meetings, defines a quorum, requires open meetings, and requires written records of 
meetings, hearings, resolutions, findings, studies, permits, and actions.2 Section 5 imposes on 
the Commission various duties relating the planning process; Section 5 authorizes expenditures 
and employees. Together, Sections 4 and 5 certainly provide the written "organization papers" 
for the transaction of business of the Commission. 
Finally, the record lacks any evidence or even an allegation that the lack of organization 
papers harmed the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not explained how any organization papers or 
bylaws would have protected them, nor have they presented a reasonable argument that the lack 
of organization papers infected or even relates to the ultimate decision. The "thing to be 
accomplished" in LLUPA is a public planning and development process based on various 
substantive criteria supplied in the statute and by county ordinances. See I.C. § 67-6502; One 
2 Section 4 also requires that "[wJritten rules consistent with this Ordinance and the Laws of the State ofldaho for 
the transaction of business of the commission shall be adopted." Just as the statutory requirement for written 
organization papers is directory, so too (and for the same reasons) is the ordinance requirement. 
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1955 Wi/lys Jeep, 100 Idaho at 154, 595 P.2d at 303 (in determining whether statute has 
mandatory or directory effect requires examination of "the entire act, its nature, its object, and 
the consequences that would result from construing it one way or another"). The requirement of 
organization papers or bylaws for the transaction of business of the commission does not relate 
in a substantive way to that end. It is therefore implausible that the Legislature intended the lack 
of organization papers for the transaction of business to nullify recommendations by planning 
and zoning commission and decisions by a governing board. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
If the Court determines that "organization papers or bylaws for the transaction of 
business of the commission" have not been adopted, the Court should determine that, for the 
reasons discussed above, I.C. § 67-6504(c)'s provision that such papers shall be adopted is 
directory, not mandatory, and thus deny the application for an injunction. 
Respectfully submitted this (Q ~ay of July 2007. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Carl J. Withroe 
Attorneys for the County Defendants 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Post-Hearing Memorandum 
this fzt-"- day of July, 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the 
corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
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Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
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CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacity, 
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Case No. CV-07-24 
VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
and PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OF 
PUBLIC RECORDS 
.. \ 
COMES NOW Plaintifl George Martin personally and through counsel and files 
this his Application for Temporary Restraining Order, and in support thereof states as 
follows, 
1. Now pending with this court is a Petition for Declaratory Judgment 
against Camas County requesting this court to declare null and void the actions of the 
Board of County Commissioners and Planning and Zoning Commission in adopting an 
Amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance as in violation of I.C. Title 67 
Chapter 65, commonly referred to ao;; the Local Land Use Planning Act, (LLUPA). 
a. Plaintiff s Petition alleges certain members of the Planning and 
Zoning Commission and Board of County Commissioner's 
illegally acted under the influence of conflict of interest; and 
further alleges that the Planning and Zoning Commission was not 
lawfully formed and therefore lacked power to make the required 
recommendations under LLUP A; and that the procedure followed 
by the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners was so ripe with infirmities that Plaintiff s Due 
Process rights were violated. 
2. Plaintiff has learned the Defendants are contemplating destruction of 
Public Records that may be germane to this case. 
3. Attached hereto is a copy of the Agenda for the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners showing a discussion item under the heading "Discuss possible resolution 
for destroying public records" 
4. Plaintiff has requested additional information regarding this item but been 
refused. 
5. It is Plaintiff's belief upon mqUIry that Defendants are attempted to 
destroy evidence in violation of law. 
6. Because of the pending lawsuit Plaintiff will be immediately and 
irreparably and uniquely damaged if Defendant is not restrained from destroying any of 
following types or categories of Camas County Public Records dealing in anyway with 
Amendments to the Comprehensive Plan, Zoning Ordinance or related use 
including and on October 
a. Meeting or Public Hearing Minutes of both the Planning and 
Zoning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners. 
b. Notices of any type or manner of Meetings or Public Hearings of 
the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
c. Agendas of any type or manner of Meetings or Public Hearings of 
the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
d. Recordings of any and all Meetings or Public Hearings of the 
Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of County 
Commissioners and or any written record or summary thereof. 
e. Memorandum, notes, recommendations or drafts of various 
ordinances, Comprehensive Plans, or any members of Planning 
and Zoning Commission and or the Board of County 
Commissioners or Planning Administrator. 
f. Comments or documentary submittals of any type or manner in 
relation to Meetings or Public Hearings of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and or the Board of County Commissioners. 
g. Any and all road records and expenditures therefore, and 
correspondence, electronic or paper, related thereto, including but 
not limited to those related to communication with or funding from 
US Department of Homeland Security and FEMA, and or any and 
all branches of Idaho government. 
h. Any email correspondence of any type or manner between 
members of the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board 
of County Commissioners, elected and/or appointed officials and 
county employees. 
1. Any and all maps including drafts, submissions that represent 
suggestions, proposals, drafts or tinal Zoning or Land Use Maps. 
7. Plaintiff has contacted Defendant, through counsel, seeking a Consent 
Order related to destruction of the above described records, who after initially consenting 
to such an order has refused to consent to such an order. 
8. Counsel for Plaintiff has made repeated attempts to contact counsel for 
Defendant to arrange a mutually convenient date and time to approach the Court but 
counsel for Defendant has not responded. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this court issue its order temporarily restraining 
and Defendant Camas County from destroying Public Records as specified in paragraph 
six (6) hereof and the proposed Temporary Restraining Order submitted herewith. 
I GEORGE MARTIN, the Petitioner herein, declare under oath that the above is true to 
the best of my knowledge. 
Dated this I st day of May, 2007. 
Petitioner 
GEORGE MARTIN 
State of Idaho ) 
) 
County of Blaine ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by GEORGE MARTIN, a person to me known, 
this I st:tt ef~fay, 2007. 





CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S MEETING 
AT THE COURTHOUSE ANNEX COMMISSIONER'S ROON1 
July 9, 2007 
9:00 Arvt - 5:00 PM (as time permits) 
*Bills presented for consideration & approval 
*Correspondence & committee reports 
*Executive session as needed 
*Planning & Zoning issues 
*Review & sign Joint Fire Department Agreement 
*Review RFP from the Fairboard 
*Review & sign proposed Resolution # 110, regarding Forest Reserve 
payments 
9:00 AM 
*Call to order 
*Reading of the minutes 
9:15 AM 
*Terry Lee Re: USDA Noxious Weed Cost Share Application & 
Agreement 
9:30 AM 
* Public Hearing to hear proposed Resolution # 108, relating to the 
Subdivision Ordinance, to increase the schedule of fees & reimbursable 
expenses 
9:451\.\11 
* Public Hearing to hear proposed Resolution # 109, relating to the Zoning 
Ordinance, to increase the schedule of fees and reimbursable expenses 
10:00 A\1 
* Adjourn as a Board of County Commissioners and meet as a Board of 
Equalization 
10;00 AM 
* Review the appeal from Bill Easterwood on Lots 3, 4, & 5 Block 37, 
Fairfield 
10:30 AM 
*Revicw the appeal of Jackie & Allen Lewis on Lot 20 Block 3. Fairfield 
11:00 AM 
*Hcar the appeal of Adam Umbaugh on RPOIS 17E5420lA at West Magic 
II :30 A\1 
*I1ear the appeal of Greg & Rosalie Miller on RP04N 13E220205A 
1:00PM 
*Discuss County Street Standards 
3:00 PM 
* Discuss Herd Districts 
4:00 Prvt 
* Discuss possible resolution for destroying public records 
* If all agenda items are not covered on July 9, the meeting will be adjourned to 
another date for completion of the agenda. 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTOREY FOR PLAINTIFF 
Christopher P. Simms 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this 13th day of July 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Response to Objections to Plaintiffs Application for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Request for Rule 11 
Sanctions by delivering same, via facsimile to Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney for Defendant 
Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, 
facsimile number 208 344 5800, and Stephanie J. Bonney and Carl Withroe, Attorneys 
for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, 
facsimile number 208 331 1202. 
Christopher Simms 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at La\v 
US Bank Bldg .. Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum. ID 83340 
Tel: 208622 7878 
Fax: 208 622 7129 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 











CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO. 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacity. 
KEN BACKTROM. 































Case No. CV-07-24 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORTING COUNTY DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
APPLICATION FOR TRO and 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
PLAINTlFF"S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S POST-HEARING 
\lE\10RANDU:V1 SI:PPORTING OBJEC nONS TO APPLICATION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
cor'viES NOW Plaintiff. through counsel, and tiles this his Brief in Response to 
Defendant's Post-Hearing Memorandum Supporting Objection to Application for 
Preliminary Injunction. and does state as follows: 
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
On June 27. 2007 this matter came on for evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs 
Application for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin ongoing processing of 
all land use applications under the Camas County Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
Ordinances as amended in the Spring of 2007. and ordinances adopted pursuant thereto. 
because the Ordinances were not lawfully adopted according to the Local Land Use 
Planning Act (LLUPA I.c. 67-6501 et. seq.) 
The hearing was limited by the court to the issue of whether the Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission was lawfully formed and the proper remedy for the 
accumulation of LLUPA violations asserted by Plaintiff. Plaintiff requested the Court to 
order the trial on the merits advanced and consolidated with the hearing on the 
Application pursuant to LR.C.P. 65(a)(2). At the conclusion of hearing the Court granted 
the parties ten (10) days to submit optional briefs of the issues and an additional seven (7) 
days to respond. This Memorandum is Plaintiffs response to Defendant's Post-Hearing 
Memorandum. 
Plaintiff petitioned this Court for Declaratory Judgment ruling that the Amended 
Comprehensive Plan and Amended Zoning Ordinance. adopted on March 29 and April 
18. 2007. and ordinances adopted pursuant thereto. illegal and therefore null and void. 
The LLUPA process began as to these amendments in the Fall of 2005. Specifically. 
Plaintiff asserts and argues that; (1) The Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission did not lawfully exist while attempting to perform mandatory functions 
under LLUPA and therefore all land use ordinances are void: (2) The Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission failed to maintain a reviewable record as required by 
law. and therefore all land use ordinances adopted during the process are void: (3) 
Inadequate notice and hearing procedure \vas employed by he Camas County Planning 
and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissions and therefore all land use ordinances 
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adopted during the process are void; (4) The Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission and Board of Commissions failed to follow the substanth'e dictates of 
LLLlPA and therefore all land use ordinances adopted during the process are void: and 
(5) Certain members of the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissions 
participated in the process despite prohibited conflicts of interest, and therefore all land 
use ordinances adopted during the process are void. 
Argument and evidence \vas presented by both Plaintiff and Defendant. 
PlaintifTs Exhibits I. 2A. 2C, 20. 2E. 2F. 2H, 2L 21. 9A, 9B. 9C & 90 \vere admitted 
into evidence. Exhibits 2A through 2F are a succession of Public Records requests and 
responses thereto admitting the Planning and Zoning Commission lacked by-laws. 
Exhibits 2H. 21 and 21 prove the County attempted to adopt bylaws by ordinance dated 
September 11,2006 but failed to publish said ordinance until some six (6) months later. 
Defendant submitted Ordinances 1 L 47. 85, 126 & 147. all of \vhich pertained to 
fOlmation of the Camas County Planning Commission and duplicated the ot1icial text as 
revealed in Plaintiff's Exhibits. Defendant conceded that Camas County never adopted 
Planning and Zoning Commission Bylaws. 
The facts are not contested. Camas County did not adopt bylaws or other written 
organizational papers for the Planning and Zoning Commission prior to September 12. 
2006 when it adopted ordinance 147. Ordinance 147 failed to become law because the 
county did not publish until beyond thirty (30) days as required by LC.37-715. Neither is 
it contested that the Planning and Zoning Commission not only began to debate but 
passed along recommended amendments to the Board of Commissioners before 
September 12.2006. 
ARGUMENT 
While it is true that Plaintiff has requested the Court to order the trial on the 
merits advanced and consolidated with the hearing on the Application pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 65(a)(2). the matter immediately before the court is whether a Preliminary 
Injunction should issue. Rule 65(e) provides the grounds for preliminary injunction. In 
pel1inent part the Rule states "A preliminary injunction may be granted in the tollO\\ing 
cases: (1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
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demanded. and such reliet~ or any part thereof. consists in restraining the commission or 
continuance of the acts complained of. either for a limited period or perpetually. (2) 
When it appears by the complaint or atlidavit that the commission or continuance of 
some act during the litigation would produce waste. or great or irreparable injury to the 
plaintiff. (3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing. or 
threatens. or is about to do. or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation 
of the plaintiffs rights. respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the 
judgment ineffectual. .. " 
Defendant's argument IS limited to whether failure to provide written 
organizational papers or bylaws is, standing alone. fatal to all subsequent land use 
ordinances. This argument ignores not only the accumulation of errors but the specific 
issue before the court. as presented by Rule 65( e). Does it appear that Plaintiff is entitled 
to the relief sought? Will the continuance of some act, (i.e. processing land use 
applications under the illegally adopted Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance) 
during the litigation produce great or irreparable injury to plaintiff? Does it appear that 
defendant is doing. or is about to do, some act in violation of the Plaintiffs rights 
respecting the subject of the action tending to render the judgment ineffectual? 
Defendant argues only that the language of Ordinance II satisfies any 
requirement for written organizational papers or bylaws. Defendant argues the term 
"shall" as used in I.C. 67-6504 (c) "Written organizational papers or bylaws ..... shall be 
adopted" and in the County's own Ordinance 11, Section 4 "Written rules consistent with 
this Ordinance with this Ordinance and the Laws of the State of Idaho for the transaction 
of business of the commission shall be adopted .. ." is simply directory. not mandatory. 
Besides missing the larger point Defendant overlooks case law describing the LLUPA 
requirements as mandatory. Sprenller, Grubb & Associates. Inc. v. Citv of Hailey. 133 
Idaho 320 at 32 L 986 P.2d 343 (1999) Curiously. Defendant. Camas County. with the 
advice of Defense Counsel adopted on April 18, 2007 a Subdivision Ordinance defining 
the term "shall" with its standard and commonly understood, mandatory meaning. 
(Ordinance Attached hereto) 
Defendant also argues ·· .. it is not as if the Commission is running amok without 
any guidance or supervision of the parent body'" Finally, Defendant argues that such 
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directory language is meaningless and should produce no remedy. Perhaps. if the only 
violation of the letter and spirit of LLUPA were this single technical violation. the lack of 
bylaws or other organizational papers could be overlooked. But it is not. 
I. ACCUMULATION OF LUJPA VIOLATIONS 
Paragraph (1) of Rule 65(e) authorizes issuance of Preliminary Injunction \vhen it 
appears Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. It is within the sound discretion of the 
District Court to grant or deny a Preliminary Injunction. Walker v. Boozer. 140 Idaho 
451. 95 P.3d 69 (S.Ct. 2004) LLUPA contains fairly rigorous procedural requirements to 
assure an objective and robust public process regarding land use issues on a local level. 
Given the long line of case law holding local governments strictly to the procedural 
requirements of LLUPA and the verified pleadings and proof before the court. it certainly 
appears likely Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. Plaintiff respectfully requests the 
court to look beyond the confines of the technical violation of LLUPA contained in the 
failure to properly form the Planning and Zoning Commission and consider the clear and 
convincing evidence presented by the pleadings and evidence already before the court. 
Plaintiff previously submitted to the court. as attachments to PlaintifTs Response 
to Defendant Camas County's Objections to Plaintiffs Application for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. ample evidence that Camas County failed 
to maintain a reviewable record of the LLUPA proceedings giving rise to the complained 
of Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. Exhibits 3A-3A(iiii) are a series of 
Public Records Requests and Responses thereto verifying that no transcribable record 
was kept of at least sixteen (16) P&Z and Board of Commissioner Meetings/Hearings 
dealing with the complained of Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. Plaintiff 
hereby otTers said Exhibits into evidence. 
Plaintiff previously submitted to the court. as attachments to PlaintitTs Response 
to Detendant Camas County's Objections to Plaintiffs Application for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. ample evidence of prohibited conflicts of 
interest by certain members of the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners in violation of I.e. 67-6506. Exhibits SA. 88. SC and SO consist 
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of official public records and demonstrative materials indicating the up-zonmg and 
favorable treatment given Defendants Ed Smith and Ken Backstom. Plaintiff hereby 
offers said Exhibits into evidence. 
When process and procedure are disregarded violation of due process of law 
become inevitable. Gav v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County. 103 Idaho 626 
(Ct. App. 19K?): Jerome County v. Hollovvav 118 Idaho 681 (S.Ct. 1990) The Court in 
Gay viev,ed •· ... a transcribable record as indispensable to meaningful judicial review of 
the rezoning proceedings where the sufficiency of notice. adequacy of opportunity to 
present or rebut evidence. or the existence of evidence supporting the agency" s tindings 
may be put at issue." 
It is an indisputable fact that transcribable records were not kept as to at least 
sixteen (16) Planning and Zoning and Board of County Commissioner Meeting/Hearings 
dealing with the amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinances. It is likewise 
indisputable at least one member of the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners had an economic interest in the outcome of the amended 
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. It is also clear that favorable upzonmg 
occurred on discrete parcels of land owned by those individuals who were charged with 
the public trust of objectivity. What is the meaning of the LLUPA procedural and 
contlict of interest requirements if valid zoning laws can be passed despite massive 
departures from those requirements? 
As to paragraph (2) of Rule 65( e). if this court does not now enter a Preliminary 
Injunction Plaintiff will suffer great and irreparable injury. Now pending are multiple 
subdivision applications under the new amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
Ordinance. A hearing \vill be held on one such application on Tuesday July 10.2007. the 
P&Z Agenda for said meeting is attached hereto. The amendments allow thousands more 
residential units to be built in Camas County than under the original rules. Real property 
owned by Plaintitfis among the limited acreage in the County downzoned. Clearly. these 
illegal ordinances. if ongoing applications are permitted to be processed. \>,ill cause 
plaintiff great and irreparable injury. 
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II. PRESERVATION OF STATUS QUO 
The Court expressed. appropriately. concern for the rights of third parties and 
potential damage to individual land owners if an Injunction is issued. Plaintiff contends 
that the rights of those third parties are not now fixed in that no land use applications 
have been processed under the amended ordinances. If continued processing of land use 
applications. under the illegally adopted new amended ordinances. is not enjoined those 
land O\vner applicants may gain rights that do not now exist. Plaintiff seeks only an order 
maintaining the status quo as it existed before the illegal adopted new amended 
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinances. 
As to paragraph (3) of the Rule. the very heart of this lawsuit is whether Camas 
County can enforce the illegally adopted new amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
Ordinances. If the County is not restrained now. the damage to Plaintiff, and the land. 
will be forever done. No future judgment declaring the Amended Comprehensive Plan 
and Zoning Ordinance null and void can undo the development that will have taken 
place. the rights vested in third parties. or economic damage to Plaintiff Only by entering 
a Preliminary Injunction preventing the processing of any and all land use applications 
under the illegally adopted amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. and 
related ordinances. can the status quo be preserved. thereby avoiding further damage to 
Plaintiff and others. 
The Court in Farm Service v. U. S. Steel Corp .. 90 Idaho 570. 414 P.2d 898 
(1966) stated. 
A party need not show that he would be entitled to the relie/prayed 
.fiJr upon/inal hearing of the case. It is sufficient to show a state ol 
facts which makes the transaction a subject oj'inl'estif{ation by a 
court of equity. White v. Coeur D'Alene Big Creek Jfininf{ Co .. 56 
Idaho 282. 55 P.2d ~20 (1936); Blue Creek Land and Livestock 
Co. v. Bailie Creek Sheep Co .. 52 Ida/to 728, 19 P.2d 628 (1933): 
Rowland \'. Kellogg Power and Water Co .. -10 Idaho 216. 233 P. 
869 (1925): Buena Vista Co. v. Boise Basin Co. Ltd.. 29 Idaho 
~R9. 162 P. 330 (1916;: Gilbert 1'. Elder. 65 Idaho 383. 31'55. 1-1-1 
P.2d 19-1 (19-13): Boise Development Company v. Idaho Trust and 
Savings Bank. Ltd. 2-1 idaho 36. 133 P. 916: Carolina Pines r. 
Catalina Pines. 121'5 Cal. App. 1'5-1.16 P.2d -81. 
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The purpose oj' (/ preliminm:v injunction is 10 maintain Ihe 
slallis quo and prevent irreparahle injury durinK the penden(V oj' 
Ihe aelion. Blue ('reek Land and Livestock ('0. v. Battle ('reek 
5;heep Co., 52 Ida/w 728, 19 P,2d 628 (}933): lVashington lValer 
Power Co. r. Crane. -10 Idaho 3lO. 233 P. 878 (1925). 
The "stalus quo" to he preserved hy a temporary injunction is 
Ihe last uncontested status which preceded the pendinK 
controveny, and not the silUation as it existed at the time the 
preliminw)' injunction was granted. Tanner Jfotor Livery, Ltd. v. 
Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 80-1 (91h Cir., 1963): rrestinghouse Electric 
Corp. v. Free SelvinK Mach Co., 256 F.2d 806 (7th Cir., 1958); 
J/CLean v. Employers Casualty Co.. 381 S'. W2d 582 
(Tex. ('iv.App.196-1). 
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER LLUPA 
The Courts have long held the government to the letter of the law regarding 
procedural safeguards in land use legislation. Even prior to adoption of LLUPA the court 
in Citizens for Better Government v. County of Valley, 95 Idaho 320. 508 P.2d 550 
(Supreme Court of Idaho 1973). held that local government are required to adhere to 
zoning enabling acts as a condition precedent to the proper exercise of zoning authority. 
Id at 322. In Citizens for Better Government a county zoning ordinance was held void 
where the government failed to publish notice of hearing or holding a public hearing as 
required by statute. The Court also clearly recognized the principle that "When the 
statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property 
rights the action of the legislative body becomes quasi judicial in character .... the 
requirements of due process and may not be dispensed with." Id at 322 quoting Johnston 
v. Board ofSup'rs of Marin Countv. 31 Cal.2d 66187 P.2d 686 (1947). 
In Gay v. Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (Ct. App. Id. 1984) 
the Court again held that the requirement of procedural due process is applicable to 
proceedings on request to change land use authorized for a particular parcel of property. 
More speci fically the court held ..... that notice. opportuni ty to present and rebut 
evidence. preparation of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. and keeping a 
transcribable record comprise the common core of procedural due process requirements. 
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constitutionally mandated in all cases where zoning authorities are requested to change 
the land use authorized for a particular parcel of land." Id at 629. 
In Mannokian v. Blaine County. III Idaho 697. __ p.2d ___ . (1987) the 
Idaho Supreme Court held conditional use permit null and void due to participation by 
member of the planning and zoning commission and by member of board of 
commissioners in zoning process where members' property was affected by the pernlit. 
The Court cited "I.C. Section 67-6506 pronounces in clear and unambiguous terms that 
"vhere a contlict of interest exists a commission member shall not participate in any 
proceeding or action." Id at 70 I. 
Again. in 1993 the Court in McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657. 851 
P.2d 953. reiterated the law that strict compliance with the procedural requirements of 
LLUPA is mandatory. The McCuskey Court held that appellant land owner was entitled 
to mailed notice when a amendment to the Zoning Ordinance affected a zoning district 
boundary change as to appellant property. and further held the ordinance void. Id at 663. 
In Chambers v Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, 125 Idaho 115, 867 
P.2d 989, (1994) the Idaho Supreme Court again reiterated the rule of law that in quasi-
judicial proceedings due process requires transcribable verbatim record and specific 
finding of facts and conclusions of upon which the decision was based. The Court held 
deficiencies in the record. and other accumulated error evidenced that due process 
safeguards were not satisfied. Id at 118. 
Recently, in Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley. 2007 Idaho 
(32264) the Supreme Court of Idaho again struck down a government land use ruling 
supported by an insufficient record. While none of these land use cases squarely 
addresses the question of Preliminary Injunction they are persuasive as to the probable 
outcome on the full merits of this action. Can the Court be left without motivation to 
investigate the various transactions herein complained. as discussed in Fam1 Service v. 
U.S. Steel. 90 Idaho 570, thereby providing the basis to issue Preliminary Injunction 
herein'? 
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IV. REMEDY ON MERITS AND CONCLUSION 
At the conclusion of the June 27. 2007 initial hearing on Plaintiff s Application 
for Preliminary Injunction the Court questioned counsel regarding the appropriate 
remedy. on the full merits of Plaintiffs claim. if the court vvas to find that the Planning 
and Zoning Commission was not properly formed. Plaintiff request only a declaration 
that the Amended Comprehensive Plan. Amended Zoning Ordinances and other land use 
ordinances adopted as part of the tainted process occurring between October 2005 to 
present be declared null and void. The logical conclusion to the question is that all land 
use related ordinances since the Idaho's adoption of LL LlPA would be null and void. 
Concededly. an extreme remedy indeed! Of course PlaintitTs complaints. and 
Defendanfs violations. under LLUPA are far from limited to this technical issue. 
Given the facts now before the Court the appropriate remedy is Preliminary 
Injunction and further evidentiary hearings to determine the extent of Defendant's bad 
acts. If and when Plaintiff proves. to the standard required by the court, after Defendant 
has had a full and fair opportunity to rebut the allegation of self-dealing. the appropriate 
remedies may include that requested by Plaintiff, removal of offending officials from 
office. criminal prosecution. appointment of a receiver and/or dissolution. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
A TTOREY FOR PLAINTIFF 
~~ 
Christopher P. Simms 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this (1. -r- day of ...) '-'L.I.( 2007. I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to Objections to Plaintiffs Application 
for Temporary Restraining Order j,qg freliminary Injunction and Request for Rule II 
Sanctions by delivering same. via~'tt Phillip J. Collaer. Attorney for Defendant 
Ed Smith. 250 South Fifth Street. Ste. 700. P.O. Box 7426. Boise Idaho 83707-7426. 
facsimile number 208 344 5800, and Stephanie 1. Bonney and Carl Withroe. Attorneys 
for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St.. Ste 520. Boise, Idaho 83702. 
facsimile number 208 331 1202. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS POST-HEARING II 
MEMORANDUM S{ PPORTING OBJECTIONS TO APPLICA nON FOR 
PRELHvlINARY INJUNCTION 
Stephanie J. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. \Vithroe, ISB No. 7051 
MOORE S:VIITH BtXroN & Tl'RCKE, CmD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/331 '1800 
Fax: 208/33 L 1202 
Attornevs lor Defendants Camas COlllltV and the lndil'idual Commissioners .. . ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 











ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 





Case No. CV-07-24 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND OBJECTION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OF 
PUBLIC RECORDS 
Come now Camas County. Idaho (the County). by and through its duly elected board of 
county commissioners, Ken Backstrom. Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual 
Commissioners). and Ed Smith. in his capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission. (collectively. County Defendants), by and through their attomeysof record, 
REPLY POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM -- I 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit this Reply Memorandum Supporting 
County Defendants Post-Hearing Memorandum Supporting County Defendants' Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 
ARGUMENT 
The scope of the June 27, 2007 hearing was limited to the question whether Camas 
County had a valid planning and zoning commission. The question on which the Court allowed 
post-hearing briefing was about the remedy if no organization papers had been adopted. Instead 
of confining their memorandum to the narrow question presented by the Court at that hearing, or 
even to the scope of the June 27 hearing in general, the Plaintiffs have wandered into a much 
larger pasture. using the opportunity to brief one narrow issue to instead expand the scope of the 
hearing and record developed thus far. Instead of staying on point, they have reiterated all their 
arguments about all the other violations they have alleged. Plaintiffs do touch on the question 
posed by the Court, and this Reply Memorandum addresses only those-and does so briefly. 
Plaintiffs contend that the mandatory/directory distinction doesn't apply to LLUPA. 
"Besides missing the larger point," Plaintiffs claim, "Defendant overlooks case law describing 
the LLUPA requirements as mandatory." Pis: Resp. 4 (citing Sprenger, Grubb & Assoes., Inc. 
1'. Ci(v of Haile}'. 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999». Plaintiffs fail to !,Yfasp the 
directory/mandatory distinction; Sprenger Gruhh & Assocs. does not hold as Plaintiffs wished it 
did. That case imolved the city's failure to include a land-usc map and a property rights 
component in its comprehensive plan. 133 Idaho at 32 I, 986 P.2d at 344. Idaho Code § 67-6508 
provided that comprehensive plans "shall be based on" the listed components "unless the plan 
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specifies reasons why a particular component is not necessary." Id. at 322, 986 P.2d at 345. One 
of the components in I.e. § 67-6508 provided that "[aJ map shall be prepared indicating suitable 
projected land uses for the jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis by Court). The Court held that the map 
requirement was mandatory, and could not be considered a ··temporary" curable defect. Id. 
Plaintiffs use this case for the idea that all requirements in LLUPA have mandatory 
effect. But this proposition overlooks the rules the Idaho Supreme Court (along with myriad 
other courts) follows when determining whether a statute has mandatory and directory effect. 
"[W]hether a statute is mandatory or directory [is] to be ascertained from a consideration of the 
entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences that would result from construing it one 
way or the other." Department o.lLaw Enforcement v. One 1955 Wil~vs Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 
154, 595 P.2d 299, 303 (1979) (quoting Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 89,481 P.2d 318, 320 
(1971 ». Clearly, a land use map is a critical component of a land use planning process and 
comprehensive plan. As described in the County Defendants first post-hearing memorandum in 
this matter, a land map is something altogether different than organization papers for the 
transaction of business. 
Plaintiffs also cite a handful of other cases, Citizens for Better Go)' 'f )'. CounZV of'Valley, 
95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d 550 (1973), Gay v. Bonne)'iIle COllIlZV, 103 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (et. 
App. 1984), JfallllOkian v. Blaine Coun(v, 112 Idaho 697,735 P.2d 1008 (1987), and McCuskey 
\'. Can.von COL If1 (v, 123 Idaho 657,851 P.2d 953,912 P.2d 100 (1996), Chambers \'. Kootenai 
COllll(V Bd. Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 867 P.2d 989 (1994), and Cr01l'l1 Point Del'.. Inc. \'. Cizvof' 
SUll Valley, No. 32264 (Idaho March 30, 2(07), for the idea that any failure to comply v.ith any 
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provision of LLUPA will invalidate the ultimate govemmental action. Citizens/or Better COl' 't 
concemed notice-and-hearing requirements, which relate to due process and are never considered 
directory; Ca,v dealt with the same thing; l'Viannokian involved a quasi-judicial proceeding 
(which this case doesn't) and dealt with the prohibition of commission or board members 
participating in matters in which they have an economic interest; McCuskey dealt with notice-
and-hearing issues; Chambers dealt with the requirement that quasi-judicial proceedings have 
transcribable records maintained, and Crmvn Point Dev. involved a quasi-judicial proceeding 
and concemed the sufficiency of the record. In sum, none of these substantive requirements, 
each dealing with the very purpose for which LLUPA was drafted, are comparable to the 
requirement that planning and zoning commissions adopt organization papers for the transaction 
of business. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the assumed failure of the planning and zoning commission to adopt organization 
papers for the transaction of business of the commission is not the sort of failure which will serve 
as a basis to invalidate the Board's adoption of the County's land use map, zoning map, and 
zoning ordinance. Because the question of the Planning and Zoning Commission's existence and 
validity are the sole questions before the court at this stage of the proceeding, the County 
Defendants request that this Court deny the application f()r a preliminary injunction. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of July. 2007. 
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MOORE SMITH Bl;XTON & Tl'RCKf, CHTD. 
Carl J. Withroe 
Attorneys for County Defendants 
*** 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Post-Hearing 
Memorandum was this 16th day of July, 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the 
corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Method: 
~--~-------------------
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Method: US N..A-LL-
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Method: 
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Carl J. Withroe 
Stephanie J. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. Withroe, ISB No. 7051 
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Case No. CV-07-24 
OBJECTION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OF 
PUBLIC RECORDS 
Come now Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected board of 
county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual 
Commissioners), and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of the Camas County PlaIll1ing and 
Zoning Commission, (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of record, 
COUNTY DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER A:"JD PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RELATING 
TO DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS -- 1 
~U03 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit this Motion to Strike and Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 
Relating to Destruction of Public Records. The County Defendants request that this Court deny 
Plaintiffs a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as there is no basis 
whatsoever for the restraining order and injunction Plaintiffs seek. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The sole basis of PlaintitTs' instant application is an agenda for a public meeting of the 
Board of County Commissioners containing an item that was, in fact tabled. From this, and 
despite assurances from counsel for the County Defendants that no public records were about to 
be destroyed, Plaintiffs have dreamed up a scenario not even remotely supported by the 
evidence. Their application is therefore meritless, if not completely frivolous. 
A. Standard of Review 
To obtain a temporary restraining order Plaintiffs must demonstrate that "it clearly 
appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or the verified complaint that immediate and 
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or the 
party's attorney can be heard in opposition .... " Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(b). Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e) 
provides four bases for obtaining a preliminary injunction; the upshot of each is that the plaintiff 
may obtain an injunction only when (a) great, irreparable damage (b) will occur immediately. 
As will be discussed below, PlaintitIs have not, and cannot, demonstrate either that the hann they 
allege will occur, or that it will occur immediately. 
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B. Plaintiffs Have Misstated The Facts; When The True Facts Are Known, It Is 
Readily Apparent That Plaintiffs Do Not Come Close To Meeting The Standard 
Necessary To Obtain A Restraining Order Or An Injunction. 
Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the 
County Defendants from destroying certain public records identified in paragraph 6 of their 
application. It would be one thing if there were some evidence tending to suggest the County 
was going to destroy records related to this case. But there is not. The sole piece of evidence 
they have, the agenda for the July 9,2007 public meeting, cannot take them where they want to 
go. So, to overcome the absence of any evidence to support their claim, Plaintiffs badly misstate 
several facts in their application. 
First to the misstated facts. At paragraph 2 of their application, Plaintiffs assert that "the 
Defendants are contemplating the destruction of Public Records that may be germane to this 
case." As will be seen momentarily, this is absurd. Second, Plaintiffs state at paragraph 4 of 
their application that they "have requested additional information regarding this item but [have] 
been refused." This too, is absurd. At paragraph 5, Plaintiffs state their "belief upon inquiry that 
Defendants are attempted [sic] to destroy evidence in violation oflaw." This is perhaps the most 
absurd assertion in the application. Plaintiffs state at paragraph 7 that they have "contacted 
Defendant, through counsel, seeking a Consent Order related to destruction of the [records 
described in paragraph 6], who, after initially consenting to such an order has refused to consent 
to such an order. This is a whopping untruth. Finally, Plaintiffs state that "Ie ]ounse! for Plaintiff 
has made repeated attempts to contact counsel for Defendant to arrange a mutually convenient 
COUNTY DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION RELATING 
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date and time to approach the Court but counsel for Defendant has not responded." This, too, is 
untrue. 
Other than their own fantasy, the only basis for the application is an agenda for the July 
9, 2007 public meeting of the Camas County Board of Commissioners. They claim that the 
County is "contemplating destruction of Public Records that may be germane to this case," and 
they have fonned a "belief upon inquiry that Defendants are attempted [sic] to destroy evidence 
in violation of law." The agenda item in question provides: "Discuss possible resolution for 
destroying public records." From this agenda item they assume that the County is going to 
destroy records having something to do with this case and that such destruction is imminent. To 
conclude as Plaintiffs have from this agenda item alone requires the kind of leap that even Evel 
Knievel wouldn't attempt. 
As was communicated to counsel for Plaintiffs both by telephone and by letter (attached 
hereto as Exhibit A), the agenda item at the center of this Application was an infonnational 
overview of the statutory requirements relating to the classification and retention of County 
records. The Board was going to ponder a sample resolution from another jurisdiction for the 
classification and retention of records. The Board was not going to consider and pass a 
resolution ordering the destruction of records and has no expressed intent of doing so. This is 
corroborated by the Affidavit of Dwight Butlin, the County's Planning Administrator, attached 
hereto. Mr. Butlin describes how the agenda item came to be and what was to be discussed. 
Idaho Code § 31-871 classifies various kinds of county documents and provides a 
retention schedule. That section also provides: "Records may only be destroyed by resolution of 
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the board of county commissioners after regular audit and upon the advice of the prosecuting 
attorney. A resolution ordering destruction must list, in detail, records to be destroyed. Such 
disposition shall be under the direction and supervision of the board's clerk." I.C. § 31-
871 (2)(d). In other words, before any county records may be destroyed, there must be in place 
an ordinance providing for the classification and retention schedule of various kinds of 
documents, then a separate resolution, after a regular audit and upon the county attorney's 
advice, listing in detail which records are to be destroyed must be passed. The item was tabled. 
No resolution was pondered. No list of records to be destroyed was compiled. No advice from 
the prosecuting attorney had been given. No audit had been done. No draft of a resolution 
ordering the destruction of records even exists. Indeed, the Board met on July 16, but did not 
discuss either record retention or record destruction. In short, the destruction of any records is 
not even on the horizon. Thus there is no legitimate basis to claim immediacy. The Plaintiffs' 
Application is at best unripe. 
And even if the Board was going to pass a resolution ordering the destruction of County 
records, there is no evidence the Board was going to destroy records related to Mr. Martin's case 
against the County. Again, there must be a detailed list of the documents that are to be 
destroyed. No such list exists, and there is no evidence tending to show the Board was going to 
attempt to circumvent the statutory requirements for destroying records. Moreover, there is a 
fairly substantial deterrent in the form of I.C. § 18-2603 (providing criminal penalties for 
destruction of evidence) against destroying records. Thus, the agenda item alone is not sufficient 
to justifY the scenario posited by the Plaintiffs. 
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Piainti1Is claim that they have a "belief upon inquiry that Defendants are attempted [sic] 
to destroy evidence in violation of law. " Yet the substance of that inquiry isn't disclosed. Did 
someone tell them they County was going to destroy records? Have they obtained a document 
showing something to support their claim? Do they have their hands on some kind of internal 
memo saying the County is going to destroy records? Of whom have they inquired? In sum, 
Plaintiffs have attempted to extrapolate far too much from the agenda item they speak of. There 
is simply no evidence to support their claim. 
* * * 
Finally, two of Plaintiffs' other assertions need to be addressed so that the record in this 
matter remains correct. First, the Plaintiffs claim that they have been refused information 
regarding the agenda item. It's unclear who the Plaintiffs claim has refused them information, 
but the County has not. Again, both by telephone and letter, each coming before the pleadings 
were filed, counsel for the County defendants provided the same information as has been 
discussed in this Objection. Second, Plaintiffs claim that counsel for the County Defendants 
initially consented to the order but then flip-flopped and refused. (pIs.' Application for TRO: 
Records para. 7.) Actually, counsel for the County Defendants suggested that Plaintiffs' counsel 
fax a proposed consent order to review, and then the County Defendants' counsel would consider 
it and then decide whether to sign it. For one thing, it included inaccurate statements. For 
another thing, upon considering the proposed order, counsel deemed it unnecessary. For those 
two reasons, counsel for the County defendants declined to sign it. So any assertion that the 
County Defendants' counsel consented to an order is untrue. 
COUNTY DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR 
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II. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order IS meritless-if not 
frivolous-and must be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of July, 2007. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Carl J. Withroe 
Attorneys for County Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection was this 18th day 
of July, 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Method: FA)(' 
~~---------------------
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.o. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Method: FA~ 
~~--------------------
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Method: P4t< 
--~--------------------
Carl 1. Withroe 
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MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
S1EPHANI6 J. BONNEY 
SUSAN I!. BUXTON" 
OANIliU.£ M. DANCHO.J· 
PAUL}. fITZEII. 
MICHAEL C. MoonEi 
llRua; M SMITH 
PAULA. TURCKii' 
CA.lIq. WrnmOEn+ 
TAMMY A. ZOI<AN+ 
ArrORNllYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
950 W. BANNOCK STREET, SUITI! 520; BOISE, ID 83702 
TELEPHONE: (208) 331-1800 FAX: (208) 331-1202 www.msbtliiw.com 
July 12,2007 
Via email.cpslaw@gmail.com 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
JOHN J. McFADDEN'1 
o/Colmsal 
.J Abo admitted in Arizona 
• Ailo admitted ill Q,ll£omia 
, Allo admitted ill Colorado 
• Also admitted ill New Mexico 
• Also adalilted in Ore&on 
• Also admitted In Soutb Dakota 
I Also admitted in WUhlRgton 
Re: Martin v. Smith. et af., Camas COlUltyNo. 07-24; your proposed consent order 
Dear Mr. Simms: 
Per Oill conversation yesterday afternoon, I have reviewed your proposed consent order. 
I see no point in consenting to an order that is totally unnecessary and I decline to sign it. To be 
sure, if I thought an opposing party was about to destroy records related to a case, I'd be 
concerned, to put it mildly. But, while I understand your position, there is no indication 
whatsoever that the County is about to destroy any records, let alone any records relating to the 
lawsuit you filed against the County. If you will allow me to explain, you will see there is no 
need for such an order. 
I believe your client has misperceived the situation. The agenda item of which you speak 
was an infonnational overview of the statutory requirements relating to the classification and 
retention of County records. The Board was going to ponder a sample resolution from another 
jurisdiction for the classification and retention of records. The Board was not going to consider 
and pass a resolution ordering the destruction of records and to my knowledge, has no intent of 
doing so. Thus, your third whereas clause, suggesting that the county is considering destroying 
unidentified public records, is inaccurate and I cannot agree to it. As I'm sure you know, 
resolutions ordering the destruction of records must be separate from a general classification and 
retention schedule, and they must list in detail what is going to be destroyed. Not only that, but 
you are doubtless aware of the statutorily-imposed penalties associated with the destruction of 
any materials that might be used in a lawsuit. 
~ u tU 
Christopher P. Simms 
July 12,2007 
Page 2 
To swn it up, the County does not intend to destroy any documents that may be relevant 
to a pending action and there is no evidence suggesting that any documents are about to be 
destroyed. 
I hope this letter allays your concerns. If you would like to discuss this further please do 
not hesitate to contact me. 
Regards, 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TuRCKE, CHARTERED 
Carl J. Withroe 
14JOll 
--- .,1.."-" _ ........ ~I ~...,. . ....,~ 'I' 
Stephanie 1. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. Withroe. ISB No. 70; 1 
MOORE SM1TH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHID. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise. II) 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/331/1202 
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State of Idaho ) 
) 5S. 
County of Camas ) 
Case No. CV-07-24 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED 
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OF 
PUBLIC RECORDS 
Dwight ButUn, being flIst duly sworn, sayeth as follows: 
AFFIDAVJT OF DWIGlIT BUTLlN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND PRELlMlNAR Y INJUNCTINO RELATING TO DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS -- 1 
\ 
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1. My name is Dwight Butlin. I am an adult human being over the age of 18 years, 
and I am of sound mind. The statements made in this affidavit are made upon my own personal 
knowledge and are true to the best of my knowledge. 
2. I am the .Planning Administrator for Camas County. I have served as such since 
November 2006. 
3. By virtue of working as the Planning Administrator, I am famiJiar with the 
documentation received and produced by the Planning and Zoning Commission and by the 
County as a whole with respect to the land use planning and development process. 
4. Upon my employment with the County as Planning Administrator, one of the 
things I noticed was that the County had been storing documents older than 13 years. I learned 
that the County had no schedule for the classification and retention of records. 
5. In January 2007, I discussed the issue of space with members of the Board of 
Commissioners. 1 am familiar with the provisions of the Idaho Code regarding the retention and 
destruction of records. The Commission members to whom I spoke thOUght it would be 
advisable to fonnally establish a classification and retention schedule for county documents. 
6. At the July 9, 2007 Board of County Commissioners meeting, an item on the 
agenda said that the County was going to discuss a possible resolution for the destruction of 
records. Either Ms. Bonney, the County attorney, or Mr. Withroe, an associate at Ms. Bonney's 
firm, was going to present an overview of the requirements for classifying, retaining, and 
destroying records. This item was tabled and has not been placed back on the agenda. [attended 
the July 16 meeting oftha County Commissioners and they did not discuss the matter further. 
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7. As long as I've worked for the County, I have not destroyed a single document 
relating to the land use planning and development process. I do not intend to destroy or allow to 
be destroyed any documents relating to County business or any documents of which the County 
might have control or custody, I have no knowledge that anyone has done so, either. 
8. .Based on my experiences working for Camas County, I have the personal heBer 
that the County is not intent on destroying any records at all-let alone any records related to the 
case Mr. Martin has filed against the County 
Further your affiant sAyeth naught. 
Dated this ~ day of July, 2007. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J f4 day of July, 2007 
AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTI...IN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Dwight Butlin 
was this 18th day of July, 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding 
marmer: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Method: t=' A-f 
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HeLL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
MethOdl~ 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
MethOd:t* 
Carl J. Withroe 
AFFIDAVIT OF D\VIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' VERlFIED APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
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Stephanie J. Bonney. ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. Withroe.ISB No. 7051 
MOORE SMITH BeXTON & TCRCKE. CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock SL Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208;331 1800 
Fax: 208/331 .. 1202 
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Case No. CV-07-24 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
JULY 13,2007 VERIFIED APPLICATION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION RELATING TO 
DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS 
Plaintiffs tiled a Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records on July 13. 2007. The County Defendants 
tiled an Objection to the Application and the Affidavit of D\vight Butlin in support of their 
Objection on July 18, 2007. The Court conducted a hearing on this Application on July 19. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' JULY 13. 2007 APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION -- 1 
1007. Having reviewed the pleadings on tile, considered the positions of counsel. and for the 
reasons expressed by the Court at the hearing, the Court tinds that a temporary restraining order 
or preliminary injunction as requested in the Application should not issue. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' July 13,1007 Application is hereby denied. 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was this ---1...L!--'--__ _ 
day of July, 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Method: ~Yl 
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HUll, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Method: 'i, 
-----~~~-----------
Stephanie J. Bonney 
Carl J. Withroe 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Banner Bank Building 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 520 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
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This matter came on for hearing at the Camas County Courthouse on the 27th of June 
2007, Christopher Simms, Ketchum, Idaho, appearing for and on behalf of plaintiff, and Carl 
Withroe, Boise, Idaho appearing for and on behalf of Camas County. The only issues for 
hearing, based on the Order to Show Cause issued June 1,2007, were whether Camas County 
had a duly constituted Planning and Zoning Commission pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6504, and 
\vhether a temporary restraining order should issue restraining or preliminarily enjoining 
DECISION ON STATUS OF CAMAS COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION FOR PURPOSES 
OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION- I 
defendant Camas County from acting upon or processing land-use applications and/or rezoning 
property, and/or approving subdivisions. The plaintiff, at the Court's direction, has reserved till 
later whether other challenges and issues raised by plaintiff to the functioning and/or authority of 
the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission (e.g.-alleged _ LLUPA violations, conflicts 
of interest" whether a reviewable record exists, adequacy of notice, etc.) are valid. The Court 
specifically declined to address any issue regarding whether P & Z Commissioners had been 
duly sworn in, as that issue had not been raised by the earlier pleadings. 
Evidence was submitted, and at the conclusion of hearing, additional briefing was called 
for, to be completed by July 16, 2007. The briefs have been timely received by the Court, and 
the matter was taken under advisement. 
FACTS 
Defendant's exhibits A-I through A-6 were marked and admitted at the hearing. 
Exhibit A-2 is Camas County Ordinance 11, which reflects that it was passed by the Camas 
Board of County Commissioners on May 10, 1976. This ordinance establishes the "Camas 
County Planning and Zoning Commission" pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 65 of the Idaho Code. 
Plaintiffs specifically acknowledged at hearing that they have no objection to Camas County 
continuing to process land-use applications under this older ordinance. What plaintiffs seek is a 
narrow ruling that the current processing of applications under the newer ordinance (Ordinance 
147) is not valid. 
Plaintiff and defendant agree that the newly formed (in 1976) Camas County Planning 
and Zoning Commission never enacted any bylaws as required by Idaho Code 67-6504(c). In 
apparent recognition of this fact, and for other reasons, the Board of County Commissioners 
adopted Ordinance 14 7 (exhibit A-6) on September 11, 2006. This ordinance purported to 
amend Ordinance 11 in order "To add language consistent with Idaho State Code, to provide 
organizational structure to the Commission and to specify starting dates for member's terms." 
DECISION ON STATUS OF CAMAS COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION FOR PURPOSES 
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Counsel for plaintiff and defendant stipulated that Ordinance 147, adopted in Sept. 2006, 
was not published in a newspaper until March 6 or 7th, 2007. Idaho Code 31-715 requires that 
ordinances "shall, before they take effect and within one (1) month after they are passed, be 
published in at least one issue of a newspaper published in the county ... " The statute does not 
provide for nor direct what happens if the ordinance is not published timely. Camas County has 
since adopted Ordinances 150 and 153 in March and April 2007, which purportedly amend the 
zoning map, zoning ordinances, and land use maps. 
Plaintiff argues that Ordinance 11, without by-laws is essentially not valid, although 
plaintiff makes no effort to invalidate Ordinance 11 in toto, and in fact does not object to the 
County processing applications under its authority. Instead, plaintiff argues that Ordinance 147 
is invalid. According to plaintiff, Ord. 147 sought to cure the defects of Ordinance 11, and 
failed to do so, and therefore the County may not proceed further under its authority. Plaintiff 
urges, first, that Ord. 147 was not timely published and. secondly, ifOrd. 11 is not valid, there 
are still no by laws. Arguably,Ord. 147 would have cured the previous lack of by laws because 
it carried within it the necessary rules, regulations, designations, meeting times, terms of office 
etc, necessary to constitute by-laws. With these two defects, Ord. 147 is arguably invalid, and 
plaintiff suggests as a result plaintiff should be entitled to a temporary restraining order 
prohibiting the County from acting under the authority of Ord. 147 and issuing building permits 
or authorizing subdivisions, etc. 
Camas County argues in reply that even if Ord. 147 was invalid, the lack of by-laws 
under Ord. 11 is not fatally defective, and therefore the County could continue to operate as it 
has, with or without Ord. 147. In other words, the County's current functioning in issuing land 
use permits and rezoning property and/or authorizing subdivisions does not depend on the 
validity or invalidity ofOrd. 147; therefore, no restraining order or preliminary injunction should 
issue. 
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ANAL YSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is important at this stage of the proceedings that all parties recognize the procedural 
posture of this case. This is an application for a TRO or a preliminary injunction. Any 
orders or rulings entered are interlocutory (preliminary) in nature, and they may be modified, 
altered, or even reversed as this case progresses and further evidence develops. According to 
IRCP Rule 65(e) and cases cited thereunder, a preliminary mandatory injunction is granted only 
in extreme cases where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from 
its refusal. See Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984). It is of paramount 
importance, therefore, to keep in mind that any observations the Court makes as to the validity or 
invalidity of any ordinance are for purposes of a preliminary injunction only. and may not be 
considered final rulings on the validity or invalidity of any ordinance. Those determinations will 
only come as/inal rulings on a determination of the whole case, followingfurther argument and 
presentation (~r evidence . . In making rulings on these narrow issues presented, the Court is also 
specifically reserving ruling on whether an "accumulation of errors" exist which may render 
specific Camas County P & Z actions void or invalid 
In order for plaintiff to be entitled to injunctive relief here, in addition to showing 
irreparable harm, plaintiff would have to show both that Ordinance 11 was fatally defective, and 
that Ordinance 147 failed to cure its defects, because it is likewise fatally defective. Otherwise, if 
only Ord. 147 is defective, the Court sees no bar to defendant's argument that Camas County 
may continue to process land use applications under Ord. 11, with or without by-laws; indeed, 
plaintiff acknowledges as much. 
Is Ordinance 11 fatally defective because by-laws were never enacted? The Court's 
conclusion, at least preliminarily, is that it is not. While the Court agrees with plaintiff that 
LLUPA requirements are generally mandatory, that is not the question. The precise question now 
at issue is whether the language of I.e. 67-6504(c) has "mandatory" or "directory" effect, when 
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it provides: "Written organizational papers or by-laws .... shall be adopted". This, the County has 
admittedly failed to do. What result follows depends precisely on whether the language of the 
statute is mandatory or directory. Whether there are LLUPA violations, or what may be the 
cumulative effect of any alleged violations, wiII have to be determined another day. 
If the government action is "mandatory", the remedy for failure to comply is invalidation 
of the government action; if the government action is deemed "directory", the government action 
will not be invalidated. Dep't. Of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willy's Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 
595 P.2d 299 (1979), Morris v. County of Marin, 559 P.2d 606, (Cal. 1977) Solen Public 
School District v. Heisler, 381 N.W. 201,203, (N.D. 1986). "Where the prescribed procedure is 
not the essence of the thing to be accomplished the statute is generally considered directory and 
not mandatory. 100 Idaho at 154, 595 P.2d at 303. "Whether a statute is mandatory or directory 
[is] to be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the 
consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other." ld. [quoting Summers 
v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 89,481 P.2d 318, 320 (1971)] 
There is much authority from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that if the 
provision being examined is intended to secure the orderly conduct of the entity's business, 
rather than being enacted for the benefit of plaintiff, such provisions are typically considered 
"directory". See Western/California,Ltd. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District, 50 Cal. 
AppAth 1461,58 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 (CaI.App. 1996); Skelly Estate Co. v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 9 CaI.2d 28,33, 69 P.2d 171, (Cal. 1937),' Seattle v. Auto Metal Workers, 620 P.2d 
1 19 (Wash.App. 1980); A1aricopa County v. Garfield, 513 P.2d 932 (Ariz.1973) This Court 
concludes that the language ofIdaho Code 67-6504(c) as applied to the bylaws is (1) not 
intended to be a substantive provision which relates to the essence of the thing to be 
accomplished in LLUPA; (2) is aimed at the orderly conduct of the Planning and Zoning 
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Commission's business, and (3) if followed, is not intended to confer any benefits upon the 
plaintiff. 
Finally, the consequences that would result from construing it one way or another weigh 
in defendant's favor at this point. Construing the statute as mandatory could, theoretically, result 
in invalidation of all activities of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission since 
1976, a result that even plaintiffs do not argue in favor of. On the other hand, since no one 
seems to suggest such a result, it is difficult to find, (similar to Willy's Jeep), that any 
"substantial prejudice" exists. This is particularly important in the present context when one 
considers what it is that the Camas P&Z does, and what it is that bylaws might or might not have 
accomplished. The Court agrees with defendant that planning and zoning commissions are 
creations of the particular governing board; they certainly cannot adopt rules that contravene 
LLUPA or other laws or ordinances. They have no substantive rulemaking authority. They are 
prohibited from passing ordinances or granting final approval of land subdivisions by Idaho 
Code 67-6504. Thus, most of their work consists of giving notice, conducting public hearings, 
and making recommendations to the governing board. Accordingly, invalidating work of any 
particular planning and zoning commission might, or might not affect any subsequent ordinance 
adopted by the governing board. That is, it does not necessarily follow that the failure of the 
Camas Planning and Zoning Commission to adopt bylaws results in invalidation of ordinances 
adopted by the Camas County Board of Commissioners (the "governing board"). While that 
might be the result if activities of a P& Z taint the process (e.g.-if conflicts exist, notice is 
inadequate, no reviewable record exists), that is not the result that good public policy would call 
for under these circumstances. 
Defendants argue further that Ordinance 11 fulfills the basic requirements of bylaws in 
any event. It is true that section 4 directs the Commission to elect its own chairman and fill such 
offices as may be necessary for the proper conduct of its affairs. It requires meetings. when duly 
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called by the chairman, by written and oral notice. It requires at least one regular meeting each 
month for at least nine months in a year. It defines a quorum. It requires that meetings shall be 
open to the pUblic. It requires written records of meetings, hearings, resolutions, studies, 
permits, and actions shall be maintained and open to the public. Section 2 sets forth the number 
of members and their requirements for residency, their terms of office, and the manner and 
method for tilling vacancies and removal of members. The Court need not reach this argument, 
for the Court assumes, without deciding, that the Camas P&Z has functioned without bylaws and 
that Ordinance 11 did not or would not constitute bylaws. Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion 
for purposes of a preliminary injunction is that Ordinance 11 is not fatally defective because the 
Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission thereafter failed to enact a separate set of 
bylaws. 
Ordinance 147, on the other hand, suffers from different defects. The requirements of 
Idaho Code 31-7 15, insofar as they direct publication of an adopted ordinance within a defined 
period of time, would appear to be "mandatory" under the legal analysis set forth above. That 
statute requires publication of all ordinances "before they take effect and within one (1) month 
after they are passed,". 
For purposes of a preliminary injunction only, the Court is willing to assume that 
Ordinance 147 is fatally defective. However, as noted above, the Court is not willing to 
conclude that a presumed failure of Ordinance 147 gives rise to plaintiffs request for a 
preliminary injunction. In order for the Court to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court would 
have to be able to make some preliminary determination that Camas County has failed or is 
failing in toto to make any legal planning and zoning or land-use determinations whatsoever. It 
occurs to the Court that even if Camas County had never validly appointed and authorized a 
planning and zoning commission, the County would still be acting lawfully through its Board of 
Commissioners pursuant to the powers reserved in them by Idaho Code 67-6504. It is not 
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necessary, however. for the Court to reach that far, for the Court has already concluded that even 
if Ordinance 147 is invalid, Camas County has had a functioning Planning and Zoning 
Commission since 1976 by virtue of Ordinance 11. 
If the Court was able to conclude that Camas County was not operating in a legal fashion 
in any respect in making land-use determinations. the Court might well issue a preliminary 
injunction, not necessarily because there was particular harm being caused to plaintiff, but 
because there would be great and irreparable injury being caused to all of the residents of Camas 
County. The Court is not able to draw any such conclusions. At least at this juncture, it appears 
the County has a properly functioning P&Z, notwithstanding its lack of bylaws. Putting those 
questions aside, the Court would still have to determine whether plaintiff has, or is about to, 
suffer any irreparable injury before a preliminary injunction could issue. Plaintiffs "irreparable 
injury" in this case consists of generalized allegations that, if Camas County is not prevented 
from passing on or approving pending subdivision or rezone applications, plaintiff (a builder and 
developer) will suffer injury by way of increased competition in Camas County. In the Court's 
view, this is far from the great and irreparable harm, or particularized injury about to be suffered 
by plaintiff, that might or should give rise to a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs request for a 
preliminary injunction is therefore DENIED. 
The Court reiterates its earlier statements that these rulings are made for purposes of a 
preliminary injunction only, and do not constitute any final ruling or determination that any 
particular ordinances enacted by Camas County are, or are not, invalid. Defendants counsel is 
requested to prepare an appropriate form of order for the Court's signature. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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Dated this 9th day of August. 2007 
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Case No. CV2007-24 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF APPLICATION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
SECOND EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
PL\I\lTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLlC\ nON FOR PRFU\lI\1ARY 
l SECO\lD EVIDLNTIARY Hb\RING 
COMES NOW Plaintiff George Martin. individually and as a member of "'lartin 
Custom Homes LLC. through coullsel. and files this his Brief in Support of Application 
for Preliminary Injunction. as part of the second evidentiary hearing thereon. and states as 
follows; 
BACKGROUND 
Pending before this Honorable Court is Plaintiffs Petition for Declaratory 
Judgment and Application for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintitf requests this Court to 
declare null and void all amendments to the Camas County Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance. made as part of a process beginning in October :W05 and concluding 
in April of 2007. due to procedural and substantive errors in the LLUPA and APA 
process. 
Generally. Plaintiff asserts five (5) arguments in support of his requests; (1) 
Improper formation and lack of valid Planning and Zoning Commission; (2) Failure to 
Maintain a Reviewable Record; (3) Inadequate Notice and Hearing; (4) Contlict of 
Interest; and (5) Failure to Consider or Deliberate Substantive Dictates of LLUP A. In an 
effort to streamline the considerable volume of evidence, the Court requested, and the 
parties stipulated. to hear and argue the above arguments in discrete segments. 
On June 29. 2007 an evidentiary hearing was had on the first argument. On 
August 13, 2007 the Court issued its Decision on Status of Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction. Said Decision declined to 
issue the requested Preliminary Injunction. based only on the status of the Planning and 
Zoning Commission. but left open "vvhether other challenges and issues raised by 
plaintiff to the functioning and/or authority of the Camas County Planning Zoning 
Commission (e.g. alleged LLUPA violations. conflicts of interest, whether a revievvable 
record exists. adequacy of notice. etc.) are valid. (Pg.2 Decision) The court specifically 
reserved "ruling on whether an accumulation of errors exists which may render specific 
Camas County P & Z actions void or invalid." (Pg. 4 Decision) 
The issue now before the court is whether the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission and Board of County Commissioners maintained a proper 
reviewable record during the process of amending the Comprehensive Plan. Zoning 
Ordinance, and accompanying Maps. between October of 2005 and April of 2007. 
Plaintiff refers the court to Plaintiffs Respol1.'I'e to Defendant ('amas COllnty 's Ohjections 
to Plaintitl's Application/hr Preliminmy Injunction filed on June 13.2007 for a complete 
statement of facts. overview of the ti\'e (5) general arguments and discussion of the lav\' 
regarding standing and injunctive relief. 
F AILlJRE TO MAINTAIN A REVIE\VABLE RECORD 
The Local Land Use Planning A.c1. Title 67 Chapter 65: APA .Title 67 Chapter 
52: Counties and County Law. Title 31 Chapter 7: and Agency Guidelines. lith: 9 
Section 347: all require a County Planning and Zoning Commission and County Board of 
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County Commissioners to maintain a reviewable record. The system of checks and 
balances necessitates verification and documentation of agency decisions to enable a 
court to determine whether the agency decision was supported by lawful procedure and 
substantive law. Without such a record it would be impossible for a court to perform its 
function. 
In the case at bar Camas County failed to record dozens of Planning and Zoning 
Commission and Board of Commissioner Meetings and Public Hearings, kept only 
minimal or no minutes of meetings and hearings, failed to maintain a written record of 
submissions and comments, failed to maintain all written materials considered, failed to 
maintain a record of oral presentation or any memorandum prepared by the presiding 
officer summarizing the contents of the presentations or other materials or documents 
prepared in conjunction with their decisions. Furthermore. no written recommendations 
of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission were created nor were general 
guidelines that identify the general subject matter of all public records kept or maintained 
by the Planning and Zoning Commission or Board of County Commissioners. 
The level of detail required for a ""reviewable record"' \aries from statute to 
statute. from a ""transcribable \'erbatim record" to simple reference to a ""record." A 
baseline reference of \vhat a '"reviewable record" must consist of is found in the 
Administrative Procedures Act. in I.e. 67-5225. 
(1) Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal oj'a rule, the agency 
shedl prepare (/ rulemaking record. The record shall he maintained in the 
main offices oj'the agem.y. 
(2) The rulemaking record shall he aWlilahlejhr puhlic impection and 
copying, The rule making record must contain: 
(a) copies oj'all puhlications in the hulletin: 
(h) aI/ m'itten petitions, suhmissions. and comments received hy the 
agency and the agem.~l'\ re."ponse to those petitions. suhmissions. and 
comments: 
(c) alll1'1'iften materials considered hy the agency in connection ~rith 
the/hrmulatioJ1. proposal. or adoption oj'the rule: 
(d) a record oj any oral presentaTions. any transcriptions oj oral 
presentations. and any memorandum prepared hy a presiding officer 
summari::ing the contents olthe presentations: LInd 
(e) any other materials or documents prepared in conjunction with the 
rulemaking 
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0) Excep/ ((S olhenl'ise required by a prOl'ision oj/ml', the rllh:17lakinK 
record need no/ cOlls/i/ute the exdusil'e basis for uKem:l' (fction on that 
rule orj(u'judicial rel'iell' thereof,' 
(4) The record required in this section shall be maintained by the 
aKenc:v/or a period (~lnot less than two (2) years after the eflective date ol 
the ntle, 
The above cited record requirement applies to the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners in the case at bar. Clearly. ':j()r 
purposes of)udicial reriew 0/ II CPA decisions, a local aKemy makiJ1K (l land lise 
decision, such (IS the Board oj ('ommissioners, is treated as a KOl'ernl7lenf uKency under 
/DAPA, Urrutia v. Blaine Count}'. /34 Idaho 353. 35-, 2 P.3d -38, -42 (20()O). The 
districl court bases i/sjlldicial rel'ieH' on the record created bejhre the local Kovernmenl 
aKenL}'. J.R.C.P. 8-1(e)(/). 139 Idaho 7/, 7-1: Erans 1'. Teton COl/nil'. Idaho Board of 
Commissioners: -::3 P. 3td 8-1:' 2006 Idaho (30061): Cowan v. Bd. of Commissioners of 
Fremont County: P.3d 
While no case law can be found on the subject the APA does contemplate 
petitions for declaratory judgment. such as the case at bar. For example, I.e. section 67-
5272 states, in part. "(/) Except when required by other provision ollaw, proceedinKsfhr 
review or declaratory judgment are instituted by filing a petition in the district court oj' 
the county in which: ... ., (emphasis added) 
TRANSCRTBABLE VERBA TIM RECORD 
The most stringent mandate to maintain a reviev,abIe record is found in Idaho 
Code 67-6536. The statute requires a transcribable verbatim record of all proceedings 
under LLUPA to be kept for not less than six (6) months. The statute specifically states 
that. "The proceeding envisioned by this statute for which a transcrihab/e verbatim 
record must be maintained shall include all public hearings at ll'hich testimony or 
eridence is receired or at ll'hich an applicant or a/lec/ed person addresses the 
commission or governing board regarding a pending application or during H'hich the 
commission or gOl'erninK board deliberates toward a decision ajier compilation oj the 
record .... " 
Based upon responses to Public Record Disclosure Request Responses. and 
discovery completed to date. it is veri tied that no recording \vas made of at least twenty 
(20) separate meetings of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and 
Board of Commissioners wherein a topic of discussion and/or deliberation was 
amendment to the Zoning Ordinance. Zoning Map. Comprehensive Plan and/or Land Use 
Map. Plaintiff has not identified case la\v discussing when a meeting is a "Public 
Hearing." Is a meeting a "Public Hearing" only when the chair so designates and 
determines a vote will be held? 
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Regardless of the outcome of the Puhlic Hearing versus Puhlic iY1eetings debate, 
the Camas Defendant" s f~liled to record three (3) meetings they themsehes labeled as 
Purdic'learings. In addition to the label "Public I fearing" these meetings were clearly 
Public Hearings because testimony or evidence was received and/or at affected persons 
addressed the commission or governing board regarding a pending application and/or the 
commission or governing board deliberated toward a decision after compilation of the 
record. (See Plaintiffs Hearing Exhibits 4.5. 12. & 28) 
On April 4. 2006 the Planning and Zoning Commission held a Noticed Public 
f learing regarding proposed amendments to the Land Use and Zoning Map. According 
to Camas County Defendant's Response to Public Records Request. the tape recording of 
the Hearing is incomplete or entirely missing. On April 13. 2006 the Board of County 
Commissioners held a noticed Public Hearing wherein notice procedures for future puhlic 
hearings regarding amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance were 
discussed. No tape recording of this Public Hearing \vas made. On March 27. 2007 the 
Board of County Commissioners held a Public Hearing and deliberated upon proposed 
amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance maps. According to 
Camas County Defendant's response to requests to produce documents. no tape recording 
of this Public Hearing \vas made. (see Plaintiffs Hearing Exhihits 4.5, 12 & 28) 
In addition to the above referenced obvious failures to record Public Hearings in 
compliance with I.e. 67-6536, Camas County failed to tape record any of the meetings. 
and "workshops" held at which the proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance were developed. A series of meetings. described as "\vorkshops" were 
held by the Planning and Zoning Commission in the fall of 2005 through spring of 2006 
for \vhich no notice was published, no agendas kept. no minutes kept. or any other record 
whatsoever maintained. 
The term "Deliberation". is defined in the code to mean "the receipt or exchange 
of in/c)fInation or opinion relating to a decision, but shall not include informal or 
impromptu discussions (!i' a general nature which do not specifically relate to a matter 
then pending befhre the public agency decision." I.e. 67-2341 (2) No definitions. or case 
la\v discussion. can be found regarding the meaning of .. testimony or evidence is 
received" or "affected person addresses the commission or governing board regarding a 
pending application:' However. the plain meaning of the words \vould appear to demand 
a tape recording of meetings wherein public comment is given or policy decisions made 
regarding a pending matter. In any event. tapes were not made of these other meetings. 
nor \vas any \\fitten record of the meetings. or recommendations made therein. kept. 
The Court in Rural Kootenai Organization. Inc. v. Board of Commissioners. 133 
Idaho 833: 993 P2d 596. recognized that "the absence of a transcribable \erhatim record" 
of zoning or land use proceedings may result in a violation of a party's right to procedural 
due process. Chambers Y. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118,867 
P.2d 989. 992 (1994) (citing Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs of Ada County, 101 
Idaho 407. 411. 614 P.2d 947, 951 (1980)). "[A] transcribable record [is) indispensable to 
meaningful judicial reyiew of rezoning proceedings where the sufficiency of notice. 
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adequacy of opportunity to present or to rebut evidence. or the existence of e\idence 
supporting the agency's findings may be put at issue." Gay v. County Comm'rs of 
Bonneville County. 103 Idaho 626. 629. 651 P.2d 560. 563 (Ct.App.1982). 
RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PLANNING AND ZONING 
COMMISSION TO BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
In addition to the requirement. under 67-6536. for a verbatim transcribable record. 
LLUPA has se\eral other references requiring a record be kept of the planning and 
zoning process. Idaho Code 67-6504(c) requires ·· ... A record (!f meelinRs. hearinR·\', 
resolutions, studies, findings, permits, and actions taken sltall be maintained ... " 
Likewise. Idaho Code sections 67-6509 (a) and (b) both contain requirements that a 
Planning and Zoning Commission make a record of recommendations made to a Board of 
Commissioners. In pertinent part the statute provides "If Ihe R01'erninR hoard will 
conducl a suhsequent puhlic hearing notice of the planlling and zoning commission 
recommendation shall he included in Ihe nOlice of puhlic hearinR prOVided hy Ihe 
f{Ol'crninR hoard A record 0/ tlte Itearings, findil1gs made, al1d actions taken by tlte 
commission shall be mail1tailled by tlte city or county. (h) The ROl'erninf{ hoard, (IS 
pro)'ided hy lonz/ ordinance. prior to adoption, amendment, or repeal of the plan. l7uzr 
conduct at least one (1) puhlic hearinR, in addition to the puhlic hearing(\) conducted hy 
the commission, usinR the same notice and hearing procedures as the commission. Tlte 
governing board sltallllot hold a public hearil1g, give notice 0/ a proposed hearing, Ilor 
take actiol1 UpOI1 the plal1, amelldmellts, or repeal IIntil recommendations have been 
received/rom tlte commission." I.C. 67-6509 (emphasis added) 
Section 67-6511 too requires a Planning and Zoning Commission to make 
recommendations. based on standards. to be made to the governing Board concerning 
amendments to a zoning ordinance. Idaho Code Section 67-6511(b) directs Planning and 
Zoning Commissions and Board of Commissioners to evaluate whether a proposed 
Zoning Ordinance is in compliance with a valid Comprehensive Plan or would have an 
adverse impact on delivery of services. No vvritten record of recommendations from the 
Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission to the Board of County Commissioners 
can be found. Undoubtedly. the legislature recognized the importance of maintaining a 
record t()r purposes of accountability regarding matters of import affecting individual 
property rights. How can a court determine \vhether the required substantive findings 
have been made without written record of same? 
Finally, I.e. Section 9-347 mandates counties adopt guidelines regarding the 
retention of records, the general subject matter and location thereof. The mandatory 
language of the statute requires adoption of such guidelines no later than January I. 1991. 
Yet. Camas County has adopted no such guidelines. 
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CONCLUSION 
LLPPA provides criteria on which to base decisions relating to land use laws. 
Comprehensive Plans must be adopted in consideration of: all the land within the 
jurisdiction. previous conditions. trends. desirable goals and objectives. or desirable 
future situations. I. e. 67-6508. The Plan must be based on at least fourteen (14) 
components. including. property rights. population. school facilities. Economic 
Development. I.and Use. Natural Resources. Hazardous Areas. Public Sen ices. 
Transportation. Recreation. Special Areas. Housing. Community Design and 
Implementation. Id. Solicitation of input and comment from affected agencies and 
political subdivisions is required as part of the process. I.e. 67-6509(a) Particular 
consideration must be given to the efIects of any proposed zone change upon the delivery 
of sen'ices by any political subdivision providing public services. including school 
districts within the planning jurisdiction. I.e. 67-6511 (a) The zoning districts must be 
in accordance \\ith the policies set forth in the adopted comprehensive plan. Id. No 
Zoning Ordinance may be amended \\ithout a finding that it is not in conflict with the 
Comprehensive Plan. Id. (c) These criteria are not suggestions but dictates. 
The reason the law mandates maintenance of a detailed record is to assure the 
public that elected and appointed officials are acting in the public interest and adhering to 
the dictates of the law. When a proper reviewable record is not maintained it is 
impossible for a court to determine whether the substantive dictates of the law are in fact 
being followed. Similarly. courts use procedural rules for trial. When procedural errors 
fatally taint the process a mistrial must be declared. Plaintiff urges this Court to consider 
the depth and breadth of procedural error infecting the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning process involved in the amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
Ordinance. The results of this fatally flawed process have caused enormous negative 
financial impact to Plaintiff. and others. and will continue to cause further damage unless 
this Court issues a Preliminary Injunction halting further processing of land use 
applications under the amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
A TTOREY FOR PLAINTIFF 
1 
PL\INTfFF'S BRIEF IN Sl'PPORT OF APPUC\TION FOR PREU\lINARY 7 
'NCTION SECO]\[) LVIDFNTlARY HEARING 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f f IEREBY CERTfFfY that on this --"--'-~_ day of_~"'--'---L-___ 2007. I sened 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Application for 
Preliminary Injunction Second Evidentiary Hearing by delivering same. via facsimile to 
Phillip J. Collaer. Attorney for Defendant Ed Smith. 250 South Fifth Street Ste. 700. 
P.O. Box 7426. Boise Idaho 83707-7426. facsimile number 2083445800. and Stephanie 
J. Bonney and Carl Withroe. Attorneys for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock 
SL Ste 520. Boise. Idaho 83702. facsimile number 208 331 1202. 
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Case No. CV-07-24 
POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM 
SUPPORTING 1HE COUNTY 
DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFFS ' APPLICATION FOR A 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
At the September 25, 2007, evidentiary hearing in this matter, the Court permitted the 
County Defendants 14 days to submit a post-hearing memorandum supporting the County 
Defendants' objection to the Plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order and 
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preliminary injunction. The scope of the hearing was limited to the issues addressed in the 
memorandum filed by counsel for Plaintiffs; that is, whether the County failed to maintain a 
"reviewable record." See PIs.' Br. Support Application Prelim. lnj. 2d Evid. Hrg. 2 (dated Sept. 
24, 2007). Plaintiffs' argument focuses three categories of the record that they allege were not 
kept: (1) tapes of the hearings; (2) documents or other records of comments submitted to the 
Commission and Board; and (3) recommendations from the Commission. 
ll. 
ARGUMENT 
This Memorandum argues that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to demonstrate 
entitlement to an injunction. First, they have not demonstrated that the actions alleged, if true, 
will cause the irreparable and immediate injury necessary to obtain an injunction. Second, 
LLUP A does not require the Board to maintain verbatim transcribable records of legislative 
actions. Third, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the record maintained by the County is 
deficient. Finally, Plaintiffs have similarly failed to demonstrate that the Commission's 
recommendations are deficient. 
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Presented Any Evidence That Would Satisfy The Irreparable 
Injury Requirement. 
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction. They therefore carry the burden to prove a right 
to an injunction, Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 
(1965), and "a preliminary mandatory injunction is granted only in extreme cases where the right 
is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal," Evans v. District 
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Court o/the Fifth Judicial District, 47 Idaho 267,270,275 P. 99, 100 (1929). Moreover, "[tJhe 
substantial likelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that [a party is] entitled to the relief 
[it] demand(s] cannot exist where complex issues of law or fact exist which are not free from 
doubt." Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 994 (1984) (quoting First 
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 495 F.Supp. 154 (W.o. Mich. 1980); Avins 
v. Widener College, Inc., 421 F.Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1976) (injunction not granted where issues of 
fact and law are seriously disputed); Wm. Rosen Monuments, Inc. v. Phil Madonick Monuments, 
Inc., 62 A.D.2d 1053,404 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (injunction granted only upon 
the clearest evidence». Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden. 
For reasons discussed in the next Section II.B. of this Memorandum, Plaintiffs cannot 
demonstrate the substantial likelihood of success necessary to obtain an injunction; this section 
addresses the Plaintiffs' failure to prove the requisite injury. In two evidentiary hearings 
conducted in this matter, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence relating to the injury they claim 
will befall them if the County is not restrained from implementing the Land Use Map, Zoning 
Map, and Zoning Ordinance. Therefore, the Court must find the requisite showing of harm in 
Plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. The harms alleged therein are vague and 
speculative and do not merit an injunction. 
Plaintiffs claim that if the County is not restrained from processing land use applications 
they will "suffer immediately and great or irreparably [sic] injury and loss." PIs.' Application 
for T.R.O. & Prelim. Inj. 3 (May 4, 2007). They state further that if the County is not restrained 
iTom processing land use applications, "the land itself will be altered to a state from which it 
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cannot be restored." Id. (It is unclear from the pleadings what land will be altered.) They 
continue: "Ordinances and resolution [sic] may be passed, subdivisions of land may occur, 
buildings and roads may be built, legal obligations may arise that simply could not be repealed, 
rescinded, demolished or erased such that the status quo could not be restored without 
injunction." Jd. (emphases added). 
It is readily apparent from Plaintiffs' own Application that their claims of injury are far 
too premature and far too speculative to satisfy the requirement that "immediate" injury "will 
result." Plaintiffs appear to complain about the Board's decisions on their property and property 
that is not theirs. With respect to decisions on land that Plaintiffs do not own, Plaintiffs allege 
the land "will be altered," but they neither (a) identify which land will be altered, nor (b) explain 
how that land will be altered, nor (c) explain how any alterations to land they do not own will 
adversely affect their protected interests. They say that other various evils "may" result. "May" 
is not synonymous with "wilL" Additionally, none of the potential harms are imminent. The 
harms alleged require applications, hearings, approvals, and the turning of dirt. But there is 
neither allegation nor evidence that any dirt-turning is imminent. Nor is there any allegation that 
any applications have been filed on that property. Indeed, given the current state of affairs as 
alleged in the Application, and given that the land-use process takes so much time before any 
land is altered, a preliminary injunction is inappropriate. 
Moreover, there is no allegation that decisions on property not belonging to Plaintiffs will 
adversely affect their interests in their land. There is no allegation that Plaintiffs' land is near the 
other land at issue, and there is no explanation of how the zoning and comprehensive plan 
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amendments will affect their property. They thus fail constitutionally-based standing test insofar 
as their claims relate to property they do not own. Standing is a "fundamental prerequisite" to 
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 79&, 800, 53 P.3d 1217, 
1219 (2002). It is a component of the constitutionally-based case-or-controversy rule and the 
threshold necessary to obtain standing cannot be legislated to require less than the constitutional 
test. ld. at 801, 53 P.3d at 1220. In other words, the declaratory judgment act is not a forum for 
those with general complaints about the conduct of one's local governing board. 
When considering whether a party has standing, the Court focuses on the party, not the 
issues the party raises. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). 
To satisfy the standing requirement, Plaintiffs must "allege or demonstrate an injury in fact .... " 
ld. Or, put differently, Plaintiffs must possess a "personal stake" in the controversy. See Rural 
Kootenai Org.) Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 841, 993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999). 
Indeed, Plaintiffs must show a "peculiar or personal injury that is different than that suffered by 
any other member of the public." Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. State, 128 Idaho 831, 834,919 
P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). But in this case, there is no allegation that the zoning ordinance and 
comprehensive plan amendments will have any adverse effect upon any of Plaintiffs' protected 
interests. 
With respect to decisions regarding Plaintiffs' property, Plaintiffs claim that the property 
was purchased "with the intention" of subdivision and development. Expressing an intent to do a 
specified act is not, as we have all recently been reminded, an unequivocal commitment to that 
act. There is no allegation that either plaintiff has filed any application to do anything on 
COUNTY DEFENDANTS' POST-HEARING MEMORAl\1)UM (2D EVIDENTIARY 
HEARIN,G) -- 5 
14]008 
property that either of them owned. Plaintiffs thus have no right to anything. The State 
Legislature granted local governing boards the authority to exercise legislative judgment in 
determining the appropriate zone or designation in a comprehensive plan-an individual has no 
right to a particular zone. See, e.g., Zealy v. Town o/Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996); 
Buhler v. Racine Counly, 146 N.W.2d 403 (Wis. 1966). To be sure, an applicant's rights are 
determined by the zoning and other ordinances in effect at the time of application. See South 
Fork Coalition v. Board 0/ Comm 'rs of Bonneville Counly, 117 Idaho 857, 861, 792 P.2d 882, 
886 (1990). But without an application, there is no right to a particular zone; without a right to a 
particular zone, there can be no injury. 
Besides, a landowner such as Martin may request that the Board consider further 
amendments to the zoning ordinance or comprehensive plan. I.C. §§ 67-6511(a) (requests for an 
amendment to the zoning ordinance shall be submitted to the planning and zoning request); 67-
6509(d) (any person may petition the planning and zoning commission for an amendment of the 
comprehensive plan at any time). In short, even assuming Plaintiffs' claims are correct (which 
the County Defendants deny), Plaintiffs' assertions are so speculative and so premature that they 
cannot meet the certainty and timing requirements mandated in Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e). An 
injunction is not appropriate on this ground alone, and no further analysis is necessary. 
B. The Record Does Not Demonstrate That The County Failed To Maintain A Record 
Of The Proceedings. 
1. The County Was Not Required To Maintain A Transcribable Verbatim 
Record Of The Proceedings. 
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Plaintiffs claim that under I.C. § 67-6536, "a transcribable verbatim record of all 
proceedings under LLUPA [must] be kept for not less than six (6) months." PIs: Br. Support 
Application Prelim. Inj. 2d Evid. Hrg. at 4. This is a misstatement of the law, it is incorrect, and 
none of the cases Plaintiffs cite enables them to overcome the plain language of the statute. 
In citing I.C. § 67-6536, Plaintiffs cite only part of the statute, leaving out a key 
provision. The applicable paragraph from the aforesaid statute provides, in full: 
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a 
transcribable verbatim record of the proceeding shall be kept for a period of not 
less than six (6) months after a final decision on the matter. The proceeding 
envisioned by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be 
maintained shall include all public hearings at which testimony or evidence is 
received or at which an applicant or affected person addresses the commission or 
governing board regarding a pending application or during which the commission 
or governing board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record. 
Upon written request and within the time period provided for retention of the 
record, any person may have the record transcribed at his expense. 
(Emphases added). That section clearly identifies the class of proceedings for which 
transcribable verbatim records must be kept: all cases in which an appeal is provided for. The 
proceedings at issue do not fall within that category. 
Land use actions are divided into two categories: those that are "legislative" in nature and 
those that are "quasi-judicial" in character. See, e.g., Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 
67,665 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1983). Legislative actions are defined as those activities that produce a 
rule or policy which has application to an open class. Id In the zoning context, "promulgation 
or enactment of general zoning plans and ordinances is legislative action." Cooper v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 409, 614 P.2d 947, 949 (1980); see also Burt, 
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105 Idaho at 67, 665 P.2d at 1077; Dawson Enters., Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 
P.2d 1257 (1977); Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243,506 P.2d 470 (1973); Cole-Collister 
Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); City of Idaho Falls v. 
Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941). 
On the other hand, quasi-judicial activities are those that impact specific individuals, 
interests or situations. Burt, 105 Idaho at 67, 665 P.2d at 1077. When a landowner files an 
application seeking a permit for a particular use or zoning designation, courts consider that 
action to be quasi-judicial. See Cooper, 101 Idaho at 409-11, 614 P.2d at 949-51. LLUPA 
establishes an appeal process, see I.C. § 67-6521, which is limited to those cases authorizing or 
denying a permit for development, see id. 
There is no "appeal" from legislative actions. Scott v. Gooding County, 137 Idaho 206, 
208, 46 P.3d 23, 25 (2002); Burt, 105 Idaho at 66 n.2, 665 P.2d at 1076 n.2. And LLUPA 
authorizes no "appeal" from legislative decisions amending the Land Use Map, Zoning Map, or 
Zoning Ordinance. Rather, challenges to those legislative actions must come in the form of a 
petition for declaratory judgment. Burt, 105 Idaho at 66 n.2, 665 P .2d at 1076 n.2. 
Because LLUP A has not provided for an appeal of the decisions challenged in this action, 
the plain language of I.e. § 67-6536 demonstrates that the statute does not apply, and the Board 
was not required to keep a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings. Courts must, of 
course, interpret statues according to their plain language. Thomas v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 
825,829,979 P.2d 1183, 1187 (1999). And courts cannot interpret a statute to render any part of 
it mere surplusage. Agric. Servs. of America, Inc. v. Kecther, 137 Idaho 62, 67, 44 P.3d 1117, 
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boards to maintain transcribable verbatim records in all proceedings under LLUP A, it surely 
could have done so. It did not. 
Plaintiffs cite several cases holding that transcribable records are critical to meaningful 
judicial review of proceedings under LLUP A. Each case involved a quasi-judicial proceeding 
and is therefore distinguishable; none is authority for the position Plaintiffs assert. Rural 
Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd of Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 883 P.2d 596 (1999), concerned an 
individual application for planned unit development and preliminary plat for a subdivision within 
the planned unit development. 133 Idaho at 834, 883 P.2d at 597. Chambers v. Kootenai County 
Bd ofComm'rs 125 Idaho 115, 867 P.2d 989 (1994), involved an application for a conditional 
use permit. 125 Idaho at 116, 867 P.2d at 990. Cooper, discussed above, involved an 
application for rezone, 101 Idaho at 407, 614 P.2d at 947, and likely provided the impetus for 
I.e. § 67-6536, 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws. ch. 129. § 3; see also Gumprecht v. City of Coeur 
d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 (1983). Gay v. County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 
103 Idaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1982), involved an individual application for a change in 
the authorized use ofland. 103 Idaho at 627, 651 P.2d at 561. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
never applied I.C. § 67-6536 to legislative proceedings. 
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Proved Any Deficiency In The Record Maintained By The 
County. 
Plaintiffs allege that the County failed to maintain a "reviewable record" of the 
proceedings which produced the actions they challenge. PIs.' Br. Support Application Prelim. 
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Inj. 2d Evid. Hrg. at 2; Pis.' Application T.R.O. & Prelim Inj. 2 (May 4, 2007). They claim that 
a provision in the Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. § 67~5225, provides the "baseline 
reference" for their assertion that the County maintain a record. Id. at 3. Under that statute, 
Plaintiffs posit that the County was required to maintain "a written record of submissions and 
comments, . . . all written materials considered, . . . a record of oral presentation or any 
memorandum prepared by the presiding officer summarizing the contents of the presentations[,] 
or documents prepared in conjunction with their decisions." Id. Plaintiffs are wrong as a matter 
of law. 
The Administrative Procedure Act does not supply the requirements for recordkeeping in 
LLUPA proceedings. Idaho Code § 67-5225 provides that "the agency" must prepare a 
rulemaking record. Local governing boards are not "agencies" under the APA. An "agency" is 
"each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make rules .... " I.C. 
§ 67-5201(2). Counties are not "agencies," and hence the APA does not apply to them, unless a 
statute expressly makes provisions of the AP A applicable to them. Gibson v. Ada County 
Sheriff's Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 7, 72 P.3d 845,847 (2003). By its plain terms, the APA applies to 
state agencies-not counties. 
For legislative actions, LLUP A does not require that local governing boards maintain the 
sort of record asserted by Plaintiffs. If there is any requirement for any recordkeeping for 
legislative activity, it is found in two places within LLUPA. First, I.C. § 67-6504(c) requires 
planning and zoning commissions to keep "[ aJ record of meetings, hearings, resolutions, studies, 
findings, permits, and actions taken shall be maintained." It is difficult to tell which items 
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contemplated in this statute they believe were not kept. Regardless, Plaintiffs have failed to 
identifY any meetings, hearings, resolutions, studies, findings, permits, or actions taken for which 
a record has not been maintained. Indeed, the record contains multiple agendas and minutes 
from various Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission meetings and hearings. (More 
discussion of the County's record of "actions taken" is had below, at Section II.C.) 
The other place within LLUP A which arguably imposes a recordkeeping requirement on 
local governing boards is I.C. § 67-6509(a), which provides that "[aJ record of the hearings, 
findings made, and actions taken by the commission shall be maintained by the city or county." 
Again, the record in this case contains documentation of the hearings and actions taken by the 
commission. That is all either statute requires. 
Again, Plaintiffs cite inapplicable cases to support their theory on what record is required. 
They claim that the recordkeeping requirement in the AP A "applies to the Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners," and then cite cases involving 
petitions for judicial review of individual applications. See PIs.' Br. Support Application Prelim. 
Inj. 2d Evid. Hrg. at 4, citing Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,2 P.3d 738 (2002) (denial 
of subdivision applications); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) (approval 
of application for zone change and planned unit development); Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of 
Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (challenge to approval of preliminary and 
final plats for subdivision). 
Finally, the AP A venue statute Plaintiffs cite, PIs.' Br. Support Application Prelim. Inj. 
2d Evid. Brg. at 4, does not somehow impose the APA's rulemaking recordkeeping requirements 
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on local governing boards. It is merely a venue statute applicable when the AP A governs. See 
I.C. § 67-5225. Indeed, the AP A contemplates petitions for judicial review and petitions for 
declaratory judgment as potential means to challenge various agency actions. See I.C. §§ 67-
5270, 67-5278. 
C. The Minutes Of The Various Hearings Contain The Commission's 
Recommendations; That Is AU That Is Required. 
Finally, Plaintiffs complain that there is no record of the Commissions recommendations 
to the Board. PIs.' Br. Support Application Prelim. Inj. 2d Evid. Hrg. at 6. Like their other 
arguments regarding transcribable verbatim records of the proceedings and the requirement for 
other recordkeeping, Plaintiffs misapprehend what the law actually requires. Idaho Code § 67-
6509, discussing the procedure for amendment of a comprehensive plan, does not require 
separate, written recommendations to be produced. Section 67-6509(b) prohibits the governing 
board from taking any action on an amendment to the plan "until recommendations have been 
received from the commission." If the governing board conducts a hearing on the recommended 
amendments, the recommendation must be advertised in the notice of public hearing. I.C. § 67-
6509(a). No part of I.e. § 67-6509 either specifies the format the recommendations must take or 
prescribes a method of delivery of the recommendations. It is clear that the import of § 67-6509 
is that the governing board receive or otherwise be aware of the recommendations of its planning 
and zoning commission, and that the public be apprised of the recommendation if a subsequent 
public hearing is to be held. As has been stated above, a record of the Commission's 
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recommendations are contained within the minutes of the hearings at which the Commission 
issued its recommendations. 
Nor does I.C. § 67-6511 prescribe the format or manner in which recommendations on 
amendments to a zoning ordinance must be produced or delivered. Again, the minutes of the 
various meetings and hearings of the Commission indicate that recommendations were made. 
At this stage of the proceedings, the question whether the Commission and Board 
followed LLUPA in adopting the amendments to the Land Use Map, Zoning Map, and Zoning 
Ordinance is not ready for adjudication. So far, the question concerns solely whether the County 
maintained the necessary record of its recommendations and the proceedings that produced them. 
As has been shown, the County complied with the law in those respects. 
In. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the County Defendants respectfully request that the Court 
issue an order denying Plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of October, 2007. 
MOORE SMITII BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Carl J. Withroe 
Attorneys for the County Defendants 
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Case No. CV2007-24 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO CAMAS 
COUNTY DEFENDANTS' POST-
HEARING MEMORANDUM 
SECOND EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
ON APPLICATION FOR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
, POST-HEARING 
HEARING ON APPUCA TION 
COMES ~OW Plaintiff~ George Martin, individually and as a member of Martin 
Custom Homes LLC, through counsel, and tiles this his Reply to Camas County 
Defendants' Post-Hearing Memorandum Second Evidentiary Hearing on Application for 
Preliminary [njunction and states as follows; 
INTRODUCTION 
This Reply addresses the issues and arguments raised in the Post-Hearing 
:ifemorandum Supporting the County Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Application jar 
Preliminary Injunction filed, out of time, by Defendants after the close of business on 
October 9, 2007. The Camas County Defendants make four arguments against issuance 
of injunctive relief These arguments, taken together. stand for the proposition that no 
citizen has a right to challenge a local government's rezoning of thousands of acres of 
land: negatively impacting the value of real property owned by plaintiff and others, and 
positively affecting the value of property owned by officials. who failed to disclose said 
ownership, controlling the rezone; despite an absence of any reviewable records to 
support the rezone other than incomplete and unverified meeting minutes and agendas. 
First, Defendant again asserts that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that irreparable 
and immediate injury has been suffered such that injunctive relief is warranted. Second, 
Defendant maintains that LLUPA does not require verbatim transcribable records of the 
proceedings in question. Third, Defendant argues that the AP A does not apply to 
LLUPA proceedings. and therefore no particular records of proceedings must be kept. 
Finally, Defendant denies LLUPA requires a Planning and Zoning Commission to make 
any written recommendations beyond \,\;'hat may be found in Meeting/Hearing Minutes. 
TOC 




Initially, for a complete statement of facts, and discussion of the law regarding 
standing and injunctive relief, PlaintifT refers the Court to his Response to Defendant 
Camas County's Objections to Plaintiff's Application for Preliminary Injunction filed on 
June 13, 2007. Plaintiff also refers the Court to PlaintitTs Response to Defendants' first 
Post-Hearing Afemorandum filed on July 16, 2007, and his Brief Support of 
Application for Preliminary Injunction Second Evidentiary Hearing tlied on September 
24,2007. 
The matter came on for a second evidentiary hearing on PlaintitTs Application for 
Preliminary Injunction, and on the merits of Plaintiff s requested injunctive relief as to 
Defendant Canlas County, on September 25,2007. PlaintitTs hearing exhibits 1-29 were 
offered and admitted into evidence. Plaintiff called as witnesses, Bob Rodman, a former 
member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission, Clinton Krahn, former 
member of the Planning and Zoning Commission, Terry Gregory, former chair of the 
Planning and Zoning Commission, County Clerk, Rollie Bennett, and Planning and 
Zoning Administrator Dwight Butlin. Defendant otTered no exhibits, witnesses or 
rebuttal evidence of any kind. 
Rodman testitled that the Planning and Zoning Commission met regularly, at the 
specitlc request of the Board of County Commissioners, beginning in the Fall of 2005 
through the winter of 2006 to discuss proposed amendment to the Comprehensive Plan 
and Zoning Ordinance. Mr. Rodman recounted interactive meetings wherein the public 
presented statements and materials and the commissioners weighed various options. No 
records. agendas, notice, publication, minutes, tape recordings, summaries or other 
materials evidencing these gatherings exist according to Defendant's responses to 
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requests to produce documents, with several notable exceptions including a minute 
and single agenda item. Clinton Krahn pretended he didn't remember any activities 
of the Commission during the period in question. Mr. Gregory contirmed that such 
meetings did occur but failed to recall much detail. 
RolIie Bennett, the Camas County Clerk, testified that despite his position as the 
County custodian of records he did not maintain or supervise the maintenance of 
Planning and Zoning Commission records. Bennett testified that he had not put place 
any system pursuant to I.e. Section 9-347 whereby guidelines identifying the general 
subject matter and location of public records. Bennett stated he had no way of knowing 
whether any record was kept of written submissions, written materials, record of oral 
presentations, memorandum or other materials that may have been before the Planning 
and Zoning Commission, or County Board of Commissioners. 
Bennett did admit to being the custodian of records for the Board of County 
Commissioners. He testified that the list of omitted tapes presented by Plaintiff was 
accurate, with three (3) exceptions. Despite the previously submitted list of tapes 
provided pursuant to Plaintiffs Requests for Production of Documents, Mr. Bennett 
sought to confirm the existence of several tapes during a break in the proceedings. 
Allegedly, tapes for October 11, 2005, December 26, 2006 and March 27, 2007 were 
located. Said tapes have not been produced for Plaintiff's review of contents. Therefore, 
some eighteen (18) Board of County Commissioner meetings/hearings, where the 
Amended Comprehensive Plan and/or Amended Zoning were discussed and deliberated 
were not recorded. 
4 
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Dwight Butiin, the Planning and Zoning Administrator, testified that he was the 
custodian of records for Planning and Zoning Commission matters. Budin acknowledged 
the list of Planning and Zoning meetings/hearings for which no tape recording was made 
was accurately depicted in Exhibit 6. Butlin did not dispute that the commission had 
discussed and deliberated upon proposed or recommended amendments to the 
Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Ordinance during the meetings/hearing cited. Butlin 
testified that he had provided all the records he could find relating to the amendments. 
Budin admitted no independent written record of recommendation made by the Planning 
and Zoning Commission was created or maintained. Furthermore, Butlin admitted that 
no set of guidelines or segregated record of materials submitted, oral presentations made, 
comments received from agencies, other written memorandum or other materials had 
been maintained. Finally, Butlin admitted no independent record had been kept relating 
to the public notice or requests for government subdivision or agency comment or other 
wise verify that such notices had been sent. 
I. 
CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
The previously submitted briefs and memoranda, referenced above, contain ample 
legal argument relating to the criteria to be considered by the court when injunctive relief 
is requested. Here, PlaintitT is seeking permanent relief under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act, I.c. 10-1201 Et seq., and preliminary relief under LR.C.P. 65(e). Plaintiff has 
requested the Court to order trial on the merits advanced and consolidated with the 
hearing on Application for Preliminary Injunction pursuant to LR.C.P. 65(a)(2). 
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MEMORANDUM SECOND EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR 
IMINARY INJUNCTION 
Defendant, despite sworn statements contained in a verified Application for 
Injunction and verified Petition continues to argue that "Plaintiffs have 
presented no evidence relating to the injury they claim \vill befall them if the County is 
not restrained ... :' Defendant goes on to conclude that Plaintiffs claims of immediate 
injury are '"far too premature and far too speculative" because the "land-use process takes 
so much time" and no "allegation that any applications have been tiled on that property." 
To be certain the Court has the current state of facts relating to both Plaintiffs property 
interests and the present and ongoing approval of land use applications by Defendant's 
attached hereto is Plaintiffs Atlidavit. The diminution in value of Plaintiff's interest in 
real property located in Camas County has already occurred, during the rezoning process, 
and continues to occur due to the ongoing processing of applications. Apparently, 
unknown to counsel, the Camas County Defendants do not take such a great deal of time 
to consider subdivision applications! 
II 
REZONE ACTION TRIGGERS DUE PROCESS & LLUPA 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A REVIEWABLE RECORD INCLUDING A 
VERBATIM TRANSCRIBABLE RECORD 
In 1980 Idaho very clearly joined Illinois, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, other 
states, and a host of law review commentators in offering due process protections, 
including a verbatim transcribable record, to those individuals whose property interests 
are adversely affected by rezoning actions by local government. Cooper v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,409,614 P.2d 947. The Court 
stated, "It is clear there is a pressing need in Idaho for establishing standards and 
procedures by which particularized land use regulation is to be administered. To 
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the discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually unlimited in the determination of 
individual is to condone government men rather than government by law:' Id at 
411. 
before ==:.!... m 1973, our Supreme Court recognized this principle as 
applied to notice and hearing requirements in a case where a citizen action group sought 
declaratory judgment that a county zoning ordinance was void. Quoting an earlier 
California case the Court in Citizens for Better Government v. Valley County, 95 Idaho 
320, 322, 508 P.2d 550, held, "When the statute requires notice and hearing as to the 
possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action of the legislative body 
becomes quasi judicial in character, and the statutory notice and hearing then becomes 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process and may not be dispensed with." A 
similar result was reached in Walker-Schmidt v. Blaine Countv, 101 Idaho 420,422; 614 
P.2d 960, 962, when the court reversed and remanded the case, "because no transcribable 
verbatim record of the proceedings was kept, and because the governing body failed to 
make specific written findings of fact and conclusions upon which the decision was 
based ... :' 
Defendant insists that Camas County's rezone action, even though it altered 
existing zoning designations and boundaries of individual property owners around the 
county, was purely legislative and therefore not subject to judicial scrutiny. Defendant 
argues that qua'ii-judicial due process analysis only applies to applications for rezone 
requested by a particular property owner. Defendant ignores the fact that here we have a 
massive rezone requested by just a few property owners, the members of the County 
Board of Commissioners, and unknown others. Furthermore. Defendant fails to 
CAMAS 




distinguish, or even cite. cases where the courts have recognized due nrr,,''''<cC' rights 
application of LLUPA standards) of property owners adversely impacted by 
rezone ordinances. The distinction between adoption of a new zoning ordinance. and 
amending an existing zoning ordinance where a change of zoning designation or 
boundaries negatively impacts a particular property owner have been repeatedly 
recognized. 
In McDonnell v. Board of County Commrs., 116 Idaho 824. 780 P.2d 146 (1989) 
this distinction was extensively discussed. Again, in McCuskey v. Canvon County, 123 
Idaho 657; 851 P.2d 953, the Supreme Court voided a rezoning ordinance, in a 
declaratory judgment action, where "the amendment effected a zoning district boundary 
change ... " In Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320,986 
P.2d 343. (1990) property owners adversely affected by the City's adoption of a rezoning 
ordinance, as applied to their property, successfully challenged the ordinance based on 
the invalidity of the Comprehensive Plan. Likewise, in Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 
Idaho 681,684,799 P.2d 969, (1990) the Court held, in a declaratory judgment action, an 
amended zoning ordinance invalid because of a failure to comply with the mandatory 
dictates of LLUP A. In none of the above cited cases was the rezoning application 
initiated by an individual property owner. In each of these cases a general rezoning 
ordinance, negatively effected the value of an individual's real property. was successfully 
challenged by the land owner on LLUPA due process grounds. 
Defendants cite Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65; 665 P.2d 1075, as 
controlling on the question of whether Camas County's action in rezoning some twenty 
thousand (20,000) acres was legislative or quasi-judicial. In the annexed land 
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that was initially zoned, not rezoned. ld at 67. Thus, the facts of Burt are 
from those of the case at bar, and assist in clarifying the holding 
The Court stated, "Legislative activity by a zoning entity is differentiated from 
quasi-judicial activity by the result-legislative activity produces a rule or policy which 
has application to an open class whereas quasi-judicial activity impacts specific 
individuals, interests and situations." Burt at 67. 
The courts have not made any distinction relating to the origin of applications, 
whether citizen or government initiated, this is a fabricated argument intended to divert 
attention from the underlying truth. Standing to challenge a government land use 
decision is ba'ied upon whether real or potential harm might come to the value of ones 
property, not whether an individual land owner, as opposed to the government initiates 
the application. Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, 2006 Idaho 
(30061); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,73 P.3d 84. 
Defendant argues narrowly, that only cases from which an "appeal", which he 
reads as a Petition for Review, requires a verbatim transcribable record. However, the 
term "appear' in I.C 67-6536 is defined in the body of the statute. The proceedings 
wherein a transcribable verbatim record is envisioned bv the statute are made clear: "all . " 
public hearings at which testimony or evidence is received ......... or during which the 
commission or governing board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the 
record .. :' The developing case law, all cited above, has offered ample guidance; the 
procedural safeguards of LL UP A apply in all cases where an individual's real property 
are affected. 
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APA APPLIES TO LLUPA PROCEEDINGS & LLUPA 
PROCEEDINGS REQUIRE A REVIEWABLE RECORD 
Defendant argues that the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act does not supply 
the requirements for recordkeeping in LLUPA proceedings, citing for authority only 
Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dep't, 139 Idaho 5; 72 P.3d 845 (2006). Defendant 
asserts that local government boards are not "agencies" under APA despite the fact that 
I.e. 67-6521 (1)( d), and an entire body of case law confirms the contrary. The Gibson 
ca<.;e appears completely irrelevant to the case at bar. Cowan, Evans, Sprenger. Grubb 
and many other cases clearly reference local government boards as subject to APA 
"agency" regulation regarding records. In at least two cases, Workman Familv 
Partnership v. Citv of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32; 655 P2.d 926, and Castaneda v. Brighton 
Corp., challenges to what were clearly quasi-judicial acts of a local government board, 
both initially filed as declaratory judgment actions, were treated by the court as Petitions 
for Review and explicitly considered AP A, not simply due process, standards. 
The conclusion that rezoning actions are beyond review disregards the underlying 
principle of law, and the fundamental premise in adoption of LLUPA; specific and 
controlling guidelines, standards and criteria are necessary to prevent political and/or 
personal abuse of the land-use entitlement process. What use are guidelines, standards 
and criteria if no record of public or agency notice, submissions, presentations or 
deliberation are kept? LLUPA provides just such controlling guidelines and standards. 
Whether an action is brought as a Petition for Judicial Review or as a Declaratory 
Judgment is really a distinction without a difference. Either form of action. 
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interchangeably. is in essence a challenge to the legality of a local government action. for 
a Court must have a record. 
For example. LLUPA, at 67-6511(a) commands a Planning and Zoning 
Commission mandates "Particular consideration shall be given to the effects of any 
proposed zone change upon the delivery of services by a political subdivision providing 
public services, including school districts. within the planning jurisdiction." If no 
transcribable verbatim record, no written recommendations, no agendas and no certified 
or verified minutes are kept, such as in the case at bar, how can the court know whether 
such "particular consideration" was given. Similarly, paragraph (b) of the statute, 
referencing the notice and hearing procedure provided in I.e. 67-6509 requires notice be 
sent to all political subdivision fifteen (15) days prior to any hearing. Here, no record 
whatsoever has been kept to confirm whether such notice was sent. 
It is curious that Defendants forced Plaintiff to spend countless hours 
painstakingly proving the absence of records and now, having proven the records do not 
exist, admit they didn't bother to maintain any records in support of their decisions. 
Finally, Defendant does begrudgingly concede I.e. 67-6504(c) and 67-6509 "arguably" 
requires " ... A record of meetings, hearings, resolutions, studies, findings, permits and 
actions shall be maintained ... " and •· ... a record of findings made, and actions taken by 
the commission shall be maintained by the city of county." Incredibly, Defendant then 
admits. 
"It is difficult to tell which items contemplated in this statute they believe 
were not kept. Regardless, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any 
meetings, hearings, resolution.", studies, findings, permit,., 01' actions 
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taken for which a record has not been maintained. Indeed, the record 
contains multiple agendas and minutes from various Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission meetings and hearings. " 
Plaintiff requested. and was according to sworn statement of counsel, provided all such 
records maintained by Camas County, which is to say no record of any such findings. or 
studies or resolutions or actions were produced. Given the opportunity to produce 
additional rPt',nrrl at hearing. Defendant produced nothing. 
Plaintiff s Hearing Exhibits 1-29 were all admitted into evidence. Conclusively, 
no verified meeting minutes have been maintained, no agenda or meeting minutes of any 
kind were maintained for a of meetings occurring in the fall of 2005 and \vinter of 
2006. No record of notice of meetings or posted agendas, or mailings, or postings on site 
have been produced by Defendant. No record that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission's recommendations or summary of action to be taken was included in any 
public notice has been produced. Defendant's response to this vacuum of support is to 
stand on the sufficiency of unverified, uncertified and unsigned minutes of "various" 
meetings and "multiple" agendas. 
IV 
WRITTEN RECOMMENDATIONS FROM P&Z ARE A 
MANDATORY PART OF A REVIEWABLE RECORD 
Defendant would have the law impose no duty on a Planning and Zoning 
Commission to maintain a record of its recommendation to the decision making body. 
and thereby avoid review of whether it fulfilled its statutory duty to apply specific and 
controlling to adoption of a Amended Comprehensive Plan or amended 
reasons that u,-\.,uu",- 67-6509 and 67-6511 not 
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the format the recommendations must take or prescribe the method of delivery or 
production of the rccolllllleuWiliun, the law really does not require creation of .such 
recommendation. No Case can be fOW1d that specifically addresses whitt \.:unstitutes a 
sufficient written recommendation, hut such rP.(,-Ommendations have been periodicaJ1y 
referenced Castaneda v. Brighton Corp, 130 Idaho 923, 929; 950 P.2d 1262. Could it be 
that the requirement is so blatantly obvious on the face of the statute that challenge has 
been deemed inappropriate? Again, even the least stringent level of judicial review of the 
validity Of an amended zoning ordinance or amended Comprehensive Plan requires a 
Court to have some written record. Here, all that exists are incomplete, uncertified 
agendas and meeting minutes devoid of fmdings made or substantive deliberations had. 
WHERE .... URe, Plaintiff requests this honotable Court enter' its order declaring 
void the Amendments to Compreheusi vt: Plun und Zoning Ordinance adopted on March 
29 and April 18, 2007 or alternatively enter Prelimiruu-y Injunction prohibiting processing 
any land use applications. including rezone and suhdjvi~on nncfp,r said amendment,.; un.til 
such time as this Petition is resolved on the merits after full trial. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
A TTOREY FOR PLAINTIff 
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CERTIFICATE OF StRVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this /& day vf ~T 2007, I served 
a true and correc:t copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Reply to Crunas County Defendant's 
Post-Hearing Memorandum Second Evidentiary Hearing on Applica,tion for Preliminary 
lr\jWlction and Plaintiff's Affidavit in support thcreofby delivering same, via facsimile to 
Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700. 
P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, facsimile number 2083445800, and Stephanie 
J. Bonney and Carl Withroe, Attorneys for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock 
St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, facsimile number 208331 1202. 
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Stephanie J. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. Withroe, ISB No. 7051 
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MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
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and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 






Case No. CV-07-24 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDA VIT OF 




Defendant Camas County respectfully moves this Court for an order striking the 
Affidavit of George Martin, filed October 16, 2007, in support of Plaintiffs' Application for a 
Preliminary Injunction. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum Supporting Motion to 
Strike, filed contemporaneously herewith. 
MOTTON TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE MARTIN -- 1 
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Defendants request oral argument on this Motion. If a hearing is conducted on this 
Motion, Defendants request that the Court pennit counsel to appear telephonically. 
Respectfully submitted this z.zJ. day of October, 2007. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Carl J. Withroe 
Attorneys for Defendant Camas County 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.-:;> 'J ->l I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion was this C::--(....-
day of October, 2007, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Method: LAS ~ 'L- \ 
Phillip 1. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Method: lA.<;,. ~l \.. 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Method: 
----------------------~ 
Carl J. Withroe 
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Stephanie J. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl J. Withroe, ISB No. 7051 
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MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CIrrD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
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This Memorandum accompanies the County Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of George Martin. 
Plaintiffs requested and obtained a hearing date of September 25,2007. Plaintiffs did not 
indicate via motion or other written pleading what the scope and nature of the September 25, 
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2007, hearing was to be. One day before the hearing, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum addressing 
the question whether the County failed to maintain a "reviewable record." See PIs.' Br. Support 
Application Prelim. Inj. 2d Evid. I-Irg. 2 (dated Sept. 24, 2007). At the hearing, Plaintiffs 
introduced numerous documents and examined witnesses regarding various documents and tapes 
related to the meetings and hearings leading up to the 2007 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map, 
Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map. The Court allowed the parties to submit post-hearing 
memoranda, but did not permit either side to present new evidence. 
Plaintiffs bear the burden to demonstrate the right to an injunction, Lawrence Warehouse 
Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965). This means of course, that they 
held the burden to produce evidence of irreparable injury. Plaintiffs, however, failed to produce 
any evidence-whether at this hearing or previously-relating to the harm Mr. Martin claims he 
will suffer if the County is not enjoined from implementing the Land Use Map, Zoning 
Ordinance, and Zoning Map. The County Defendants addressed this in their post-hearing 
memorandum. 
In their Reply Memorandum, Plaintiffs argue Mr. Martin has suffered a diminution in 
value of his property due to the rezoning process. Attached to said memorandum, filed October 
16, 2007, is the affidavit of Plaintiff George Martin. Therein, Mr. Martin states numerous, 
complex facts, many of which are not in the record, to demonstrate that the amendments to the 
Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map caused him irreparable injury. He identifies 
no value diminution, but instead speculates that the amended zoning ordinance increases the 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE 
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supply of residential property. Martin Aff. 2·3. His claimed injury appears to be increased 
competition in the development market. 
Mr. Martin's affidavit is the first articulation of the harm claimed in this case. It comes 
after the hearing, after the County Defendants post-hearing memorandum was filed, and attached 
to Plaintiffs' reply post-hearing memorandum, the last memorandum permitted by this Court on 
this matter. Mr. Martin's affidavit violates Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3)(B), thereby prejudicing the 
County Defendants. That rule provides that (1) when a motion is supported by an affidavit, the 
affidavit shall be served with the motion, and (2) any opposing affidavit shall be filed so that it is 
received no later than seven days prior to the hearing. Of course, as stated above, the order of 
things related to this hearing differed from the norm. The only pre-hearing filing (for the second 
evidentiary hearing) was Plaintiffs' memorandum supporting his application for an injunction. 
Nevertheless, Rule 7(b)(3)(B) required Plaintiff, at a minimum, to submit evidence of his harm at 
the hearing. This he did not do. He certainly could have: Mr. Martin was present at the hearing 
and could have been called to testify as to the harm he claims. His opportunity to present 
evidence of harm has passed; he should not be permitted to do it now. 
The County Defendants will be prejudiced if Mr. Martin's affidavit is entered into 
evidence for consideration of the injunction based on the record arguments in the second 
evidentiary hearing. The prejudice is nearly self-evident. Permitting Mr. Martin's affidavit to be 
entered without a reasonable opportunity to respond violates the fundamental tenets of the 
adversarial system and the due process-inspired opportunity to respond to the evidence against 
them. Indeed, the prejudice that will befall the County Defendants is likely the very sort of 
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prejudice Rule 7(b)(3)(B) is designed to avoid. It ensures that each party will have ample notice 
to review and prepare for the evidence that will be asserted against it. 
The nature of the relief sought in this matter only amplifies the prejudice Mr. Martin's 
affidavit would inflict on the County Defendants. Mr. Martin seeks to enjoin the County from 
implementing its amended Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map. These planning 
documents affect all the property in Camas County. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy. 
Perrault v. Robinson, 29 Idaho 267, 158 P. 1074 (1916). Injunctions issue "only in extreme 
cases where the right is very clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its 
refusal," Evans v. District Court of the F~fth Judicial District, 47 Idaho 267, 270, 275 P. 99, 100 
(1929). If the Court were to permit Mr. Martin's affidavit to be considered, and if the requisite 
elements of an injunction were present (which the County Defendants, of course, deny), more 
than two years of comprehensive land use planning would be enjoined, affecting numerous 
people, all without first affording the County an opportunity to respond. The risk of error in 
issuing the injunction and prejUdice to the County (and its inhabitants) thereby is too great given 
the nature of the relief sought. 
For the foregoing reasons, the County Defendants respectfully request that the Court 
issue an order striking the Affidavit of George Martin. 
Respectfully submitted this --* day of October, 2007. 
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Carl J. Withroe 
A ttomeys for Defendant Camas COtlllty 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum was this 
2.-"L .. cet day of October, 2007, served upon the following individuals and in the 
corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Method: (A 4 tM.t...Lc 
Phillip 1. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 < 
Method: vt ~ Mcc l ( 
--------------------
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Method: LtS (Wtt( 
Carl J. Withroe 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Tel: 208 622 7878 
Fax: 208 622 ~ 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacity, 
KEN BAXTROM, 































Case No. CV-07-24 
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE 
TO AMEND PETITION FOR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
f)j \l 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave To Amend Petition having come before this Court, 
and the Court being fully apprised of the premises and good cause having been shown; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiff is granted Leave of Court to Amend Petition 
for Declaratory Judgment. 
DATEDthis--=-'_{ _day of ~ 2007. 




CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Tel: 208 622 7878 
Fax: 208 622 7129 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 












CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacity, 
KEN BAXTROM, 































Case No. CV-07-24 
Amended Petition for Breach of Contract, 
Tortious Interference with Contract, 
and for Declaratory Judgment 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
COMES NOW, plaintiff George Martin, personally and on behalf of Martin 
Custom Homes, L.L.C. as a member, by and through counsel, and in support of his 
Amended Petition for Breach of Contract and Intentional Interference with 
Contract against Defendant Ed Smith personally, and his Petition for Declaratory 
Judgment against Camas County, by and through its duly elected Board of 
Commissioners, does state following: 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 
& 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
1. George Martin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff' jointly with 
Martin Custom Homes, L.L.c.) is a resident of and owner of real property situated 
in the County of Camas, State of Idaho. 
2. Martin Custom Homes, L.L.C (hereinafter referred to as "'Plaintiff' 
jointly with George Martin) is an Idaho Limited Liability Company in good 
standing. 
3. Defendant Ed Smith (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant Smith") is 
a resident of Camas County, State ofIdaho. 
4. Defendant Ed Smith, is licensed by the State of Idaho as a Real Estate 
Broker doing business as Town and Country Realtors, and whose business address 
is 514 Soldier Road, Fairfield, Idaho 83327. 
5. All acts and activities alleged to have occurred in this Complaint 
occurred within County of Camas, State of Idaho. 
6. Damages claimed by Plaintiff are within the jurisdictional amount 
required to be heard in the District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Camas. 
7. The 5th District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Camas, has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 67-5270, 67-5273, 67-
5278 and section 1-705. 
WHEREFORE, this honorable court having jurisdiction Plaintiff prays this 
court hear and determine the controversies presented herein. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
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8. On or about September 8, 2004 Plaintiff entered into an agreement 
with Defendant Smith, in Camas County, for which good and valuable consideration 
was exchanged, whereby Defendant was to act as Plaintiff's "Exclusive Bu)'er's 
Broker," (hereinafter referred to as the "Agency Agreement") for purposes of 
purchase of vacant land in Camas County Idaho. 
9. Defendant Smith, by entry into said agreement, owed Plaintiff certain 
duties and obligations, including but not limited to the following; 
a. To perform the terms of the written agreement 
b. To exercise reasonable skill and care 
c. To promote the best interests of the Plaintiff in good faith, honesty 
and fair dealing including, but not limited to 
(i) Disclosing to the Plaintiff all adverse material facts actually 
known or which reasonably should have been known by the 
defendant; 
(ii) Seeking a property for purchase at a price and under terms 
and conditions acceptable to the buyer and assisting in the negotiation 
therefore 
d. To immediately, upon receiving any offer to purchase signed and 
dated by plaintiff, provide a copy of the offer to purchase to the buyer as a 
receipt 
e. To make certain that all offers to purchase real property or any 
interest therein are in writing and contain all terms and conditions of the real 
estate transaction as directed by the plaintiff 
f. Any and all fiduciary duties. 
10. On or about September 8, 2004 property for purchase was located, 
then owned by Ron and Deborah Pauls, Husband and Wife, (hereinafter, "Sellers"), 
which said property is situated in Camas County, Idaho, and fully described in the 
"Legal Description" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
11. Terms for an offer were defined by Plaintiff and submitted in writing 
to Defendant Smith. 
12. Defendant Smith thereafter failed to perform the terms of the written 
agreement; to exercise reasonable skill and care; to promote the best interest of 
Plaintiff in good faith, honesty and fair dealing; failed to notify Plaintiff of all 
adverse facts known or which reasonably should have been known by Defendant 
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Smith; failed to make certain the offer to purchase real property contained all the 
terms and conditions as directed by Plaintiff. 
13. Plaintiff, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant Smith's 
breach of agency contract, suffered monetary damages in an amount exceeding Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000). 
14. Defendant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law 
causing Plaintiff to incur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-
120 and 12-121. 
15. Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for 
its likely consequences. Defendant Smith acted with an extremely harmful state of 
mind whether his conduct was malicious or grossly negligent. 
WHERFORE, Plaintiff prays this court enter judgment against Defendant 
Smith in an amount in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 for monetary 
damages, for punitive damages and for attorney's fees. 
COUNT II 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
16. Upon further negotiations Seller and Plaintiff entered into a contract 
to purchase real property (hereinafter the "Real Estate Contract") subject to a 
series of terms and conditions including a "contingent on rezone and replat" clause. 
17. Defendant Smith knowing of the contract between Plaintiff and Seller, 
and the specific terms and conditions thereof, set about a course of action that 
further breached his own contractual duties to Plaintiff and intentionally interfered 
with the contract for purchase of real property with Seller by taking all efforts 
possible to prevent the real property in question from being rezoned in a manner 
satisfactory to Plaintiff and otherwise intentionally obstructing closure on the Real 
Estate Contract. 
18. Defendant Smith actively enticed Sellers to breach the Real Estate 
Contract thereby directly causing Sellers to declare the Real Estate Contract null 
and void thereby breaching said Real Estate Contract. 
19. In addition to the above specifically described intentional interference 
with contract by enticing Sellers to breach the contract to purchase real property 
Defendant Smith continued his malicious and illegal conduct under this count and 
in his ostensibly official capacity, as plead in Count III below, by acting as Chair of 
the body ostensibly acting as Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission that 
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apparently recommended amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
Ordinance. 
20. Plaintiff, seeking to mitigate his damages and take advantage of the 
residual value of his contractual rights, (i.e. diminished potential development rights 
and or resale value in the real property) waived all conditions, terms and 
contingencies and closed on the real property in question on or about September 26, 
2005. 
21. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Smith's intentional 
interference with the Real Estate Contract with Sellers that led to a breach of said 
contract Plaintiff suffered monetary damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000). 
22. Defendant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law 
causing Plaintiff to incur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-
120 and 12-121. 
23. Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for 
its likely consequences. Defendant Smith acted with an extremely harmful state of 
mind whether his conduct was malicious or grossly negligent. 
WHERFORE, Plaintiff prays this court enter judgment against Defendant 
Smith in an amount in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 for monetary 
damages, for punitive damages and for attorney's fees. 
COUNT III 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
OR IN THE AL TERNERA TIVE 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Factual Allegations Common to All Legal Theories 
24. During the period and within the time frame addressed by this 
Petition, Camas County, by and through its duly elected Board of Commissioners, 
and through the members of a body ostensibly acting as, but not lawfully organized, 
Planning and Zoning Commission, undertook to exercise the mandatory powers 
authorized Title 67 Chapter 65, commonly referred to as the Local Land Lse 
Planning Act, by amending the Camas County Comprehensive Plan, the Land Lse 
Map and Zoning Ordinance, text and Zoning Map, and did thereby uniformly and 
systematically up-zone real property owned by various members, relations and 
clients of members of the Board and Commission, and downzone real property 
owned by Plaintiff. 
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25. The dates of approval or recommendation of the various aspects of 
the Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map, by 
the unlawfully organized Planning and Zoning Commission, are difficult if not 
impossible to discern because no proper record was created or maintained. 
26. The Camas County Board of Commissioners did adopt an amended 
Zoning Ordinance No. 153, on April 18, 2007, but failed to attach a copy of the 
ordinance, text or map. Curiously, Zoning Ordinance Map No. 150, was adopted by 
the Board prior to the text, on March 29, 2007, which did not include legal 
description of the various zones. Also on March 29, 2007 the Board passed a 
resolution adopted a Comprehensive Land Use Map, but failed again to provide 
legal description of the areas contemplated for future land uses. No written record 
of recommendation from the unlawfully formed Planning and Zoning Commission 
was created. 
Conflict of Interest 
27. Defendant Smith, during the period' addressed in this Petition, acted 
as an appointed government official serving on a body that purported to be a duly 
empowered Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission. 
28. Defendant Smith owns, and frequently buys and sells, numerous 
parcels of real property situated within Camas County, Idaho. 
29. Defendant Smith is actively engaged in the purchase and sale of real 
property situated in Camas County both for his own account and as a broker agent 
for the purpose of generating income through commission. During the period 
addressed by this Petition, it believed Defendant Smith has purchased, sold or been 
associated with the purchase or sale as a broker agent numerous parcels of real 
property. 
30. Defendant Smith and other members of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and Board of County Commissioners had an economic interest in the 
outcome of this legislative and quasi-judicial activity under Idaho Code Section 67-
6506 and therefore suffered a fatal conflict of interest requiring recusal in their 
capacity as a member(s) of the body purporting to be the Camas County Planning 
and Zoning Commission and the Board of County Commissioners. 
Planning and Zoning Commission Lacked Jurisdiction 
31. During the period addressed by this Petition the Camas County 
Planning and Zoning Commission did not legally exist and/or was operating without 
authority in that no Ordinance was duly passed by the Board of County 
Commissioners creating a Planning and Zoning Commission and no organizational 
papers or bylaws had been adopted as required by Idaho Section 67-6504. 
AMENDED PETITION 
Therefore, any and all acts dependant on a valid amended Comprehensive Plan, 
including an amended zoning ordinance are without legal authority. 
Fatal Procedural Infirmities (Due Process Violations) 
32. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to follow the notice and hearing procedures required 
by Idaho Code in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Ordinance. 
33. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to keep a transcribable verbatim record of 
proceedings as required by Idaho Code in amending the Comprehensive Plan. 
34. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to keep a transcribable verbatim record of 
proceedings as required by Idaho Code in amending the Zoning Ordinance. 
35. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed to comply with the substantive dictates of the Local 
Land Use Planning Act. 
36. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Commissioners failed, in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning 
Ordinance, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law or other documentation 
or record of recommendations as required by I.e. 67-6508(b) thereby rendering 
impossible a meaningful review whether the substantive requirements and 
mandatory Planning duties under Idaho Code were adhered to. 
37. The Camas County Board of Commissioners, as governing board, 
failed to remand and re-notice public hearing after material changes were made to 
the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. 
Additional Fatal Procedural Infirmities 
RESOLUTION 96 MAY 25, 2006 AMENDMENT TO COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
38. On or about May 25, 2006 Defendant Camas County adopted 
Resolution #96 - New Comprehensive Plan with revised Land Use Map, changing 
the permitted future land use of the subject property from R-7 to Low Density 
Residential - was not supported by proper notice pursuant to I.C. Section 67-6509. 
Therefore, Resolution 96 is lawfully deficient and should be stricken as void and 
held for naught. 
39. More specifically the notice published failed to contain a summary of 
any kind or manner, including any sort of legal description or map of the areas to be 
affected, the land use and/or use designations; nor did Defendant Camas County 
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provide a notice to other media serving the jurisdiction for use as a public sen'ice 
announcement, nor was notice of intent to adopt the amended plan sent to all 
political subdivisions providing services within the planning jurisdiction, including 
school districts. 
40. Moreover, Defendant Camas County failed to provide proper mailed 
or lawfully authorized alternative notice such as site posting. 
41. Furthermore, Defendant Camas County altered the proposed land use 
map on the day of the hearing and thereafter failed to properly notice a subsequent 
hearing. 
42. Additionally, Defendant Camas County failed, in relation to the 
planning duties required by I.e. Section 67-6508, to include "all land" and provide a 
map, including the entire county, indicating suitable projected land uses for the 
jurisdiction. 
43. Moreover, Defendant Camas County has not complied with 67-
6509(c) requiring a copy of the plan to accompany each adopting resolution and to 
be kept on file with the county clerk and said the portion of said Plan that is the 
land use is to this day not available at the office of the County Clerk. 
ORDINANCES 150 & 153 APRIL 18,2007 AMENDED ZONING 
ORDINANCE 
44. On or about March 29, 2007, and April 18, 2007 Defendant Camas 
County adopted Ordinances #150 & #153- Amended Zoning Ordinance and Map 
providing for amended zoning districts and boundaries thereby, rezoning the 
subject property - publication for which failed to comply with the requirements of 
I.C. 31-715 and/or 31-715A. Therefore, Ordinances 150 and 153 are lawfully 
deficient and should be stricken as void and held for naught. 
45. More specifically, said publications did not an accurately and 
completely summarize the ordinance nor did the publications provide a statement 
that the full text of the ordinances were available at a given location or time where a 
copy of same could be obtained. 
46. Additionally, said publications failed, because the ordinances deal 
with real property requiring legal description, to publish in full those sections 
containing the legal description or map thereof with sufficient detail to clearly 
define the area with which the ordinance is concerned. 
47. Moreover, Ordinance 150 adopting an Amended Zoning Map, was 
adopted March 29, 2007 some twenty (20) days prior to adoption of Ordinance 153, 
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the Amended Zoning Ordinance text upon which the Map is supposedly based 
indicating a unlawful final decision to adopt was made prior to hearing. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
48. Defendant Camas County, acting through its duly elected Board of 
County Commissioners acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law causing 
Plaintiff to incur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Section 12-117. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this court to enter its Judgment declaring 
null and void all activities and ostensibly official actions under LLUPA taken by the 
Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of Commissioners 
on and after September 8, 2004, to restrain Defendant from processing land use 
applications under the ostensibly adopted amended Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance and to enter judgment in an amount reasonably required for 
Plaintiff's attorney fees. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this // day of £7 £: (- 2007, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED PETITION by 
delivering same, via FACSIMILE to Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney for Defendant Ed 
Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, 
facsimile number 208 344 5800, and Stephanie J. Bonney and Carl With roe, 
Attorneys for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 
83702, facsimile number 208 331 1202. 
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12/17/2007 11:42 FAX 20/s 331 MOORE SMITH BUXTON 141002 
Stephanie J. Bonney, ISB No. 6037 
Carl 1. Withroe, ISB No. 7051 
MOORE SMITH BI.JXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 




ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by 
and through the duly elected Board of 
Commissioners in their official capacity, 


















Case No. CV-07-24 
AMENDED ANSWER OF 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY, 
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF 
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE 
CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, AND ED SMITH IN 
HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE 
CAMAS COUNTY PLANNING AND 
ZONING COMMISSION 
In response to Platiniffs' Amended Answer, Defendants Camas County, Idaho (the 
County), by and through its duly elected board of county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill 
Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a 
member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission (collectively, County 
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12/17/2007 11: 42 J:<!\A ;.;:UO .).lL ".Vw 
Defendants), by and through their attorneys of record, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, 
Chartered, hereby submit this Amended Answer to the Plaintiffs' Amended Petition for Breach 
of Contract, Tortious Interference with Contract, and for Declaratory Judgment. 
This pleading is divided into three parts. In Part I, the County Defendants answer the 
Plaintiffs' Petition in this matter using the same numbering scheme as in Plaintiffs' Petition. 
Phrases in brackets immediately following some paragraph numbers correspond to the heading 
provided by Plaintiffs and in no way should be construed as an admission or deniaL Unless 
specific responses to individual sentences or allegations are indicated, the response applies to the 
entire corresponding paragraph in Plaintiffs' Petition. Part II sets forth the County Defendants' 
affinnative defenses; Part III contains the County Defendants' request for relief. 
I. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION 
The County Defendants admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
1. [Facts Common to all Counts and Jurisdictional Statement] County Defendants 
lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
2. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
3. Admit. 
4. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
5. Admit that the acts or omissions alleged in Plaintiffs' Petition occurred in Camas 
County, Idaho to the extent those acts or omissions relate to the alleged actions of the Camas 
County Planning and Zoning Commission and/or Camas County Board of County 
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12/17/2007 11:42 FAX 208 3311202 MOORE SMITH BUXTON 141004 
Commissioners. Otherwise, County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and 
therefore deny. 
6. Deny. 
7. Deny that the judicial review provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act 












[Count I; Breach of Contract] Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants arid therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
Not relevant to the County Defendants and therefore deny. 
[Count II; Tortious Interference with Contract] County Defendants lack 
information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
17. Deny. 
18. Deny. 
19. County Defendants lack intormation sufficient to admit or deny and theretore deny. 
20. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
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24. [Count III; Petition for Declaratory Judgment or in the Alternative Petition for 
Judicial Review] County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore 
deny. 
25. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
26. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny and therefore deny. 
27. [Conflict of Interest] County Defendants are unable to ascertain from the Petition 
what "the time period addressed in this Petition" is and therefore deny. County Defendants 
admit that Ed Smith has served as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission. 
28. County Defendants admit that Ed Smith owns property in Camas County, Idaho, 
and has purchased and sold property in Camas County. County Defendants otherwise deny. 
29. Admit that Ed Smith is a duly-licensed Idaho real estate agent and that Mr. Smith 
has generated income as such. County Defendants otherwise deny. 
30. Deny. 
3 I . [Planning and Zoning Commission Lacked Jurisdiction] Deny. 
32. [Fatal Procedural Infirmities (Due Process Violations)] Deny. 
33. Deny. 
34. Deny. 
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38. [Additional Fatal Procedural Infirmities] Admit that on May 25, 2007, Defendant 
Camas County adopted Resolution No. 96. Deny the remainder. 
39. Deny. 
40. States a legal conclusion and therefore deny the same; to the extent this paragraph 
alleges a fact, deny. 
41. Deny. 
42. States a legal conclusion and therefore deny the same; to the extent this paragraph 
alleges a fact, admit that the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amended a portion of the 
previous map. 
43. Deny. 
44. [Ordinances 150 & 153 April 18, 2007 Amended Zoning Ordinance] Admit that 
On March 29, 2007, Camas County adopted Ordinance No. 150. The Ordinance is the best 
evidence of its contents and therefore speaks for itself. Admit that on April 18, 2007, Camas 
County adopted Ordinance No. 153. The Ordinance is the best evidence of its contents and 
therefore speaks for itself. Deny that the publication of the ordinances was deficient. 
45. Deny. 
46. States a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required. To the extent a 
response is required, deny. 
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47. Admit that Ordinance No. 150 was adopted on March 29, and admit that Ordinance 
~o. 153 was adopted on April 18,2007. Deny the remainder. 
48. [Attorney Fees] Deny and affirmatively allege that Plaintiffs' Petition is wholly 
devoid of any merit whatsoever and that the County Defendants are entitled to costs and attorney 
fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-117 because this action has been brought without a reasonable basis in 
fact and law. 
II. 
AFFIRMA TlVE DEFENSES 
First Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in their favor and 
against the County Defendants. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute oflimitations. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of their own actions 
or omissions. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
A.ny injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of the acts or 
omissions of others for whom the County Defendants are not liable. 
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Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of TitIe 6, Chapter 9, Tort Claims 
against Government Entities. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants have immunity pursuant to I.e. §§ 6-904(1), 6-904(3), and 6-
904B(3). 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants are not liable for punitive damages pursuant to I. C. § 6·918. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
The Plaintiffs have not suffered actual harm or a violation of a fundamental right as 
required by I.e. § 67-6535. 
III. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore, the answering County Defendants request that the Plaintiffs take nothing by 
their Petition and each cause of action pleaded therein; that the County Defendants be awarded 
their reasonable costs and attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12·117, 12-120, 12-121, and 6-918A; and 
that the Court provide the County Defendants any further relief as may be just and equitable. 
Respectfully submitted this -D!-day of December, 2007. 
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MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Carl J. Withroe 
Attorneys for County Defendants 
* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer was this {7 ~- day 
of June, 2007 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Phillip 1. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Via United States mail 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Via United States mail 
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Carl J. Withroe 
